Handbook on European non-discrimination law
2018 edition
HANDBOOK
Handbook on European non-discrimination law – 2018 edition FRA/ECtHR
The manuscript for this handbook was completed in February 2018.
Updates will become available in future on the FRA website at fra.europa.eu and on the European
Court of Human Rights website under the Case-Law menu at echr.coe.int.
Photo credit (cover & inside): © iStockphoto
© European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2018
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights/Council of Europe copyright, permission must be sought directly
from the copyright holders.
Neither the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights nor any person acting on behalf of
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights is responsible for the use that might be made
of the following information.
This handbook was drafted in English. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes no
responsibility for the quality of the translations into other languages. The views expressed in this
Handbook do not bind the ECtHR. The Handbook refers to a selection of commentaries and manuals
on the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR takes no responsibility for their content,
nor does their inclusion on this list amount to any form of endorsement of these publications.
Further manuals on the Convention are listed on the internet pages of the ECtHR library:
www.echr.coe.int/Library.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018
CoE: ISBN 978-92-871-9851-8
FRA – print: ISBN 978-92-9491-909-0 doi:10.2811/58933 TK-07-17-108-EN-C
FRA – web: ISBN 978-92-9491-910-6 doi:10.2811/792676 TK-07-17-108-EN-N
Handbook on European
non-discrimination law
2018 edition

3
Foreword
In January 2010, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights decided to cooperate on the preparation of
a handbook on European case law concerning non-discrimination. We are now
pleased to present an updated version of this handbook, which contains updated
examples of relevant case law and an improved structure.
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union became legally binding. Furthermore, the treaty provides for EU
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. In this context, increased
knowledge of common principles developed by the Court of Justice of the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights have become essential for the proper
national implementation of a key aspect of European human rights law: the standards
on non-discrimination. Furthermore, the work of the FRA is anchored in the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development and committed to the principles of universality,
equality and leaving no one behind. In this context the handbook promotes SDG 5
(Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls), 10 (Reduce inequality
within and among countries) and 16 (Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies).
This handbook is designed to assist legal practitioners who are not specialised in the
field of non-discrimination law, serving as an introduction to key issues involved. It is
intended for lawyers, judges, prosecutors, social workers and persons who work with
national authorities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other bodies that
may be confronted with legal questions relating to issues of discrimination.
With the impressive body of case law developed by the European Court of Human
Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the non-discrimination
field, it seems useful to present an updated and accessible handbook intended
for legal practitioners – such as judges, prosecutors and lawyers, as well as lawenforcement officers – in the EU and Council of Europe member states and beyond.
In particular, those at the forefront of human rights protection need to be aware
of the non-discrimination principles, in order to be able to apply them effectively
in practice. It is the national level that brings non-discrimination provisions to life,
and it is here, on the ground, that the challenges become visible.
We would like to thank Dr. Magdalena Jankowska-Gilberg and Dr. Dagmara Rajska for
their contribution in drafting this updated handbook. We would also like to thank all
those who provided input and support throughout its preparation, in particular the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Council of Europe
Department of the European Social Charter. We are also grateful for the documentary
support provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Roderick Liddell Michael O’Flaherty
Registrar of the European Court
of Human Rights
Director of the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights

5
Contents
FOREWORD  .................................................................................................................... 3
ABBREVIATIONS  ........................................................................................................... 9
HOW TO USE THIS HANDBOOK  .................................................................................  11
1 INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW:
CONTEXT, EVOLUTION AND KEY PRINCIPLES  ....................................................  15
1.1. Context and background to European non-discrimination law  ............. 16
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 16
1.1.1. Council of Europe: development of non-discrimination law  ..... 18
Key point  ................................................................................................................. 18
1.1.2. European Union: development of non-discrimination law .......  20
Key points  ..............................................................................................................  20
1.1.3. European non-discrimination law and UN human rights
treaties  ............................................................................................... 24
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 24
1.2. Who receives protection under European non-discrimination law?  .... 27
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 27
1.3. Scope of the ECHR: Article 14 and Protocol No. 12  .................................  28
Key points  ..............................................................................................................  28
1.3.1. Rights covered by the ECHR  ..........................................................  29
1.3.2. Scope of ECHR rights  .......................................................................  30
1.3.3. Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR  ............................................................ 32
1.4. Scope of EU non-discrimination law  .......................................................... 34
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 34
2 DISCRIMINATION CATEGORIES  ............................................................................ 39
Key point  ................................................................................................................  42
2.1. Direct discrimination  .................................................................................... 43
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 43
2.1.1. Less favourable treatment  ............................................................  44
2.1.2. A comparator  ...................................................................................  44
2.1.3. Causation  ..........................................................................................  49
2.1.4. Discrimination by association  .........................................................  51
6
2.2. Indirect discrimination  ................................................................................. 53
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 53
2.2.1. A neutral rule, criterion or practice  ............................................... 54
2.2.2. Significantly more negative in its effects on a protected group  ... 56
2.2.3. A comparator  .................................................................................... 57
2.3. Multiple and intersectional discrimination  ............................................... 59
Key points  ............................................................................................................... 59
2.4. Harassment and instruction to discriminate  ...........................................  64
2.4.1. Harassment and instruction to discriminate under the EU
non-discrimination directives  .......................................................  64
Key point  ................................................................................................................  64
2.4.2. Harassment and instruction to discriminate under the
ECHR and ESC  .................................................................................... 67
2.5. Special or specific measures  ......................................................................  69
Key points  ..............................................................................................................  69
2.6. Hate crime  ...................................................................................................... 81
Key point  ................................................................................................................. 81
2.7. Hate speech  ..................................................................................................  86
Key point  ................................................................................................................  86
3 JUSTIFICATION FOR LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT UNDER
EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW  ........................................................... 91
3.1. Application of objective justification under ECHR  ..................................  92
Key points  ..............................................................................................................  92
3.2. Application of the objective justification under EU law  ........................  94
Key point  ................................................................................................................  94
3.3. Specific grounds of justification under EU law  ........................................  96
Key points  ..............................................................................................................  96
3.3.1. Genuine occupational requirement  ..............................................  97
3.3.2. Religious institutions  ..................................................................... 102
3.3.3. Exceptions on the basis of age  .................................................... 103
4 SELECTED AREAS OF PROTECTION  .................................................................... 109
Key point  ...............................................................................................................  112
4.1. Employment  ................................................................................................  113
4.2. Access to welfare and social security  ..................................................... 122
4.3. Education  ...................................................................................................... 129
7
4.4. Access to supply of goods and services, including housing  ................ 133
4.5. Access to justice  .......................................................................................... 139
4.6. The ‘personal’ sphere: private and family life, adoption, home
and marriage  ...............................................................................................  141
4.7. Political participation: freedom of expression, assembly and
association, and free elections  ................................................................. 148
4.8. Criminal law matters  ..................................................................................  151
5 PROTECTED GROUNDS  ........................................................................................ 155
Key points  ............................................................................................................. 160
5.1. Sex  ................................................................................................................. 162
5.2. Gender identity  ...........................................................................................  171
Key points  .............................................................................................................  171
5.3. Sexual orientation  ...................................................................................... 176
5.4. Disability ....................................................................................................... 182
5.5. Age  ................................................................................................................ 190
5.6. Race, ethnicity, colour and membership of a national minority  ......... 196
5.7. Nationality or national origin  ...................................................................  202
Key points  ............................................................................................................  202
5.8. Religion or belief  ......................................................................................... 210
5.9. Social origin, birth and property  .............................................................. 216
5.10. Language  ..................................................................................................... 218
5.11. Political or other opinion  .......................................................................... 222
5.12. ‘Other status’  ..............................................................................................  224
6 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW  .................................. 229
Key points  ............................................................................................................  230
6.1. Shifting the burden of proof  ..................................................................... 231
6.2. Circumstances irrelevant for the finding of discrimination  ................  239
6.3. Role of statistics and other data  .............................................................  242
6.4. Enforcement of non-discrimination law  ................................................  248
Key points  ............................................................................................................  248
CASE LAW  .................................................................................................................  253
INDEX  .........................................................................................................................  275
LIST OF LEGAL TEXTS  ..............................................................................................  293
NOTE ON CITATION  ..................................................................................................  295

9
Abbreviations
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CFI Court of First Instance
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union (prior to December 2009,
European Court of Justice)
CoE Council of Europe
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CST European Union Civil Service Tribunal
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights (full name: European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms)
ECSR European Committee of Social Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ESC European Social Charter
EU European Union
EU Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
HRC Human Rights Committee
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation
TCN Third-Country National
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations

11
How to use this handbook
This handbook provides an overview of key aspects of non-discrimination law in
Europe, with specific reference to the prohibition of discrimination provided in the
Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as interpreted
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the law of the European
Union, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The handbook acknowledges that the principle of non-discrimination is very
important because it influences the enjoyment of all other human rights. The aim
of non-discrimination law is to allow all individuals an equal and fair prospect to
access opportunities available in a society.
The handbook is designed to assist legal practitioners who are not specialised
in the field of non-discrimination law, serving as an introduction to key issues
involved. It is intended for lawyers, judges, prosecutors, social workers, as
well as for persons who work with national authorities, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and other bodies that deal with legal questions relating to
issues of discrimination. The handbook may also be useful for legal research or
public advocacy purposes. It is designed to permit practitioners to refer directly
to specific sections/topics as required; it is not necessary to read the handbook
as a whole.
It is a point of reference on European non-discrimination law, explaining how
each issue is regulated under EU law as well as under the ECHR. Where relevant,
there are also references to the European Social Charter (ESC), other Council of
Europe (CoE) instruments and international treaties concluded under the auspices
of the United Nations (UN) relating to non-discrimination.
The ECHR law is described mainly through selected case law of the ECtHR. The
law stemming from the EU law is presented through legislative measures (nondiscrimination directives), relevant provisions of the EU treaties, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) and the jurisprudence
of the CJEU.
12
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
The case law described or cited in this handbook provides examples of an
important body of both ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence. The handbook covers, as far
as possible, given its limited scope and introductory nature, legal developments
until April 2017, including later developments where possible. The preference
was given for more recent case law, although older leading cases are mentioned
where necessary. To avoid confusion, the handbook refers to the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) as CJEU, even for decisions issued before December 2009. Since
many cases involve several different aspects covered in the handbook, the choice
of section under which a given case is discussed is subjective.
Each chapter covers a distinct subject, while cross-references to other topics and
chapters provide a fuller understanding of the applicable legal framework and
relevant case law. Each chapter starts with a table outlining the issues addressed
in that chapter. The table also specifies the applicable legal provisions under the
two separate European systems and lists relevant CJEU and ECtHR case law. The
chapter then presents the legal provisions under each system relating to the topic
covered. This allows the reader to see where the two legal systems converge
and where they differ. Practitioners in non-European Union (EU) states that are
member states of the CoE, and thereby parties to the ECHR, can access the
information relevant to their own country by going straight to the CoE Sections.
Practitioners in EU Member States will need to use both sections as those states
are bound by both legal orders.
In addition, key points are presented at the beginning of each section.
The handbook begins with a brief exploration of the two legal systems as
established by CoE and EU law. Chapter 1 explains the context and background
to European non-discrimination law and outlines the personal and material scope
of both systems.
Chapter 2 outlines when differences in treatment are considered discriminatory.
The focus is on discrimination categories (such as direct and indirect
discrimination, harassment or instruction to discriminate, hate crime and hate
speech). Chapter 3 then covers possible justifications for differential treatment.
In Chapter 4, the principle of non-discrimination is presented from the perspective
of various areas of life including, among others, employment, access to welfare
and social security, education, private and family life.
13
How to use this handbook
Chapter 5 analyses the discrimination grounds such as sex, gender identity, sexual
orientation, disability, age, race, ethnic origin, national origin and religion or belief.
Chapter 6 examines the procedural issues in non-discrimination law. Special
attention has been given to the shift in the burden of proof. Other evidential
questions, such as the role of statistics and other data, have also been explained.
The electronic version of the handbook contains hyperlinks to the case law
and EU legislation. Hyperlinks to EU law sources direct the reader to eur-lex
overview pages, from where one can open the case or legislation in any available
EU language. The ECtHR and ESC case law is hyperlinked to the Hudoc database,
which is available in English and French. For some cases, translations into other
languages are available.

15
EU Issues covered CoE
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 20 (equality before the law)
and 21 (non-discrimination)
TEU, Art. 2, 3 (3), 9
TFEU, Art. 10
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC)
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC)
CJEU, C-571/10, Kamberaj v. IPES
[GC], 2012
CJEU, C-236/09, Association
Belge des Consommateurs
Test-Achats ASBL v. Conseil des
ministres [GC], 2011
Equality
and nondiscrimination
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination), Protocol No. 12,
Art. 1 (general prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC, Art. E, Protocol Providing
for a System of Collective
Complaints (Revised)
Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities
Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence
(Istanbul Convention)
Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings
Convention on Access to Official
Documents
Protocol to the Convention on
Cybercrime
Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine
ECtHR, Khamtokhu and
Aksenchik v. Russia [GC],
Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 2017
ECtHR, Pichkur v. Ukraine,
No. 10441/06, 2013
ECtHR, Savez crkava “Riječ
života” and Others v. Croatia,
No. 7798/08, 2010
1
Introduction to European
non-discrimination law:
context, evolution and
key principles
16
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
TFEU, Art. 18
Directive on the right to family
reunification (2003/86/EC)
Directive on long-term legally
resident third country nationals
(2003/109/EC)
Nondiscrimination
based on
nationality and
immigration
status
This introductory chapter outlines the origins of non-discrimination law in Europe.
From the outset, it is important to note that national judges and prosecutors are
required to apply the guarantees provided for under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and those under the EU non-discrimination directives,
irrespective of whether a party to the proceedings invokes them. This is
consequent to the legal principles established in each respective system, for
example, the direct effect of Union law in the EU Member States and the direct
applicability afforded to the ECHR,1
which means that it must be complied with
in all EU and Council of Europe (CoE) Member States.
1.1. Context and background to European
non-discrimination law
Key points
• Protection against discrimination in Europe can be found within both EU and Council of
Europe law.
• Both systems operate separately but they can influence each other through their
case law.
The term ‘European non-discrimination law’ suggests that a single Europe-wide
system of rules relating to non-discrimination exists. It is, however, made up
of a variety of sources. This handbook draws mainly from the law of the CoE
(focusing on the ECHR) and the EU. These two systems have different origins,
structures and objectives.
1 See CJEU, C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [GC], 19 January 2010.
17
Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Although both systems operate separately, there are numerous links between
them. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) refers to ECHR2 and the
European Social Charter (ESC)3
as providing guidance for the interpretation of EU
law. Both acts are also referred to in the EU treaty framework: Article 6 (3) of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly acknowledges the ECHR as a source of
inspiration for the development of fundamental rights in the EU; Article 52 (3) of
the EU Charter provides that the meaning and scope of corresponding Charter
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR4
(although EU law may
provide more extensive protection). Article 151 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) and the preamble to the EU Charter mention
the European Social Charter. In their case law, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) refer to
EU legislation and the CJEU case law.5
EU law and the ECHR are closely connected. All EU Member States have joined
the ECHR and the CJEU looks to the ECHR for inspiration when determining the
scope of human rights protection under EU law. The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights also reflects (though is not limited to) the range of rights in the ECHR.
Consequently, EU law is largely consistent with the ECHR. However, if an individual
wishes to make a complaint about the EU and its failure to guarantee human
rights, they are not entitled to take the EU, as such, before the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Instead, they must either: make a complaint before the
national courts, which can then refer the case to the CJEU through the preliminary
reference procedure; or complain about the EU indirectly before the ECtHR while
bringing action against a Member State.
The Lisbon Treaty contains a provision mandating the EU to join the ECHR as
a party in its own right and Protocol 14 to the ECHR amends it to allow this
to happen. It is not yet clear when this would happen and what the future
relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR would be.
2 For example, see CJEU, C-510/11 P, Kone Oyj and Others v. European Commission,
24 October 2013, paras. 20-22.
3 For example, see CJEU, Joined cases C-395/08 and C-396/08, Istituto nazionale della previdenza
sociale (INPS) v. Tiziana Bruno and Massimo Pettini and Daniela Lotti and Clara Matteucci,
10 June 2010, paras. 31-32.
4 See also Art. 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Preamble.
5 For example, see ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark, No. 38590/10 [GC], 24 May 2016.
18
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
1.1.1. Council of Europe: development of nondiscrimination law
Key point
• The principle of non-discrimination is enshrined in a number of Council of Europe
treaties.
The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organisation that originally came
together after the Second World War to promote, among other things, the rule
of law, democracy, human rights and social development (see Preamble and
Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe). In 1950, CoE member states
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, calling on the ECHR to help achieve these aims. The ECHR was the
first of the modern human rights treaties drawing from the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It sets out a legally binding obligation
for its members to guarantee a list of human rights to everyone within their
jurisdiction, not just citizens. The implementation of the ECHR is reviewed by the
ECtHR, which hears cases brought against member states. The Council of Europe
currently has 47 members and any state wishing to join must accede to the ECHR.
The prohibition of discrimination is established in Article 14 of the ECHR, which
guarantees equal treatment in the enjoyment of the other rights set out in the
Convention. Protocol 12 (2000) to the ECHR, not yet ratified by all EU Member
States,6 expands the scope of the prohibition of discrimination to equal treatment
in the enjoyment of any right, including rights under national law.
The ESC (revised)7
is the CoE’s other main human rights treaty. Unlike the 1961
Charter,8 it contains Article E, an explicit provision prohibiting discrimination. Its
wording is very similar to that of Article 14 of the ECHR. It provides protection
from discrimination through a horizontal clause covering grounds such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or
social origin, health association with a national minority, birth or ‘other status’.
6 For the number of EU Member States that ratified Protocol 12, see Chart of signatures and
ratifications of Treaty 177.
7 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (revised), CETS No. 163, 3 May 1996.
8 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, CETS No. 35, 18 October 1961.
19
Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
The ECSR is responsible for monitoring the compliance with the ESC. It stressed
that the “insertion of Article E into a separate Article in the Revised Charter
indicates the heightened importance the drafters paid to the principle of nondiscrimination with respect to the achievement of the various substantive rights
contained therein.”9 Accordingly, the revised ESC does not allow discrimination on
any of the grounds listed in this article (which is a non-exhaustive list, similarly to
Article 14 of the ECHR) in respect of any of the rights contained in the instrument.
Under the ESC, the additional protocol provides for a system of collective
complaints. It entitles non-governmental organisations (NGOs) enjoying
participatory status with the Council of Europe to lodge collective complaints
against a state which has ratified it, for non-compliance with the ESC.
The principle of non-discrimination is a governing principle in a number of other
Council of Europe instruments, even if these are not a primary focus of this
handbook. 10 For example, protection against discrimination is also provided
in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,11 the
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings12 and the Convention
on Access to Official Documents.13 The Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime14
also calls for protection against discrimination. Furthermore, the Convention
on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
(Istanbul Convention) condemns all forms of discrimination against women.15 In
its preamble, the Istanbul Convention recognises that violence against women
is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between women and
men, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by
9 ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002,
4 November 2003.
10 The texts of all Council of Europe treaties are available at the Council of Europe Treaty Office
webpage.
11 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM),
CETS No. 157, 1995. See Art. 4, 6 (2) and 9.
12 Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS No. 197,
2005. See Art. 2 (1).
13 Council of Europe, Convention on Access to Official Documents, CETS No. 205, 2009. See
Art. 2 (1).
14 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems,
ETS 189. See Art. 3 (1).
15 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence, CETS No. 210, 2011. See Art. 4.
20
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
men and prevented the full advancement of women.16 The Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine prohibits any form of discrimination against a person on
the grounds of his or her genetic heritage.17 In addition, the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 18 a human rights body of the Council of
Europe, monitors problems of racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance and
racial discrimination.19
The principle of non-discrimination has been influential in shaping CoE standards
and is seen as a fundamental right that needs to be protected.
1.1.2. European Union: development of nondiscrimination law
Key points
• EU non-discrimination law comprises a variety of legal acts promoting equality in
different areas of life.
• EU institutions are legally bound to observe provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, including prohibition of discrimination. EU Member States must also observe
the Charter when acting within the scope of EU law.
The original treaties of the European communities did not contain any reference
to human rights or their protection. The creation of an area of free trade in
Europe was not expected to have any impact on human rights. However, as
cases began to appear before the CJEU alleging human rights breaches caused
by Community Law, the CJEU developed a body of judge-made laws, known
as the ‘general principles’ of Community Law. According to the CJEU, these
general principles would reflect the content of human rights protection found
16 The European Commission proposed that the EU signs the Istanbul Convention; see Proposal for
a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,
COM (2016) 109 final, Brussels, 4 March 2016.
17 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, CETS No. 164, 1997. See Art. 11.
18 The first Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe set up ECRI in 1993,
composed of 47 independent experts.
19 See ECRI’s webpage.
21
Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
in national constitutions and human rights treaties, in particular the ECHR.20 The
CJEU stated that it would ensure the compliance of Community Law with these
principles. With subsequent revisions of the treaties, human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights became the
Union’s founding values, embedded in its treaties and mainstreamed into all its
policies and programmes.
The EU anti-discrimination law was originally limited to a provision prohibiting
discrimination based on sex in employment. The relevant measures aimed to
prevent EU Member States from gaining a competitive advantage by offering
lower rates of pay or less favourable working conditions to women. The body of
anti-discrimination law evolved considerably, to include areas such as pensions,
pregnancy and statutory social security regimes. However, until 2000, nondiscrimination law in the EU only applied to employment and social security, and
only covered the grounds of sex. In addition, the prohibition of non-discrimination
on the basis of nationality is a fundamental principle laid out in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (Articles 18 and 45 of the TFEU) and its predecessors.
When the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999, the EU gained the
ability to take action to combat discrimination on a wide range of grounds. This
competence led to the introduction of new equality directives, as well as the
revision of the existing provisions on sex equality. There is now a considerable
body of anti-discrimination law in the EU.
According to Article 2 of the TEU, the non-discrimination principle is one of the
fundamental values of the Union. Article 10 of the TFEU requires the EU to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age
or sexual orientation, when defining and implementing its policies and activities.
In 2000, two directives were adopted: the Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC)21 prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
religion or belief, age and disability, in the area of employment; and the Racial
20 This was first established in cases such as CJEU, Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm,
12 November 1969; CJEU, Case 11/70. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 17 December 1970; CJEU, Case 4/73, J. Nold,
Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission of the European Communities, 14 May 1974;
and regarding the principle of non-discrimination: CJEU, C-149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société
anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, 5 June 1978.
21 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, pp. 16–22.
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Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)22 introduced prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of race or ethnicity in the context of employment, but also in accessing
the welfare system and social security, as well as goods and services. This
was a significant expansion of the scope of non-discrimination law under
EU law. It recognised that to allow individuals to reach their full potential in the
employment market, it is also essential to guarantee them equal access to areas
such as health, education and housing. In 2004, the Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC)23 extended the scope of sex discrimination to the area
of goods and services. However, protection on the grounds of sex does not quite
match the scope of protection under the Racial Equality Directive. The so-called
Gender Equality Directive (recast) (2006/54/EC)24 guarantees equal treatment
only in relation to social security, and not to the broader welfare system, such
as social protection and access to healthcare and education.
Although sexual orientation, religious belief, disability and age are only protected
grounds in the context of employment, a proposal to extend protection to
other areas, such as accessing goods and services (known as the ‘Horizontal
Directive’),25 is currently being debated in EU institutions.
In recognising that its policies could have an impact on human rights and in
an effort to make citizens feel ‘closer’ to the EU, the EU and its Member States
proclaimed the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. The EU Charter contains
a list of human rights, inspired by the rights contained in the constitutions of
the Member States, the ECHR and universal human rights treaties such as the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Under the title ‘Equality’ (Articles 20 to
26), the EU Charter emphasises the importance of the principle of equal treatment
in the EU legal order.
22 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, pp. 22–26.
23 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services,
OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, pp. 37–43.
24 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women
in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, pp. 23–36.
25 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM/2008/0426
final.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,26 as adopted in 2000, was merely a nonbinding ‘declaration’. However, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in
2009, it altered the status of the Charter to make it a legally binding document
with the same legal value as the EU treaties. As a result, EU institutions are bound
to comply with the Charter, as are EU Member States but only when implementing
EU law (Article 51 of the EU Charter). Article 21 of the EU Charter contains
a prohibition of discrimination on various grounds. This means that individuals
can complain about EU legislation or national legislation that implements EU law,
if they feel the Charter has not been respected. National courts can seek guidance
for the correct interpretation of EU law from the CJEU through the preliminary
reference procedure under Article 267 of the TFEU.
The establishment of new bodies within the EU, such as the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)27 or the European Institute for Gender
Equality (EIGE),28 have accompanied these developments to promote
fundamental rights and equality. Besides that, the European Network of Equality
Bodies (Equinet)29 promotes equality in Europe by supporting and enabling
the work of national equality bodies, bringing together 46 organisations from
34 European countries. The EU equal treatment legislation requires Member States
to set up an equality body to provide independent assistance to victims of
discrimination. Most Member States have implemented this requirement, either
by designating an existing institution or by setting up a new body to carry out
the tasks assigned by the new legislation. However, no specific guidelines exist
for Member States on how these bodies should operate. So far, European antidiscrimination law only requires that equality bodies are set up in the fields of
race, ethnic origin and gender. Many countries have bodies that deal with other
grounds of discrimination as well.
26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, pp. 389–405.
27 See FRA’s website.
28 See EIGE’s website.
29 See Equinet’s website.
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1.1.3. European non-discrimination law and
UN human rights treaties
Key points
• European human rights law is influenced by the UN human rights treaties.
• The European Union has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRDP), the provisions of which are an integral part of the Union’s legal
order.
Naturally, human rights protection mechanisms are not limited to Europe. As
well as other regional mechanisms in the Americas, Africa and the Middle East,
the United Nations (UN) created a significant body of international human rights
law. All EU Member States are party to the following UN human rights treaties, all
of which contain a prohibition on discrimination: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),30 the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),31 the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),32 the Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),33 the Convention Against Torture,34
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).35 All these human rights
treaties recognise protection against discrimination in the provision, protection
and promotion of rights. EU legislation, including the equality directives, refers
to various international agreements, including the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, United Nations
30 United Nations (UN), General Assembly (GA) (1966), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) vol. 999, p. 171.
31 UN, GA (1966), International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
16 December 1966, UNTS vol. 993, p. 3.
32 UN, GA (1966), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), 16 December 1966, UNTS vol. 660, p. 195.
33 UN, GA (1966), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
18 December 1979, UNTS vol. 1249, p. 13.
34 UN, GA (1984), Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, UNTS vol. 1465, p. 85.
35 UN, GA (1989), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 1989, UNTS vol. 1577,
p. 3. In addition most of the Member States are also party to the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (UN Doc. A/61/488,
20 December 2006); however, none are yet party to the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (UN Doc. A/
RES/45/158, 1 July 2003).
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination.36 References to UN treaties can also be found in the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR. The ECtHR emphasised that the ECHR cannot be interpreted in
a vacuum, but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of
international law. One should take into account any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties, in particular the rules
concerning the international protection of human rights.37
Traditionally, only states can become members of human rights treaties. However,
as states cooperate more through international organisations – to which they
delegate significant powers and responsibilities – there is a pressing need to make
sure that these organisations also commit themselves to give effect to the human
rights obligations of their member states. The 2006 Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 38 is the first UN-level human rights treaty that
is open to membership by regional integration organisations, and which the EU
ratified in December 2010.39 In 2015, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities conducted its first review to determine how the EU has implemented
its obligations.40 In its Concluding observations, the Committee expressed its
concern that the EU directives, the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43), the Gender
Goods and Services Directive (2004/113) and the Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54) failed to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of
disability and to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities
in the areas of social protection, health care, rehabilitation, education and the
provision of goods and services, such as housing, transport and insurance.41 It
recommended that the EU extend protection against discrimination to persons
with disabilities by adoption of the proposed horizontal directive on equal
treatment.42
36 For example, see recital 4 of Directive 2000/78, recital 3 of Directive 2000/43.
37 ECtHR, Harroudj v. France, No. 43631/09, 4 October 2012, para. 42. See for example ECtHR,
Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 24 January 2017 referring
to the CEDAW; ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98,
6 July 2005 referring to the ICERD.
38 UN Doc. A/61/611, 13 December 2006. All Member States except Ireland ratified the CRPD.
39 For the EU the CRPD entered into force on 22 January 2011.
40 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2015), Concluding observations on
the initial report of the European Union, CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, 2 October 2015.
41 Ibid., para. 18.
42 Ibid., para. 19.
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The CRPD contains an extensive list of rights for persons with disabilities,
aimed at securing equality in the enjoyment of their rights, as well as imposing
a range of obligations on the state to undertake positive measures. According
to Article 216 (2) of the TFEU, international agreements concluded by the EU are
binding to the Union and the Member States, and are an integral part of Union law.
As the EU is party to the CRPD, when applying EU law, EU institutions and Member
States have to comply with the convention. In addition, individual Member States
have acceded to the CRPD in their own right, which imposes obligations upon
them directly. The CRPD became a reference point for interpreting both EU and
ECtHR law relating to discrimination on the basis of disability.43 In 2013, the
CJEU applied the definition in accordance with the concept of ‘disability’ used
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The
CJEU stated that “Directive 2000/78 must, as far as possible, be interpreted in
a manner consistent with the Convention.”44
On 11 May 2017, the Council of the EU adopted two decisions on the signing of the
Istanbul Convention by the EU, covering judicial cooperation in criminal matters
and asylum and non-refoulement. The EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers
and Gender Equality, Věra Jourová, signed the Istanbul Convention on behalf of
the European Union on 13 June 2017. The decision on signing is the first step in the
process of the EU joining the Convention. Following the official signing, accession
requires the adoption of the decisions on the conclusion of the Convention. These
decisions will need the consent of the European Parliament.
43 CJEU, C-312/11, European Commission v. Italian Republic, 4 July 2013; CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v.
A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community School [GC],
18 March 2014; CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014; CJEU,
C-395/15, Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, 1 December 2016; CJEU, C-406/15,
Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen
kontrol, 9 March 2017.
44 CJEU, Joined cases C-335/11 and C-33711, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk
almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, 11 April 2013.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
1.2. Who receives protection under
European non-discrimination law?
Key points
• The ECHR protects all individuals within the jurisdiction of its 47 States Parties.
• Under EU secondary law, the protection is somewhat limited.
A preliminary point should be made on the issue of the beneficiaries of protection
under EU law and the ECHR. Under the ECHR, protection is guaranteed to all those
within the jurisdiction of a member state, whether they are citizens or not, and
even beyond the national territory to those areas under the effective control of
the state (such as occupied territories).45 However, as discussed in Section 5.7,
the case law of the ECHR shows that a state may consider nationals and nonnationals to be in distinct situations (and consequently treat them differently
under certain circumstances).
Under EU law, Article 18 of the TFEU prohibits 'any discrimination on grounds of
nationality' so that all nationals and EU citizens could be treated equally within
the scope of the Treaties. The aim of Article 18 was to ensure that the principle of
equal treatment was being upheld, so as to allow the free movement of persons.
This is because the free movement of workers (Article 45) is one of the most
important rights provided to individuals within the European Union. Article 18 is
to be applied in instances where no other specific rights of non-discrimination
exist, and it guarantees the equal treatment of all residents, provided that the
situation is governed by EU law.
Although Articles 20 and 21 of the EU Charter are broader, under EU secondary
law, the personal scope of the protection is limited. Third-country nationals
(TCNs) – citizens of a state that is not a member of the EU – are not protected
against unfavourable treatment based on nationality under the non-discrimination
Directives.46 Both the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality
Directive state that they do not create any right to equal treatment for TCNs
45 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para. 138;
ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey [GC], No. 15318/89, 18 December 1996, para. 52; ECtHR, Mozer v. the
Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], No. 11138/10, 23 February 2016, para. 101.
46 See Art. 3 (2) of both Directive 2000/43/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC.
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in relation to conditions of entry and residence47 and in relation to access to
employment and occupation.48 They also state that they do not cover ‘any
treatment which arises from the legal status of third-country nationals’.49
However, apart from those exceptions, prohibition of direct or indirect
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, as regards the areas covered
by the Directives, also applies to TCNs. The Gender Equality Directive (recast),
and Gender Goods and Services Directive do not exclude protection for TCNs.
Furthermore, TCNs will enjoy a right to equal treatment in broadly the same areas
covered by the non-discrimination directives where they qualify as ‘long-term
residents’, which requires a period of five years of lawful residence.50 They may
also rely on protection arising from gender equality provisions. In addition, the
Family Reunification Directive allows for TCNs resident in a Member State to be
joined by family members in certain conditions.51 They may be protected in certain
areas (for instance in employment) under agreements with third countries or
under other instruments of EU law, such as Directive 2003/109 EC on long-term
legally resident third-country nationals.
Under EU law, these rules do not prevent Member States from introducing more
favourable conditions under their own national law. In this respect, the ECHR
places obligations on Member States regarding TCNs, which in some cases go
beyond the requirements of EU law.
1.3. Scope of the ECHR: Article 14 and
Protocol No. 12
Key points
• Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination only in relation to the exercise of
another right guaranteed by the Convention.
• Under Protocol No. 12, the prohibition of discrimination became a free-standing right.
47 Art. 3 (2) of both Directive 2000/43/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC.
48 Directive 2000/43/EC, Recital 13 and Directive 2000/78/EC, Recital 12.
49 Art. 3 (2) of both Directive 2000/43/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC.
50 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents, OJ L 16, 23.01.2004, p. 44, Art. 11 (1).
51 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Article 14 guarantees equality in ‘the enjoyment of […] [the] rights and freedoms’
set out in the ECHR. The ECtHR will therefore not be competent to examine
complaints of discrimination unless they fall within the ambit of one of the rights
protected by the ECHR.
Whenever the ECtHR considers an alleged violation of Article 14, this is always
done in conjunction with a substantive right. An applicant will often allege
a violation of a substantive right, and in addition, a violation of a substantive
right in conjunction with Article 14. That is, that the interference with their rights
was, in addition to failing to meet the standards required in the substantive right,
also discriminatory, in that those in a comparable situation did not face a similar
disadvantage. As noted in Chapter 4, where the ECtHR finds a violation of the
substantive right, it will not go on to consider the complaint of discrimination,
where it considers that this will involve an examination of essentially the same
complaint.
This section will first briefly set out the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and then
explain how the ECtHR has interpreted the scope of the ECHR for the purposes
of applying Article 14.
1.3.1. Rights covered by the ECHR
Since Article 14 is wholly dependent on discrimination based on one of the
substantive rights guaranteed in the ECHR, it is necessary to gain an appreciation
of the rights covered by this Convention. The ECHR contains a list of rights,
predominantly characterised as ‘civil and political’; however, it also protects
certain rights, which might be considered ‘economic and social’.
The substantive rights contained within the ECHR cover a number of areas: for
example, the right to life, the right to respect for private and family life and
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Wherever an issue of discrimination relates to one of the areas covered by an
ECHR right, the ECtHR will consider complaints alleging a violation of Article 14.
This is an extremely significant distinction between EU law and the ECHR, in
that the ECHR provides protection from discrimination over issues that EU nondiscrimination law does not regulate. Although the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights obliges the EU not to interfere with human rights in the measures it
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
takes (including a prohibition of discrimination), the Charter only applies to the
Member States when they are applying EU law.
Since the introduction of the non-discrimination directives and the extension of
protection to accessing goods and services and the welfare system, the difference
in scope between the protection offered under the ECHR and the directives has
diminished. Nonetheless, particular areas where the ECHR provides protection
over and above EU law can be identified. These will be examined below.
1.3.2. Scope of ECHR rights
When applying Article 14, the ECtHR has adopted a wide interpretation of the
scope of ECHR rights:
• first, the ECtHR has made clear that it may examine claims under Article 14
taken in conjunction with a substantive right, even if there has been no
violation of the substantive right of itself;52
• second, it has held that it was possible for a complaint of discrimination to
fall within the scope of a particular right, even if the issue in question did
not relate to a specific entitlement granted by the ECHR. In such cases, it
was sufficient that the facts of the case broadly relate to issues that are
protected under the ECHR.53
Example: In Zarb Adami v. Malta,
54 the applicant complained of sex
discrimination due to the disproportionately high number of men called
for jury service. The ECtHR found that, although ‘normal civic obligations’
were not covered by the prohibition of ‘forced or compulsory labour’ under
Article 4 (put otherwise, that the ECHR does not confer a right to be free
from performing jury service), the facts of the case did fall within the scope
of the right. ‘Normal civic obligations’ could become ‘abnormal’ where they
were applied in a discriminatory manner.
52 See, for example, ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], No. 31871/96, 8 July 2003.
53 See, for example, ECtHR, A.H. and Others v. Russia, No. 6033/13 and 15 other applications,
17 January 2017, para. 380f.
54 ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta, No. 17209/02, 20 June 2006.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Example: In Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia,55 two men serving life
sentences in Russia complained of discriminatory treatment between them
and other convicts who were not eligible for a life sentence under national
law, namely women of all ages and men who were under 18 years when
committing the offence or over 65 years at the date of conviction. They
alleged a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5. The ECtHR
found that Article 5 of the Convention did not preclude the imposition of
life imprisonment where such punishment was prescribed by national law.
Nevertheless, the prohibition of discrimination enshrined by Article 14
extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
states in accordance with the Convention and its Protocols. It also applies
to additional rights voluntarily provided by the state, which fall within the
general scope of the Convention. The ECtHR found that the difference in
treatment between the applicants and juvenile offenders was justified by
their mental and emotional immaturity, and their capacity for rehabilitation
and reformation; the difference of treatment with the offenders aged over
65 years was justified by the fact that the eligibility for release on parole
after 25 years would otherwise be illusory in their case. For the difference
in treatment on account of sex, on the basis of the existing international
instruments on the situation and needs of women and the statistics
submitted by the government, the Court concluded that there was a public
interest justifying the position under national law that women were ineligible
for the life sentence. It further appeared difficult to criticise the Russian
legislature for having established, in a way that reflected the evolution of
society in that sphere, the exemption of certain groups of offenders from
life imprisonment. Such an exemption represented, all things considered,
social progress in penological matters. In the absence of common ground
regarding the imposition of life imprisonment, the Russian authorities had not
overstepped their margin of appreciation. There had thus been no violation
of the Convention.
Example: The case of A.H. and Other v. Russia56 concerns an allegedly
discriminatory ban on the adoption of Russian children by US nationals. The
ECtHR reiterated that the right to adopt was not guaranteed by the ECHR.
However, where a state had gone beyond its obligations under Article 8 and
created such a right in its domestic law, it could not, in applying that right, take
55 ECtHR, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 24 January 2017,
para. 58.
56 ECtHR, A.H. and Others v. Russia, No. 6033/13 and 15 other applications, 17 January 2017.
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discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14. The applicants’ right
to apply for adoption, and to have their applications considered fairly, fell within
the general scope of private life under Article 8.57
Example: In Pichkur v. Ukraine,
58 the payment of the applicant’s pension was
terminated on the ground that he resided permanently abroad. He complained
that the deprivation of his pension on the ground of his place of residence had
been discriminatory. The ECtHR stressed that if a state had legislation in force
providing for the payment of a welfare benefit as of right, that legislation had
to be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for those satisfying its requirements. Consequently,
although the said provision did not include the right to receive a social-security
payment, if a state decided to create a benefits scheme, it had to do so in
a manner which was compatible with Article 14.
Similarly, for the purpose of applying Article 14, the ECtHR has found in many
other cases that any form of state benefit which becomes payable will fall under
the scope of either Article 1 of Protocol No. 159 (because it is deemed to be
property)60 or Article 8 (because it affects the family or private life).61
1.3.3. Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR
Protocol No. 12 prohibits discrimination in relation to the ‘enjoyment of any right
set forth by law’ and ‘by any public authority’ and is thus greater in scope than
Article 14, which relates only to the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In the
first case examined by the ECtHR under Protocol No. 12, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina62 (discussed in Section 5.6), the Court confirmed that Article 1
57 Ibid., para. 385.
58 ECtHR, Pichkur v. Ukraine, No. 10441/06, 7 November 2013.
59 An explanation as to the scope of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR can be found in: A. Grgić,
Z. Mataga, M. Longar and A. Vilfan (2007), ‘The right to property under the ECHR’, Human
Rights Handbook, No. 10.
60 For example, ECtHR, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01,
12 April 2006 (pension payments and invalidity benefits); ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC],
No. 55707/00, 18 February 2009 (pension payments); ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France,
No. 40892/98, 30 September 2003 (disability benefit); ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria,
No. 17371/90, 16 September 1996 (unemployment benefit).
61 For example, ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary, No. 44399/05, 31 March 2009 (a social security
payment for the purposes of supporting families with children).
62 ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06,
22 December 2009.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
of Protocol No. 12 introduced a general prohibition of discrimination. It further
confirmed that the notions of discrimination prohibited by both Article 14 and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 were to be interpreted in the same manner.63
The commentary provided on the meaning of these terms in the Explanatory
Report of Protocol No. 12 states that Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 relates to
discrimination:
(i) in the enjoyment of any right specifically granted to an individual under
national law;
(ii) in the enjoyment of a right which may be inferred from a clear obligation
of a public authority under national law, that is, where a public authority is
under an obligation under national law to behave in a particular manner;
(iii) by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power (for example,
granting certain subsidies);
(iv) by any other act or omission by a public authority (for example, the behaviour of law enforcement officers when controlling a riot).64
Example: In Savez crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia,
65 the
applicants (three Reformist churches) complained that, unlike other religious
communities, they were denied certain privileges, such as the right to provide
religious education in schools and nurseries or to have religious marriages
recognised by the state, as the domestic authorities refused to conclude an
agreement with them regulating their legal status. The applicant churches’
complaint in this respect therefore did not concern “rights specifically granted
to them under national law”, as it was in the state’s discretion to grant
such privileges. The ECtHR concluded that the criteria to grant privileged
status were not applied on an equal basis to all religious communities. The
Court held that this difference in treatment did not have an objective and
reasonable justification and was in violation of Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 9 of the ECHR. Relying on the Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 12,
it considered that the applicants’ complaint fell within the third category
specified by the Explanatory Report, as it concerned alleged discrimination
63 Compare also: ECtHR, Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 41939/07, 9 June 2016.
64 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ETS No. 177), Explanatory Report, para. 22.
65 ECtHR, Savez crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia, No. 7798/08, 9 December 2010.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
“by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power”. However, it
was not necessary to examine the complaint under that Protocol as the ECtHR
had already found a violation of Article 14.
The Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 12 further states that, while that Protocol
principally protects individuals against discrimination from the state, it will also
apply to those relationships between private persons, which should normally
be regulated by the state. These may include, ‘for example, arbitrary denial of
access to work, access to restaurants, or to services which private persons may
make available to the public such as medical care or utilities such as water and
electricity’.66 Broadly speaking, Protocol No. 12 will prohibit discrimination outside
purely personal contexts, where individuals exercise functions placing them in
a position to decide on how publicly available goods and services are offered.
1.4. Scope of EU non-discrimination law
Key points
• Under EU non-discrimination law, the prohibition on discrimination is free-standing,
but it is limited to specific areas.
• Article 20 of the EU Charter confirms that everyone is equal before the law; Article 21
prohibits any discrimination on an open list of grounds.
• The principle of non-discrimination can only be applied, where the matter falls within
the scope of EU law.
• Protection under EU non-discrimination directives has a varied scope:
0 protection on the grounds of race and ethnicity is the widest, covering access to
employment, welfare systems, and goods and services;
0 sex discrimination is prohibited in the context of access to employment, social
security (which is more limited than the broader welfare system), and goods and
services;
0 sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, and age are protected grounds only
in the context of access to employment.
66 Ibid., para. 28.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Unlike Article 14 of the ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination in Article 21 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is a freestanding right applying to situations
that do not need to be covered by any other Charter provision. It prohibits
discrimination on ‘any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual
orientation’. Article 20 of the EU Charter provides that everyone is equal before
the law.
It should be noted that the EU Charter makes a distinction between “equality
before the law” under Article 20 and non-discrimination under Article 21.67
Article 20 of the Charter corresponds to a principle, which is included in all
European constitutions and has also been recognised by the Court of Justice
as a basic principle of Community law.68 This principle requires states and
EU institutions to comply with the requirements of formal equality (treating like
cases in a like manner) in framing and implementing EU law. Article 21 embeds
non-discrimination into the framework of substantive norms. This is accompanied
by a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds.
According to the CJEU, the principle of equal treatment is a general principle
of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of
non-discrimination, laid down in Article 21 (1) of the Charter, is a particular
expression.69
Example: In Glatzel,
70 the CJEU had to determine whether the EU legislation
in question (more severe requirements of visual acuity for drivers of heavy
goods vehicles, but not for other drivers) was compatible with Articles 20,
21 (1) and 26 of the EU Charter.
67 See, for example, FRA (2012), FRA Opinion on proposed EU regulation on property
consequences of registered partnerships, FRA Opinion, 1/2012, 31 May 2012, which looks at
‘Discrimination (Article 21 of the Charter)’ (Section 2.1) and ‘Equality before the law (Article 20
of the Charter)’ (Section 2.2).
68 CJEU, Joined cases 117-76 and 16-77, Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh & Co.
v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen; Diamalt AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, 19 October 1977; CJEU,
Case 283/83, Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 13 November 1984; CJEU, C-292/97, Kjell
Karlsson and Others, 13 April 2000.
69 CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014, para. 43.
70 CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
As regards the conformity with Article 21 (1) of the EU Charter, the CJEU stated
that the differential treatment of a person with impaired eyesight can be
justified by concerns such as road safety, which fulfils an objective of public
interest, is necessary and is not a disproportionate burden. Furthermore,
the court recalled that Article 20 of the EU Charter aims to ensure inter alia
that comparable situations do not receive different treatment. In so far as
the situations of two groups of drivers are not comparable, a difference in
treatment of the situations concerned does not infringe the right of drivers
in one or other of the groups to ‘equality before the law’ in Article 20 of
the Charter.
In addition to those Articles, Title III of the EU Charter contains a number of other
provisions relating to equality. Article 22 introduces the obligation to respect
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. Article 23 concerns gender equality.
Pursuant to Article 24, children have the right to such protection and care as
is necessary for their well-being. Article 25 states that the EU recognises and
respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and
to participate in social and cultural life. According to Article 26, the EU recognises
and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures
designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration, and
participation in the life of the community. All EU secondary legislation, including
the Equality Directives, must comply with the Charter.
Example: In Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and
Others v. Conseil des ministres71 (discussed in Section 5.1), the CJEU found
that an exception in the Gender Goods and Services Directive permitting
differences in the insurance premiums and benefits between men and
women was invalid. The Court relied on Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
However, the principle of non-discrimination can only be applied where the
matter falls within the scope of Union law.
71 CJEU, C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil
des ministres [GC], 1 March 2011.
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Introduction to European non-discrimination law: context, evolution and key principles
Example: In Bartsch,
72 the CJEU clarified that where the allegedly
discriminatory treatment contains no link with EU law, the application
of the principle of non-discrimination is not mandatory. In this case, the
employee died on 5 May 2004, i.e. before the expiry of the deadline for
implementation of Directive 2000/78/EC (December 31 2006), leaving
a widow who was 21 years younger. The employer’s occupational pension
scheme excluded the surviving spouse’s right to the pension, if they are more
than 15 years younger than the deceased employee. The CJEU ruled that the
case did not fall within the scope of Union law because, on the one hand, the
guidelines of the occupational pension scheme could not be considered as
an implementation measure of Directive 2000/78/EC, and at the time, the
deadline for implementation of the directive had not expired.
The Equality Directives differ in terms of protected groups and the areas in which
discrimination is prohibited.
The Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) prohibits discrimination on grounds of
race or ethnic origin in employment, vocational training, membership of employer
and employee organisations, social protection, including social security and
healthcare, social advantages, education, and access to and supply of goods and
services, including housing. It covers all natural persons within the EU. However,
there are two restrictions on its scope of application. First, it only applies to such
goods and services that are available to the public. Second, it does not apply to
differential treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions
governing the entry, residence and employment of third country nationals.
Example: In Servet Kamberaj v. IPES and Others,
73 an application for housing
benefit submitted by a third-country national was refused owing to the
exhaustion of the funds for third-country nationals. The CJEU held that
difference in treatment was based on the complainant’s status as a thirdcountry national and therefore it did not fall within the scope of Racial
Equality Directive.
72 CJEU, C-427/06, Birgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH
[GC], 23 September 2008.
73 CJEU, C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], 24 April 2012.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
The Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, religion and belief, age and disability in the
area of employment, occupation and related areas such as vocational training
and membership of employer and employee organisations. Similar to the
Racial Equality Directive, the Employment Equality Directive applies to persons
within the EU, and to both the public and private sectors, but it does not cover
nationality-based discrimination. It also provides a number of specific exceptions
from the application of its provisions.74
The Gender Goods and Services Directive (2004/113/EC) provides for protection
against discrimination on the grounds of sex regarding access to and supply of
goods and services. It covers all persons and organisations (both in the public
and private sectors) that make goods and services available to the public and/or
goods and services offered outside the area of private and family life. It excludes
the following from its scope of application: media content, advertisement and
education. Furthermore, it does not apply in the field of employment and
self-employment.
The Gender Equality Directive (recast) (2006/54/EC) guarantees equal treatment
on grounds of sex in matters of pay (Article 4), occupational social security
schemes (Article 5), and access to employment, vocational training and promotion
and working conditions (Article 14).
Further legal acts promote gender equality, in the area of state social security
(Directive 79/7/EEC),75 equal treatment between self-employed men and
women (Directive 2010/41/EU),76 relating to pregnancy (Directive 92/85/EEC)77
and parental leave (Directive 2010/18/EU).78
74 See Chapters 2 and 3.
75 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ L 6, 10.1.1979,
pp. 24–25.
76 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an
activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC, OJ L 180,
15.7.2010, pp. 1–6.
77 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have
recently given birth or are breastfeeding, OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, pp. 1–7.
78 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and
repealing Directive 96/34/EC, OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, pp. 13–20.
39
EU Issues covered CoE
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 2 (2) (a)
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 2 (2) (a)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC),
Art. 2 (1) (a)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC),
Art. 4 (1) (a)
CJEU, C-356/12, Glatzel v.
Freistaat Bayern, 2014
CJEU, C-267/12, Hay v. Crédit
agricole mutuel, 2013
CJEU, C-303/06, Coleman v.
Attridge Law and Steve Law
[GC], 2008
CJEU, C-267/06, Maruko v.
Versorgungsanstalt der
deutschen Bühnen [GC], 2008
CJEU, C-423/04, Richards v.
Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, 2006
CJEU, C-256/01, Allonby v.
Accrington and Rossendale
College, 2004
CJEU, C-13/94, P v. S and
Cornwall County Council, 1996
Direct
discrimination
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC, Art. E (non-discrimination)
ECtHR, Guberina v. Croatia,
No. 23682/13, 2016
ECSR, CGIL v. Italy, Complaint
No. 91/2013, 2015
ECtHR, Burden v. the United
Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05,
2008
2
Discrimination
categories
40
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 2 (2) (b)
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 2 (2) (b)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC),
Art. 2 (1) (b)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC),
Art. 4 (1) (b)
CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ
Razpredelenie Bulgaria”
AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot
diskriminatsia [GC], 2015
CJEU, C-385/11, Elbal Moreno v.
INSS and TGSS, 2012
CJEU, C-152/11, Odar v. Baxter
Deutschland GmbH, 2012
Indirect
discrimination
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC, Art. E (non-discrimination)
ECSR, AEH v. France, Complaint
No. 81/2012, 2013
ECtHR, D.H. and Others v.
the Czech Republic [GC],
No. 57325/00, 2007
CJEU, C-443/15, Parris v. Trinity
College Dublin and Others, 2016.
Multiple and
intersectional
discrimination
ECtHR, Carvalho Pinto de
Sousa Morais v. Portugal,
No. 17484/15, 2017
ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France [GC],
No. 43835/11, 2014
ECtHR, B.S. v. Spain,
No. 47159/08, 2012.
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 2 (3) and (4)
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 2 (3) and (4)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC),
Art. 4 (3) and (4)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC),
Art. 2 (2) (a) and (b)
Harassment and
instruction to
discriminate
ECHR, Art. 2 (right to life), Art. 3
(prohibition of torture), Art. 9
(freedom of religion), Art. 11
(freedom of assembly and
association), Art. 14 (prohibition
of discrimination)
ESC, Art. E (non-discrimination),
Art. 26 (The right to dignity at
work)
ECtHR, Đorđević v. Croatia,
No. 41526/10, 2012
ECtHR, Catan and Others v. the
Republic of Moldova and Russia
[GC], Nos. 43370/04, 18454/06
and 8252/05, 2012
41
Discrimination categories
EU Issues covered CoE
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 23 (men and women),
Art. 24 (children), Art. 25 (the
elderly), Art. 26 (Persons with
disabilities)
Racial Equality
Directive (2000/43/EC), Art. 5
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 7
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC), Art. 3
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC), Art. 6
European Parliament resolution
on strengthening the fight
against racism, xenophobia and
hate crime (2013/2543(RSP))
CJEU, C-173/13, Leone and
Leone v. Garde des Sceaux,
ministre de la Justice and Others,
17 July 2014
CJEU, C-407/98, Abrahamsson
and Anderson v. Fogelqvist,
6 July 2000
CJEU, C-409/95, Marschall v.
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997
CJEU, C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie
Hansestadt Bremen, 1995
Specific
measures
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination), Protocol No. 12,
Art. 1 (General prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC (Revised), Art. E
ECtHR, Çam v. Turkey,
No. 51500/08, 2016
ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v.
Hungary, No. 11146/11, 2013
ECSR, The Central Association
of Carers in Finland v. Finland,
No. 71/2011, 2012
European Parliament resolution
on strengthening the fight
against racism, xenophobia and
hate crime (2013/2543(RSP))
Council Framework Decision
on racism and xenophobia
(2008/913/JHA)
Victims’ Rights Directive
(2012/29/EU)
Hate crime /
Hate speech
ECtHR, Škorjanec v.
Croatia, 25536/14, 2017
ECtHR, Halime Kiliç v. Turkey,
No. 63034/11, 2016
ECtHR, Identoba and Others v.
Georgia, No. 73235/12, 2015
ECtHR, M’Bala M’Bala v. France
(dec.), No. 25239/13, 2015
ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC],
No. 64569/09, 2015
ECtHR, Perinçek v. Switzerland
[GC], No. 27510/08, 2015
ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia,
No. 40094/05, 2012
42
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Key point
• Discrimination defines a situation where an individual is disadvantaged in some way
on the basis of ‘one or multiple protected grounds’.
Non-discrimination law aims to allow all individuals an equal and fair prospect
to access opportunities available in a society. We make choices on a daily basis
over issues such as whom we socialise with, where we shop and where we work.
We prefer certain things and certain people over others. While expressing our
subjective preferences is commonplace and normal, at times we may exercise
functions that place us in a position of authority or allow us to take decisions that
may have a direct impact on others’ lives. We may be civil servants, shopkeepers,
employers, landlords or doctors who decide over how public powers are used,
or how private goods and services are offered. In these non-personal contexts,
non-discrimination law intervenes in the choices we make in two ways.
First, it stipulates that those individuals who are in similar situations should
receive similar treatment and not be treated less favourably simply because of
a particular ‘protected’ characteristic that they possess (‘direct’ discrimination).
Second, in some situations treatment based on a seemingly neutral rule can also
amount to discrimination, if it disadvantages a person or a group of persons as
a result of their particular characteristic (‘indirect’ discrimination).
This chapter discusses in greater depth the
meaning of direct and indirect discrimination, some of their specific manifestations,
such as multiple discrimination, harassment
or instruction to discriminate, hate crime
and hate speech and how they operate in
practice through case law. It will then examine how the justification test operates.
The non-discrimination principle prohibits
scenarios where persons or groups of
people in an identical situation are
treated differently, and where persons or
groups of people in different situations
are treated identically.
43
Discrimination categories
2.1. Direct discrimination
Key points
• Direct discrimination is when a person is treated less favourably on the basis of
‘protected grounds’.
• Less favourable treatment is determined through a comparison between the alleged
victim and another person, who does not possess the protected characteristic, in
a similar situation. The European and national courts have accepted the notion of
discrimination by association, where an individual is treated less favourably because
of their association with another individual who possesses a ‘protected characteristic’.
Direct discrimination is defined similarly under the ECHR and EU law. Under EU law,
Article 2 (2) of the EU Racial Equality Directive states that direct discrimination
is ‘taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is,
has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or
ethnic origin’.79 Under the ECHR, the ECtHR uses the formulation that there must
be a ‘difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar,
situations’, which is ‘based on an identifiable characteristic’.80
Procedurally, under the ECHR, an applicant
must be able to show that he or she was
“directly affected” by the measure complained of, in order to be able to lodge an
application (victim status).81
Under EU law, unlike the ECHR, direct
discrimination can be established, even
if there is no identifiable complainant
claiming to have been a victim of such
79 Similarly: Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (2) (a); Gender Equality Directive (recast),
Art. 2 (1) (a); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2 (a).
80 ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark [GC], No. 38590/10, 24 May 2016, para. 89; Similarly, ECtHR, Carson and
Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 42184/05, 16 March 2010; para. 61; ECtHR, D.H. and
Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 175; ECtHR, Burden
v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, para. 60.
81 ECtHR (2014), Practical guide on admissibility criteria.
Direct discrimination will have occurred
when:
• an individual is treated less
favourably;
• by comparison to how others, who
are in a similar situation, have been
or would be treated;
• and the reason for this is a particular
characteristic they hold, which falls
under a ‘protected ground’.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
discrimination. In the Feryn case,82 the CJEU found that an employer which
declares publicly that it will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial
origin constitutes direct discrimination in respect of recruitment within the
meaning of the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43), since such statements are
likely to strongly dissuade candidates from submitting their applications and
hinder their access to the labour market.
2.1.1. Less favourable treatment
At the heart of direct discrimination is the less favourable treatment that an
individual is subject to. This can be relatively easy to identify compared with
indirect discrimination, where statistical data is often needed (see below). Here
are examples taken from cases that are referred to in this Handbook: refusal of
entry to a restaurant or shop, receiving a smaller pension or lower pay, being
subject to verbal abuse or violence, being refused entry at a checkpoint, having
a higher or lower retirement age, being barred from a particular profession,
not being able to claim inheritance rights, being excluded from the mainstream
education system, being deported, not being permitted to wear religious
symbols, being refused or revoked social security payments. Consequently, the
first feature of direct discrimination is evidence of the difference of treatment.
Direct discrimination can also arise from treating two people in different situations
in the same way. The ECtHR has stated that ‘the right not to be discriminated
against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the ECHR is also violated
when States […] fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly
different’.83
2.1.2. A comparator
Less favourable treatment can be established by making the comparison to
someone in a similar situation. A complaint about ‘low’ pay is not a claim of
discrimination unless it can be shown that the pay is lower than that of someone
hired by the same employer to perform a similar task. Therefore, to determine
whether a person was treated less favourably, it is necessary to identify
a suitable ‘comparator’: that is, a person in materially similar circumstances,
82 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008. See also CJEU, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării, C-81/12, 25 April 2013.
83 ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], No. 34369/97, 6 April 2000, para. 44. Similarly, ECtHR, Pretty
v. the United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, para. 88.
45
Discrimination categories
with the main difference between the two persons being the ‘protected ground’.
Proving a comparator does not need to be contentious, and discrimination may
be established without an explicit discussion in this regard. Below are some
examples of cases where proving the comparator was expressly raised as an
issue by the deciding body.
Under EU law, in a number of cases the CJEU examined in detail whether two
groups could be considered as comparable.
Example: In Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern,
84 the applicant was refused
a driving licence for heavy goods vehicles because of insufficient visual acuity
in one of his eyes. Contrary to other categories of drivers, he did not have
a possibility to obtain a driving licence in ‘exceptional cases’, after additional
examinations confirming his ability to drive.
The CJEU found that the situation of both categories of drivers was not
comparable. In particular, the two categories differed by the size of the
vehicle driven, the number of passengers carried and the responsibilities
which accordingly result from driving such vehicles. The characteristics of the
vehicles concerned justified the existence of different conditions for different
categories of driving licence. Consequently, a difference in treatment was
justified and did not infringe the right to ‘equality before the law’ under
Article 20 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Example: In P v. S and Cornwall County Council,
85 the complainant was
undergoing gender reassignment from male to female when she was
dismissed by her employer. The CJEU found that the dismissal constituted
unfavourable treatment. As to the relevant comparator, the CJEU stated that
‘where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to undergo,
or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably
by comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to
belong before undergoing gender reassignment’. As to the grounds, although
it could not be shown that the complainant was treated differently because
he was a man or a woman, it could be shown that the differential treatment
related to the concept of her sex.
84 CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014.
85 CJEU, C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 30 April 1996.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Example: The case Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime
et des Deux-Sèvres86 concerns marriage benefits for same-sex partners. At
the time of the dispute, marriage for same-sex couples was not possible in
France, but registered civil partnership existed for both hetero- and homosexual
couples. The claimant was employed by a bank that offered special benefits
to employees on occasion of their marriage. The claimant applied for these
benefits after he entered into a same-sex civil partnership, but the bank refused.
The CJEU had to determine whether such a difference in treatment amounted
to discrimination based on sexual orientation. The CJEU reaffirmed that while
situations do not have to be identical, but only comparable, the comparability
must be assessed in the light of the benefit concerned, and not in a global and
abstract manner. The CJEU established that persons of the same sex who cannot
marry and therefore conclude a civil partnership are in a situation comparable
to that of married couples. The CJEU explained that although the difference in
treatment is based on the employees’ marital status and not expressly on their
sexual orientation, it constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation. Homosexual employees were unable to marry and consequently
meet the condition required for obtaining the benefit claimed.
Under EU law, proving comparability in cases concerning equal pay involves
establishing whether the work performed by a female worker is ‘equal’, or
of ‘equal value’, to work performed by a male worker, and whether there are
differences in the salary received by male and female workers. In this regard,
the CJEU did not accept a comparison across companies.
Example: In Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College,
87 a female lecturer
complained about different pay conditions under different employment
contracts. The college where the complainant was initially employed as
a lecturer did not renew her contract. She was later employed by a company
that subcontracted lecturers to educational establishments, and deployed at
her old college, performing the same duties as before, but for a lower salary.
She alleged discrimination on the basis of sex, saying that male lecturers
working for the college were paid more. As the difference in pay could not
86 CJEU, C-267/12, Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres,
12 December 2013.
87 CJEU, C-256/01, Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services,
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment,
13 January 2004.
47
Discrimination categories
be attributed to ‘single source’ (the same employer), the CJEU held that male
lecturers employed by the college were not in a comparable situation to the
complainant, who was employed by an external company.
An apparent exception for finding a suitable ‘comparator’, at least within the scope
of employment, is where the discrimination suffered is due to pregnancy. It is well
established case law of the CJEU, that where the detriment suffered by a woman is
due to pregnancy, then it constitutes direct discrimination based on sex, there being
no need for a comparator.88 The same applies in situations when discrimination is
related to maternity leave89 or undergoing in vitro fertilisation treatment.90
Under the ECHR, the ECtHR stressed that two groups of people may be considered
as being in an analogous situation for the purpose of one particular complaint but
not another. For example, married and unmarried couples can be regarded as not
being in a comparable situation in the fields of taxation, social security or social
policy. In contrast, married and unmarried partners who had an established family
life have been found to be in a comparable situation as regards the possibility to
maintain contact by telephone while one of them was in custody.91 Consequently,
the comparability should be assessed in light of the aim of the contested measure
and not in an abstract context.
Example: In Varnas v. Lithuania,
92 the applicant, a prisoner on remand,
complained that he had been denied conjugal visits from his wife, while
convicted prisoners were allowed such visits. The ECtHR explained that
the requirement of being in an “analogous position” did not mean that the
comparator groups had to be identical. The fact that the applicant’s situation
was not fully analogous to that of convicted prisoners did not preclude the
application of Article 14 of the ECHR. The applicant had to show that he was in
a relevantly similar situation to others who had been treated differently. The
ECtHR went on to conclude a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction
with Article 8.
88 CJEU, C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, 8 November 1990. Similarly, CJEU, C-32/93, Carole Louise
Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., 14 July 1994.
89 CJEU, C-191/03, North Western Health Board v. Margaret McKenna, 8 September 2005, para. 50.
90 CJEU, C-506/06, Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [GC],
26 February 2008.
91 ECtHR, Petrov v. Bulgaria, No. 15197/02, 22 May 2008, para. 55.
92 ECtHR, Varnas v. Lithuania, 42615/06, 9 July 2013, for further details see Section 5.12.
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Example: In Burden v. the United Kingdom,
93 two sisters had co-habited for
a period of 31 years. They owned a property jointly and each had left their
share in the property to the other in their will. The applicants complained
that, unlike married couples or those that entered into civil partnerships, upon
death of one, the other would have to pay inheritance tax. The ECtHR found
that the applicants as siblings could not compare themselves to cohabiting
couples who were married or civil partners. Marriage and civil partnerships
amount to special relationships entered into freely and deliberately in order
to create contractual rights and responsibilities. In contrast, the applicants’
relationship was based on consanguinity and therefore was fundamentally
different.
Example: In Carson v. the United Kingdom,
94 the applicants complained that
the state did not apply the same increment to the pension payments of the
retirees living abroad as those living the United Kingdom (UK). The ECtHR
concluded that the applicants – who did not live in the UK or a state with
which the UK had a reciprocal social security arrangement – were not in
a similar position to those retired in the UK. Although these different groups
had all contributed to government revenue through the payment of national
insurance, this did not constitute a pension fund but rather general public
revenue to finance various aspects of public spending. Furthermore, the
duty of the government to apply increments was based on consideration
of the rise in cost of the standard of living in the UK. The applicants were
therefore not in a comparable situation to these other groups and there had
accordingly been no discriminatory treatment.
Similarly, under the ESC, references to a comparator can be found in the case
law of the ECSR.
Example: In Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy,95
the ECSR examined a complaint concerning discrimination of medical
practitioners96 who did not raise conscious objection to provide abortion
services. They complained that they were disadvantaged at work in terms of
93 ECtHR, Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008.
94 ECtHR, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 42184/05, 16 March 2010.
95 ECSR, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013,
12 October 2015.
96 Ibid., para. 215 ff.
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Discrimination categories
workload, distribution of tasks, career opportunities and protection of health
and safety. The Committee confirmed that the non-objecting and objecting
medical practitioners were in a comparable situation, because they had
similar professional qualifications and worked in the same field of expertise.
Consequently, the difference in treatment amounted to discrimination.
The ECSR stated that the legal status in national law of different groups is not
relevant for the assessment of whether those groups are in a comparable
situation. For example, in Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy97
(discussed in detail in Section 5.12), concerning access to the social security
scheme, the ECSR compared the situation of tenured and lay judges. It held that in
the circumstances of the case, only the duties assigned, hierarchical authority and
tasks performed by both groups of judges were relevant. As they were similar,
the ECSR found that lay judges were functionally equivalent to tenured judges.
Moreover, it held that the comparison should be made only in respect to different
groups in a certain Member State. In Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway98
(discussed in detail in Section 5.5), concerning the retirement age of seafarers in
Norway, the claimant argued that the national provision was discriminatory on
the grounds of age, both in comparison to seafarers employed on ships in other
countries (where the retirement age of seafarers was higher than in Norway) and
to individuals in other professions in Norway. The ECSR held that examination
had to be limited to the situation of Norway. Furthermore, the ECSR accepted
that senior pilots and senior oil workers are comparable categories of workers
for the purposes of this complaint. It considered that they were in a sufficiently
similar situation, in particular owing to professional hardship and physical strain.
2.1.3. Causation
Chapter 4 will discuss the range of ‘protected grounds’ that exist in European nondiscrimination law, such as: sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability,
age, race, ethnic origin, national origin and religion or belief. This section will
focus on the need for a causal link between the less favourable treatment and
the protected grounds. In order to satisfy this requirement, one should ask the
following question: would the person have been treated less favourably had they
been of a different sex, of a different race, of a different age, or in any converse
97 ECSR, Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy, Complaint No. 102/2013, 5 July 2016.
98 ECSR, Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway, Complaint No. 74/2011, 2 July 2013.
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position under any one of the other protected grounds? If the answer is yes,
then the less favourable treatment is clearly caused by the grounds in question.
The rule or practice that is being applied does not necessarily need to refer
explicitly to the ‘protected ground’, as long as it refers to another factor that is
indissociable from the protected ground. Essentially, when considering whether
direct discrimination has taken place, one is assessing whether the less favourable
treatment is due to a ‘protected ground’ that cannot be separated from the
particular factor being complained about.
Example: In Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen,
99 after the
death of his registered same-sex partner, the complainant wished to claim
the ‘survivor’s pension’ from the company that ran his deceased partner’s
occupational pension scheme. The company refused to pay, on grounds that
survivors’ pensions were only payable to spouses and the complainant had
not been married to the deceased. The CJEU accepted that the refusal to
pay the pension amounted to unfavourable treatment and that this was
less favourable in relation to the comparator of ‘married’ couples. The CJEU
found that the institution of ‘life partnership’ in Germany created, in many
aspects, the same rights and responsibilities for life partners as for spouses,
particularly with regard to state pension schemes. It admitted that for the
purposes of this case, life partners were in a similar situation to spouses. The
CJEU then went on to state that this would amount to direct discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Thus, the fact that they were unable to marry
was indissociable from their sexual orientation.
Example: In Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,
100 the
complainant who had undergone male-to-female gender reassignment
surgery wished to claim her pension on her 60th birthday, which was the
pensionable age for women in the United Kingdom. At that time, Ms Richards
was unable to have her new gender recognised for the purposes of pension
legislation.101 The government refused to grant the pension, maintaining that
99 CJEU, C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [GC], 1 April 2008.
100 CJEU, C-423/04, Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,
27 April 2006.
101 Prior to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“the GRA”), which came into force on 4 April 2005, it
was necessary to take a person’s gender as assigned at birth to determine that person’s
gender, so as to decide when that person attained ‘pensionable age” for the purposes of
pension legislation.
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Discrimination categories
the complainant had not received unfavourable treatment in comparison to
those in a similar situation. According to the government, the complainant
had to be regarded as a “man” for the purposes of the pensions legislation.
The CJEU noted that the absence of relevant national law precluded the
complainant to fulfil the conditions of pension legislation. The CJEU found
that a person who has undergone male-to-female gender reassignment in
accordance with national law cannot be refused a pension she would be
entitled to, had she been held to be a woman under national law.
2.1.4. Discrimination by association
The CJEU have given a broad interpretation of the scope of the ‘protected
ground.’ It can include ‘discrimination by association’, where the victim of the
discrimination is not themselves the person with the protected characteristic. It
can also involve the particular ground being interpreted in an abstract manner.
This makes it imperative that practitioners embark on detailed analysis of the
reasoning behind the less favourable treatment, looking for evidence that the
protected ground is causative of such treatment, whether directly or indirectly.
Example: In S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, 102 a mother claimed
that she was treated unfavourably at work because her son was disabled. Her
son’s disability led her to be late to work on occasion and to request leave
to be scheduled according to her son’s needs. The complainant’s requests
were refused and she was threatened with dismissal, as well as receiving
abusive comments relating to her child’s condition. The CJEU considered her
colleagues in similar posts and with children as comparators, finding that they
were granted flexibility when requested. It also accepted that this amounted
to discrimination and harassment on the grounds of the disability of her child.
The ECtHR has also confirmed that Article 14 covers discrimination by association.
Example: In Guberina v. Croatia103 (discussed in Section 5.4), the ECtHR
stressed that Article 14 also covers instances in which an individual is treated
less favourably on the basis of another person’s protected characteristic. It
102 CJEU, C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], 17 July 2008.
103 ECtHR, Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 22 March 2016.
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found that the discriminatory treatment of the applicant on account of the
disability of his child was a form of disability-based discrimination.
Example: In Weller v. Hungary, 104 a Romanian woman was ineligible to
claim maternity benefits payable after giving birth because she was not
a Hungarian citizen. Her Hungarian husband was also ineligible, the benefit
being paid only to mothers. The ECtHR found that he had been discriminated
against on the basis of fatherhood (rather than sex), since adoptive male
parents or male guardians were entitled to claim the benefit, while natural
fathers were not. A complaint was also lodged by the children, who claimed
discrimination on the basis of the refusal to pay the benefit to their father,
which the ECtHR accepted. Thus, the children were discriminated against on
the grounds of the status of their father.
The concept of discrimination by association can be also found in national case
law.
Example: The first case105 of discrimination by association on the ground of
sexual orientation in Poland concerns an employee who worked as a shop
security guard. He took part in an equality parade, excerpts of which were
shown on television. After the broadcast, the claimant was informed of his
dismissal, his employer submitting that he ‘could not imagine a homosexual
working for his company’. The Polish courts considered that discrimination
could occur regardless of whether the victim had a certain protected
characteristic. The claimant’s sexual orientation was therefore irrelevant.
The courts went on to find that the claimant was discriminated against on the
basis of his participation in the march linked to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and
trans (LGBT) community. They confirmed that discrimination by association
had taken place and awarded the claimant compensation.
104 ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary, No. 44399/05, 31 March 2009.
105 Poland, District Court in Warsaw (court of the second instance), V Ca 3611/14,
18 November 2015. See also, Tribunal du travail de Leuven, 10 December 2013, Jan V.H. v. BVBA,
n° 12/1064/A.
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2.2. Indirect discrimination
Key points
• Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral rule disadvantages a person
or a group sharing the same characteristics.
• It must be shown that a group is disadvantaged by a decision when compared to
a comparator group.
Both EU and CoE law acknowledge that prohibiting the different treatment of
people in similar situations might not be sufficient to achieve factual equality.
In some situations, offering the same treatment to people who are in different
situations may put certain people at a particular disadvantage. In this case, it is
not the treatment that differs, but rather the effects of that treatment, which will
be felt differently by people with different characteristics. The idea that different
situations should be treated differently has been incorporated into the concept
of indirect discrimination.
Under EU law, Article 2 (2) (b) of the Racial Equality Directive states that ‘indirect
discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision,
criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular
disadvantage compared to other persons’.106
Under the ECHR, the ECtHR has drawn on this definition of indirect discrimination
in some of its judgments, stating that ‘a difference in treatment may take the
form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure
which, though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group’.107
Under the ESC, the ECSR has found that indirect discrimination may arise by
“failing to take due and positive account of all relevant differences between
persons in a comparable situation, or by failing to take adequate steps to ensure
106 Similarly: Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (2) (b); Gender Equality Directive (recast),
Art. 2 (1) (b); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2 (b).
107 ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark [GC], No. 38590/10, 24 May 2016, para. 103; ECtHR, D.H. and Others v.
the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 184.
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that the rights and collective advantages
that are open to all are genuinely
accessible by and to all”.108
It should be noted, however, that
both kinds of discrimination result in
a difference of treatment in comparable
situations. For example, a woman could
be excluded from employment either
because the employer does not want to employ women (direct discrimination)
or because the requirements for the position are formulated in such a way that
most women would not be able to fulfil them (indirect discrimination). In some
cases, the division is more theoretical and it might be problematic to establish
whether the situation constitutes direct or indirect discrimination.109
2.2.1. A neutral rule, criterion or practice
The first identifiable requirement of indirect discrimination is an apparently
neutral rule, criterion or practice. In other words, there must be some form of
requirement that is applied to everybody. Follow some cases for illustration. For
further examples, see Chapter 6 on evidential issues and the role of statistics.
Example: In Isabel Elbal Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social,
Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social,
110 the complainant had worked
part-time for four hours a week for 18 years. According to the relevant
provision, in order to obtain a pension – which was already proportionally
lower – a part-time worker had to pay contributions for a longer period
than a full-time worker. As the referring court explained, on the basis of
a part-time contract of 4 hours a week, the complainant would have to work
for 100 years to complete the minimum period of 15 years, which would
108 ECSR, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013,
12 October 2015, para. 237; ECSR, Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) v.
France, Complaint No. 50/2008, decision on the merits of 9 September 2009, paras. 39 and 41;
ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002,
4 November 2003, para. 52.
109 See, for example, CJEU, C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen
[GC], 1 April 2008, where the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer and CJEU reached different
conclusions in this regard.
110 CJEU, C-385/11, Isabel Elbal Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) and
Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS), 22 November 2012.
The elements of indirect discrimination
are as follows:
• a neutral rule, criterion or practice;
• that affects a group defined by
a ‘protected ground’ in a significantly
more negative way;
• in comparison to others in a similar
situation.
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Discrimination categories
give her access to a pension of € 112.93 a month. The CJEU held that the
relevant provisions put part-time workers who have worked part time for
a long time at a disadvantage. In practice, such legislation excludes those
workers from any possibility of obtaining a retirement pension. Given that
at least 80 % of part-time workers in Spain are women, the effect of this
rule disproportionately affected women in comparison to men. Accordingly,
it constituted indirect discrimination.
Example: In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 111 a series of tests were
used to establish the intellectual capacity of pupils to determine whether
they should be placed into special schools designed for children with special
educational needs. The same test was applied to all pupils who were
considered for placement in special schools. The ECtHR considered that there
was a danger that the tests were biased and that the results were not analysed
in the light of the particularities and special characteristics of the Roma children
who sat them. In particular, the educational background of Roma children (such
as a lack of preschool), some of the children’s inability to speak Czech and
their unfamiliarity with the testing situation were not taken into account. As
a result, Roma students were inherently more likely to perform badly on the
tests – which they did – with the consequence that between 50 % to 90 % of
Roma children were educated outside the mainstream education system. The
ECtHR found that this was a case of indirect discrimination.
Example: In European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France112 (discussed
in Section 4.4), the ECSR considered that limited funds in the state’s social
budget for the education of children and adolescents with autism indirectly
disadvantaged persons with disabilities. The Committee explained that the
limited public funding allocated to social protection could equally affect
everyone who was supposed to be covered by this protection. However,
a person with a disability is more likely to be dependent on community
care, funded through the state budget, in order to live independently
and in dignity, in comparison to other persons. Thus, budget restrictions
in social policy matters are likely to place persons with disabilities at
a disadvantage, which results in a difference in treatment indirectly based
on disability. Consequently, the ECSR found that the state’s limited social
budget constituted indirect discrimination against persons with disabilities.
111 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007.
112 ECSR, European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012,
11 September 2013.
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Example: In a case113 before the United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal,
the complainant, a train driver and single mother with three children under
the age of five, filed a request for flexible working. Her request was refused
on the basis that it would be unfair to allow her to only work the familyfriendly shifts because other drivers would then be denied the choice of
those shifts as a result. The courts agreed that the required shift pattern
generally put women at a disadvantage, because more women have caring
responsibilities than men and would be unable to work those hours. The case
was remitted for the question of objective justification to be reconsidered.
2.2.2. Significantly more negative in its effects on
a protected group
The second identifiable requirement is that the apparently neutral provision,
criterion or practice places a ‘protected group’ at a particular disadvantage.
Accordingly, indirect discrimination differs from direct discrimination in that it
moves the focus away from differential treatment to differential effects.
Example: In Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH,
114 the CJEU considered a formula
in a social plan, resulting in employees aged over 54 years receiving less redundancy compensation than younger ones. Dr. Odar, who had severe disability,
received a compensation under the social plan, which was calculated based
on the earliest date at which he would receive a pension. If his compensation
had been calculated under the standard formula, taking into account the length
of service, he would have received twice the amount. The Court found that
it did not constitute direct discrimination based on age (such a difference in
treatment may be justified under Article 6 (1) of Directive 2000/78/EC) but
indirect discrimination based on disability. The CJEU held that the difference in
treatment disregarded the risks that persons with severe disabilities face over
time, particularly in finding new employment, as well as the fact that those
risks tend to become exacerbated as they approach retirement age. In paying
a worker with a severe disability a compensation that is lower than the amount
paid to a worker without a disability, the special formula has an excessive
adverse effect on the legitimate interests of severely disabled workers and
therefore goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the social policy objectives.
113 United Kingdom, Employment Appeal Tribunal, XC Trains Ltd v. CD & Ors, No. UKEAT/0331/15/LA,
28 July 2016.
114 CJEU, C-152/11, Johann Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH, 6 December 2012.
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Discrimination categories
When considering statistical evidence that the protected group is disproportionately affected in a negative way in comparison to those in a similar situation, the
CJEU and ECtHR will seek evidence that a particularly large proportion of those
negatively affected is made up of that ‘protected group’. For instance, in Di Trizio
v. Switzerland,115 the ECtHR relied on statistics showing that 97 % of persons
affected by the applied method of calculation of disability benefits were women
who wished to reduce their working hours after the birth of a child. This will be
considered in detail in Chapter 5 relating to evidential issues. For now, reference
is made to the collection of phrases used by the CJEU appearing in the Opinion of
Advocate General Léger in the Nolte case when speaking of sex discrimination:
‘[I]n order to be presumed discriminatory, the measure must affect “a far greater number of women than men” [Rinner- Kühn116] or “a considerably lower percentage of
men
than women” [Nimz,
117 Kowalska118] or “far more women than men” [De Weerd119]’.120
Example: In a case121 before German courts, a woman applied to training for
pilots at Lufthansa. Although she passed all the tests, she was not admitted
because she was shorter than 1.65 m required for pilots. She complained
about indirect discrimination, arguing that, since 44.3 % of all women but
only 2.8 % of men were smaller than 1.65 m, the requirement specifically
disadvantaged women. The case ended in friendly settlement. Lufthansa
agreed to pay compensation for the unequal treatment.
2.2.3. A comparator
As with direct discrimination, a court will still need to find a comparator to
determine whether the effect of the particular rule, criterion or practice is
significantly more negative than those experienced by other individuals in a similar
115 ECtHR, Di Trizio v. Switzerland, No. 7186/09, 2 February 2016.
116 CJEU, C-171/88, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG, 13 July 1989.
117 CJEU, C-184/89, Helga Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 7 February 1991.
118 CJEU, C-33/89, Maria Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 27 June 1990.
119 CJEU, C-343/92, M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor
de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others, 24 February 1994.
120 Opinion of Advocate General Leger of 31 May 1995, paras. 57-58 in CJEU, C-317/93, Inge Nolte v.
Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, 14 December 1995. For an example of a similar approach
having been adopted under the ECHR, see the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech
Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007 (discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3).
121 Germany, Federal Labour Court, 8 AZR 638/14, 18 February 2016.
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situation. Both in cases of alleged direct and indirect discrimination, the courts
will compare, for example, men to women, homosexual couples to heterosexual
couples, individuals with disabilities to individuals without disabilities.
However, establishing indirect discrimination requires proving that there are
two groups: one advantaged and one disadvantaged by the contested measure.
Usually, the disadvantaged group does not exclusively consist of persons holding
protected characteristics. For example, part-time employees disadvantaged by
a certain rule are mostly women, but men can also be affected. On the other
hand, not all persons holding a particular characteristic are disadvantaged. For
example, in a situation in which having a perfect knowledge of a language is
a condition for employment, it will mostly disadvantage foreign applicants, but
there might be some people among those foreign candidates who are able to fulfil
this requirement. In cases where a formally neutral criterion in fact affected an
entire group, the CJEU has concluded that there had been direct discrimination.122
The following case provided an opportunity for the CJEU to clarify various aspects
related to the concept of discrimination, the difference between direct and
indirect discrimination and the appropriate comparator.
Example: In “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot
diskriminatsia,
123 the claimant ran a shop in an urban district inhabited
mainly by persons of Roma origin. She complained that the high placement
of electricity meters on pylons, a practice which was not carried out in other
districts, meant that she was unable to control her electricity consumption.
Before the national courts, the claimant alleged discrimination based on
ethnic origin, even though she was not Roma herself.
The CJEU held that the concept of ‘discrimination on the grounds of ethnic
origin’ applied to any person who, although not a member of the race or
ethnic origin concerned, was nevertheless affected by a discriminatory
measure in the same way as persons who were members of that ethnic
origin. Accordingly, it had to be established that there was a link between
a discriminatory measure and racial or ethnic origin. As regards the
122 See C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [GC], 1 April 2008
discussed in detail in Section 2.1.3 and CJEU, C-267/12, Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de
Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres, 12 December 2013, discussed in Section 2.1.2 and 4.1.
123 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015.
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Discrimination categories
comparator, the CJEU held that all final consumers of electricity, supplied
by the same distributor within an urban area, irrespective of the district in
which they resided, had to be regarded as being in a comparable situation.
The second important issue concerns the question of whether the practice
at issue fell within the category of direct or indirect discrimination. If the
reason for the practice was based on the ethnicity of the majority of the
district inhabitants, the alleged practice constituted direct discrimination.
If the national courts reached the conclusion that the practice was based
exclusively on objective factors unrelated to race or ethnic origin (for example
because of the high level of illegal interference with electricity meters) the
practice could constitute indirect discrimination, if a measure disadvantaged
only districts inhabited by a Roma majority. Such a measure would be capable
of being objectively justified if there existed no other appropriate and less
restrictive means to achieve the pursued aims (ensuring the security of
electricity transmission and the due recording of electricity consumption). In
the absence of such measure, the practice would not be disproportionate only,
if the inhabitants of the district were prejudiced in having access to electricity
in conditions which are not of offensive or stigmatising nature and which do
enable them to monitor their electricity consumption regularly.
2.3. Multiple and intersectional
discrimination
Key points
• Addressing discrimination from the perspective of a single ground fails to tackle
adequately various manifestations of unequal treatment.
• ‘Multiple discrimination’ describes discrimination that takes place on the basis of
several grounds operating separately.
• ‘Intersectional discrimination’ describes a situation where several grounds operate
and interact with each other at the same time in such a way that they are inseparable
and produce specific types of discrimination.
People with differing backgrounds often face multiple discrimination, because
everyone has an age, a gender, an ethnic origin, a sexual orientation, a belief
system or religion; everyone has some state of heath or may acquire a disability.
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No group characterised by a specific ground is homogenous. Every person has
a unique pattern of characteristics, which have impact on their relationships with
other people, and may involve domination by some over others.
It is increasingly recognised that addressing discrimination from the perspective
of a single ground fails to capture or adequately tackle the various manifestations
of unequal treatment that people may face in their daily lives.
There is no single settled terminology – ‘multiple discrimination,’ ‘cumulative
discrimination,’ ‘compound discrimination,’ ‘combined discrimination’ and
‘intersectional discrimination’ are often used interchangeably, although these
terms have slightly different implications.
Most often ‘multiple discrimination’ describes discrimination that takes place
on the basis of several grounds operating separately, while ‘intersectional
discrimination’ refers to a situation where several grounds operate and interact
with each other at the same time in such a way that they are inseparable124 and
produce specific types of discrimination.
Under ECHR law, both Article 14 of the ECHR and additional Protocol No. 12
prohibit discrimination on a large number of grounds, making a claim on more
than one ground theoretically possible. Furthermore, the non-exhaustive list of
grounds of discrimination allows the ECtHR to extend and include grounds not
expressly mentioned. However, the Court does not use the terms multiple or
intersectional discrimination.
Example: In N.B. v. Slovakia,
125 concerning forced sterilisation of a Roma
woman at a public hospital, the applicant expressly complained that she
was discriminated against on more than one ground (race/ethnic origin and
sex). The ECtHR made no explicit reference to discrimination or multiple
discrimination. It stated, however, that “the practice of sterilisation of women
without their prior informed consent affected vulnerable individuals from
various ethnic groups”.126 It found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR.
124 European Commission (2007), ‘Tackling Multiple Discrimination. Practices, policies and laws’.
125 ECtHR, N. B. v. Slovakia, No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012. See also ECtHR, V.C. v. Slovakia,
No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011.
126 Ibid., para. 121.
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Discrimination categories
In more recent cases, the ECtHR seems to tacitly recognise the phenomenon
of intersectional discrimination, and it is also repeatedly urged to do so by
different third-party interveners. The ECtHR clearly takes into consideration
multiple-grounds approach, although still without using the terms multiple or
intersectional discrimination.
Example: In B.S. v. Spain,
127 a female sex worker of Nigerian origin and legally
resident in Spain, alleged that the Spanish police mistreated her physically
and verbally on the basis of her race, gender and profession. She claimed
that, unlike other sex workers of European origin, she was subject to repeated
police checks and a victim of racist and sexist insults. In this case, two thirdparty interveners – the AIRE Centre and the European Social Research Unit
of the University of Barcelona – asked the ECtHR to recognise intersectional
discrimination, which required a multiple-grounds approach. The Court found
a violation of Article 3, but this time went further to separately examine
whether there was also a failure to investigate a possible causal link between
the alleged racist attitudes and the violent acts of the police. Consequently,
the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14, because the domestic courts failed to
take into account the applicant’s particular vulnerability inherent in her position
as an African woman working as a prostitute. The Court thus took a clearly
intersectional approach, however, without using the term ‘intersectionality’.
Example: The case S.A.S. v. France128 concerns a ban on wearing a religious
face covering in public. In this case, third-party interveners (Amnesty
International and a non-governmental organisation, Article 19) also pointed
to the risk of intersectional discrimination against Muslim women, which
may express itself particularly in the form of stereotyping of sub-groups of
women. The ECtHR acknowledged that the ban had specific negative effects
on the situation of Muslim women who, for religious reasons, wished to wear
the full-face veil in public, but considered this measure to have an objective
and reasonable justification.
Example: In Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal,
129 the applicant
brought a civil action against a hospital for medical negligence during her
gynaecological surgery. The Administrative Court ruled in her favour and
awarded her compensation. On appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court
upheld the first-instance judgment but reduced the amount of damages.
127 ECtHR, B.S. v. Spain, No. 47159/08, 24 July 2012.
128 ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014 (also described in Section 5.8).
129 ECtHR, Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, No. 17484/15, 25 July 2017.
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The applicant complained that the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment was
discriminatory on the grounds of her sex and age. The Supreme Administrative
Court had relied on the fact that the applicant was already 50 years old and had
two children at the time of the surgery. It considered that at this age sexuality
is not as important as in younger years and that its significance diminishes with
age. The Supreme Administrative Court also stated that she “probably only
needed to take care of her husband”, considering the age of her children. The
ECtHR observed that the issue was not considerations of age or sex as such,
but rather the assumption that sexuality was not as important for a 50-year
old woman and mother of two children as for someone of a younger age. That
assumption reflected a traditional idea of female sexuality as being essentially
linked to child-bearing purposes, and thus ignored its physical and psychological
relevance for the self-fulfilment of women. Apart from being judgemental, it
omitted to take into consideration other dimensions of women’s sexuality in the
concrete case of the applicant. In other words, the Supreme Administrative Court
had made a general assumption without attempting to look at its validity in the
concrete case. The wording of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment
could not be regarded as an unfortunate turn of phrase. The applicant’s age and
sex appeared to have been decisive factors in the final decision, introducing
a difference in treatment based on those grounds. Therefore, the ECtHR found
a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 8.
Under EU law, the only mention of multiple discrimination at present130 can be
found in recitals to the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Employment
Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) stating merely that “women are often the victims
of multiple discrimination”.
Similarly to Article 14 of the ECHR, Article 21 of the EU Charter contains an open
list of grounds. Extending grounds of discrimination is, however, impossible under
EU secondary law because the grounds covered by the equality directives are
listed exhaustively. The CJEU has repeatedly emphasised that it is not within
its power to extend those grounds,131 and it has so far not invoked Articles 20
or 21 of the EU Charter to overturn this position. This means that it would not be
130 As of April 2017.
131 CJEU, C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [GC], 11 July 2006, para. 56;
C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], 17 July 2008, para. 46; C-310/10
Ministerul Justiţiei și Libertăţilor Cetăţenești v. Ştefan Agafiţei and Others, 7 July 2011; C-406/15,
Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen
kontrol, 9 March 2017.
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possible to create new grounds to reflect the specific situations of discrimination
experienced by certain groups, such as black women.
Another possibility is to combine grounds within the existing list without
regarding this as a new subgroup. However, this approach has its limitations,
because the scope of each directive is different. It is difficult to establish whether
the open scope of Articles 20 and 21 would allow a broader interpretation, since
the CJEU has not yet referred to them in such cases.
Example: In Parris v. Trinity College and Others,
132 the CJEU had to address
the possibility of multiple discrimination, since the referring court specifically
posed this question. Dr Parris requested that on his death the survivor’s
pension provided for by the pension scheme should be granted to his civil
same-sex partner. He was refused on the basis that they entered into a civil
partnership only after he had turned 60, thus not meeting the pension
scheme requirements. The civil partnership, however, was established in
the United Kingdom in 2009, once Dr Parris was over 60 years old; in Ireland,
it was only recognised from 2011 onwards. This meant that any homosexual
person born before 1 January 1951 would not be able to claim a survivor’s
benefit for his civil partner or spouse under this scheme.
The CJEU ruled, however, that if a measure is not capable of creating
discrimination on any of the grounds prohibited by Directive 2000/78/
EC – when these grounds are taken alone – then it cannot be considered to
constitute discrimination as a result of the combined effect of such grounds,
in this case sexual orientation and age.
Thus, under EU law, while discrimination may indeed be based on several
protected grounds, the CJEU considered that there could be no new category of
discrimination consisting of the combination of more than one of those grounds.
In international law, intersectionality is officially recognised by the CEDAW
Committee as a pertinent concept for understanding the scope of State Parties’
obligation to eliminate discrimination. The Committee stated that: “States parties
must legally recognise and prohibit such intersecting forms of discrimination and
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned.”133
132 CJEU, C-443/15, David L. Parris v. Trinity College Dublin and Others, 24 November 2016.
133 UN, CEDAW (2010), General Recommendation 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under
Art. 2, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, para. 18.
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2.4. Harassment and instruction to
discriminate
2.4.1. Harassment and instruction to discriminate
under the EU non-discrimination directives
Key point
• Harassment is a particular manifestation of direct discrimination treated separately
under EU law.
A prohibition on harassment and on instruction to discriminate as part of EU nondiscrimination law were introduced to allow for more comprehensive protection.
Harassment features as a specific type of discrimination under the EU nondiscrimination directives. It had previously been dealt with as a particular
manifestation of direct discrimination. Its separation into a specific head under
the directives is based more on the importance of singling out this particularly
harmful form of discriminatory treatment, rather than a shift in conceptual
thinking.
EU law adopts a flexible objective/subjective approach. First, it is the victim’s
perception of the treatment that is used to determine whether harassment has
occurred. Second, however, even if the
victim does not actually feel the effects
of the harassment, a finding may still be
made, so long as the complainant is the
target of the conduct in question.
As the European Commission stated in
the Explanatory Memorandum attached
to the Commission’s proposal for the
Employment Equality Directive and Racial
Equality Directive, harassment may take
134 See: Racial Equality Directive, Art. 2 (3); Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (3); Gender
Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2 (c); Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 2 (1) (c).
According to the non-discrimination
directives, harassment shall be deemed
to be discrimination when:
• unwanted conduct related to
a protected ground takes place;
• with the purpose or effect of
violating the dignity of a person;
• and/or creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating or
offensive environment.134
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Discrimination categories
different forms “from spoken words and gestures to the production, display
and circulation of written words, pictures or other materials” as long as it is of
serious nature.135
In S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law,
136 the CJEU held that the prohibition of
harassment is not limited to a person holding certain characteristics and therefore,
for instance, the mother of a disabled child is also protected. Interpretation of
the notion ‘harassment’ can be found in the case law of the European Union
Civil Service Tribunal (CST),137 responsible for determining disputes involving
the European Union civil service at first instance. The CST explained that for the
conduct to be considered as harassment, it should be perceived as excessive
and open to criticism for a reasonable observer of normal sensitivity and in the
same situation.138 Furthermore, referring to the definition of ‘harassment’ given
by the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), the CST stressed that from
the condition ‘the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person’ follows
that the harasser does not have to intend to discredit the victim or deliberately
impair the latter’s working conditions. It is sufficient that such reprehensible
conduct, provided that it was committed intentionally, led objectively to such
consequences.139 The CST held that an appraisal of the performance of an official
made by a supervisor, even if critical, cannot as such be classified as harassment.
Negative comments addressed to a member of staff do not thereby undermine
his personality, dignity or integrity where they are formulated in measured terms
and are not based on allegations that are unfair and lacking any connection
with objective facts.140 It has also held that the refusal of annual leave in order
to ensure the proper functioning of the service cannot, as such, be regarded as
a manifestation of psychological harassment.141
135 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM/99/0566 final - CNS 99/0253, 25/11/1999
and Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation, COM/99/0565 final - CNS 99/0225.
136 CJEU, C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], 17 July 2008.
137 In 2015, in view of the increase in litigation and the excessive length of proceedings in cases
being dealt with in the General Court, the EU legislature decided to gradually increase the
number of Judges at the General Court to 56 and to transfer to it the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Tribunal, which was dissolved on 1 September 2016.
138 European Union Civil Service Tribunal (CST), F-42/10, Carina Skareby v. European Commission,
16 May 2012, para. 65.
139 CST, F-52/05, Q v. Commission of the European Communities, 9 December 2008, para. 135.
140 CST, F-12/13, CQ v. European Parliament, 17 September 2014, para. 87.
141 Ibid., para. 110.
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The Gender Equality Directives set out sexual harassment as a specific type of
discrimination, where the unwanted ‘verbal, non-verbal, or physical’ conduct is
of a ‘sexual’ nature.142 A FRA EU-wide survey on gender-based violence against
women shows that 75 % of women in qualified professions or top management
have been victims of sexual harassment,143 and one in 10 women has experienced
stalking or sexual harassment through new technologies.144
According to the definition of harassment, there is no need for a comparator
to prove it. This essentially reflects the fact that harassment in itself is wrong
because of the form it takes (verbal, non-verbal or physical abuse) and the
potential effect it may have (violating human dignity).
Questions of fact, relating to whether conduct amounts to harassment, are
usually determined at the national level before cases are referred to the CJEU.
The following cases, therefore, draw from national jurisdiction.
Example: In a case145 before the French Court of Cassation, an employee
complained that his manager regularly criticised him, used inappropriate
language and moved him to a smaller office. Despite an internal mediation
procedure, the employee instituted civil proceedings against the company
for failure to guarantee its employees safety at work. The Court of Cassation
specified that the employer was liable for acts of harassment at the
workplace, if he had not taken appropriate measures both to prevent any
moral harassment and to stop it after it had been formally notified. Since
in the case the employer did not adopt sufficient preventive measures, for
instance by failing to provide relevant information and training, the French
court concluded that the employer had been liable.
Example: In a case146 before the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority,
a complaint was made about teachers who told Roma students that
their misbehaviour at school had been notified to the ‘Hungarian Guard’,
142 Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2 (d); Gender Equality Directive (recast),
Art. 2 (1) (d).
143 FRA (2014), Violence against women: an EU-wide survey. Main results report, Luxembourg,
Publications Office of the European Union (Publications Office), p. 96.
144 Ibid., p. 104.
145 France, Court of Cassation, Social Chamber, M. Jean-François X... v. M. Serge Y...; and Others,
No. 14-19.702, 1 June 2016.
146 Hungary, Equal Treatment Authority, Decision No. 654/2009, 20 December 2009.
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Discrimination categories
a nationalist organisation known for committing acts of extreme violence
against Roma. It was found that the teachers had implicitly endorsed the
racist views of the Guard and created a climate of fear and intimidation,
amounting to harassment.
In addition, the non-discrimination directives all state that an ‘instruction to
discriminate’ is deemed to constitute ‘discrimination’.147 However, none of the
directives provide a definition as to what is meant by the term. In order to be of
any worth in combating discriminatory practices, it ought not to be confined to
merely dealing with instructions that are mandatory in nature, but should extend
to catch situations where there is an expressed preference or an encouragement
to treat individuals less favourably due to one of the protected grounds. This is
an area that may evolve through the jurisprudence of the courts. An example of
instruction to discriminate would be a situation, in which a landlord instructs an
estate agent not to rent his apartment to homosexual couples.
Acts of harassment and acts of instruction to discriminate, in addition to
constituting discrimination, may well fall under national criminal law, particularly
where they relate to race or ethnicity.148
2.4.2. Harassment and instruction to discriminate
under the ECHR and ESC
While the ECHR does not contain specific provisions prohibiting harassment or
instruction to discriminate, it does contain particular rights that relate to the same
area. However, harassment may fall under the right to respect for private and
family life (protected under Article 8 of the ECHR), or the right to be free from
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3. Instruction to
discriminate may be examined under other ECHR provisions, such as freedom
of religion under Article 9 or freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11,
depending on the context. Where these acts display a discriminatory motive,
the ECtHR will examine the alleged breaches of relevant Convention provisions
either alone or in conjunction with Article 14, which prohibits discrimination.
147 Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (4); Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 4 (1);
Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 2 (2) (b); Racial Equality Directive, Art. 2 (4).
148 See Sections 2.6 and 2.7.
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Example: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland,
149 the mayor of Warsaw made
public announcements of a homophobic nature, stating that he would refuse
permission to hold a march to raise awareness about sexual orientation
discrimination. When the decision came before the relevant administrative
body, permission was refused based on other reasons, such as the need to
prevent clashes between demonstrators. The ECtHR found that the mayor’s
statements could have influenced the decision of the relevant authorities,
and that the decision was based on the ground of sexual orientation and so
constituted a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 11
(the right of peaceful assembly).
Example: In Đorđević v. Croatia,
150 the applicants, a mentally and physically
disabled man and his mother, complained that the authorities had failed to
protect them from harassment and violence perpetrated by children living in
their neighbourhood. The ECtHR noted that most of the alleged defendants
were children under fourteen, who could not be held criminally liable under
domestic law. However, the authorities had been aware of the situation
of serious harassment directed against a person with physical and mental
disabilities and they were obliged to take reasonable measures to prevent
further abuse. Isolated reactions to specific incidents (like the prompt arrival
of police officers, interviews with the children and police reports) were not
sufficient in a situation where incidents of harassment and violence had
persisted over a long period of time. The authorities should have taken action
of a general nature to combat the problem. The ECtHR concluded that there
had been a violation of Article 3 in respect of the disabled man. Regarding
the mother’s complaint, the ECtHR stressed that the continued harassment of
her disabled son, of whom she was taking care, along with incidents which
concerned her personally, had negatively affected her private and family
life. By failing to address properly the acts of violence or to put in place any
relevant measures to prevent further harassment of her son, the authorities
had failed to protect her right to respect for private and family life, in breach
of Article 8 of the ECHR.
Example: In Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia,
151
the ECtHR examined a complaint of harassment in relation to the right to
education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The applicants, children and
149 ECtHR, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 1543/06, 3 May 2007.
150 ECtHR, Đorđević v. Croatia, No. 41526/10, 24 July 2012.
151 ECtHR, Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 43370/04, 18454/06 and
8252/05, 19 October 2012.
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Discrimination categories
parents from the Moldovan community in Transdniestria, complained
about the forcible closure of schools and harassment of pupils wishing to
be educated in their national language. Incidents of harassment included
detention of teachers, destruction of Latin script materials, as well as
repeated incidents of vandalism and intimidation, including parents losing
their jobs.
The ECtHR considered those acts as interference with the applicant
pupils’ right to education but also found that the said measures amounted to
an interference with the applicant parents’ rights to ensure their children’s
education and teaching in accordance with their philosophical convictions.
The measure did not seem to pursue any objective aim. In fact, the language
policy of the ‘Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria’, as applied to these
schools, appeared to have been intended to enforce the Russification of the
language and culture of the Moldovan community. Consequently, there had
been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 by Russia.
Under the ESC, Article 26 (2) establishes a right to protection of human dignity
against harassment creating a hostile working environment related to a specific
characteristic of a person. It must be possible for employers to be held liable when
harassment occurs in relation to work, or on premises under their responsibility, even
when it involves, as a defendant or a victim, a third person not employed by them,
such as independent contractors, self-employed workers, visitors, clients, etc.152
2.5. Special or specific measures
Key points
• To ensure that everyone has equal enjoyment of rights, governments, employers and
service providers may need to take special or specific measures to adapt their rules
and practices to those with different characteristics.
• The terms ‘special’ or ‘specific’ measures can be taken to include redressing past
disadvantage suffered by those with a protected characteristic. Where this is
proportionate, it may constitute a justification for differential treatment.
Refraining from discriminatory treatment is sometimes not sufficient to achieve
factual equality. Therefore, in some situations, governments, employers and
152 ECSR, Conclusions 2014, Finland; Conclusions 2003, Sweden.
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service providers must ensure that they take steps to adjust their rules and
practices to take relevant differences into consideration – that is, they must do
something to adjust current policies and measures. In the UN context, these are
labelled ‘special measures’, while the EU law refers to ‘specific measures’ or
‘positive action’. The ECtHR speaks about ‘positive obligations’. By taking special
measures, governments are able to ensure ‘substantive equality’, that is, equal
enjoyment of opportunities to access benefits available in society, rather than
mere ‘formal equality’. Where governments, employers and service providers
fail to consider the appropriateness of taking special measures, they increase
the risk that their rules and practices may amount to indirect discrimination.
Example: In a case from the United Kingdom,153 two female cabin crew
members brought a claim against their employer, after it failed to offer
arrangements that they considered appropriate to enable them to continue
breastfeeding when they returned to work after maternity leave. They were
required to work shifts of more than eight hours, which was not acceptable
on medical grounds (prolonged periods without expressing milk increase
the risk of mastitis). The Employment Tribunal found that the airline had
discriminated against the claimants indirectly on grounds of their sex. It
stressed that the airline should have reduced the breastfeeding mothers’
hours, found them alternative duties or suspended them on full pay. The
refusal could not be objectively justified because there was no convincing
evidence that creating special arrangements for two employees would cause
the employer excessive difficulties.
The example described above illustrates a situation in which a person in
a disadvantaged position alleged that the employer did not adequately address
their needs. The defendant fails to act and to provide for positive measures. In
contrast, when the obligation to act is fulfilled, the term ‘special measures’ is
used to include a situation where differential treatment takes place that favours
individuals on the basis of their protected grounds. Therefore, the term ‘special
measures’ can be understood from two different angles. From the perspective
of the beneficiary, more favourable treatment is accorded on the basis of
a protected characteristic, in comparison to someone in a similar situation.
From the perspective of the victim, less favourable treatment is accorded on the
153 United Kingdom, Bristol Employment Tribunal, McFarlane and another v. easyJet Airline
Company, ET/1401496/15 and ET/3401933/15, 29 September 2016.
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Discrimination categories
basis that they do not hold a protected characteristic. Typical examples include
reserving posts for women in male-dominated work places or ethnic minorities
in public services, such as policing, in order to better reflect the composition of
society. Reduced fees for public transport for elderly person to compensate for
their reduced earning capacity represents another example.
Special measures therefore allow moving beyond an individual approach and
taking into consideration the collective aspect of discrimination.
The terminology used to describe this varies greatly to include ‘positive measures’,
‘positive’ or ‘reverse’ discrimination, ‘preferential treatment’, ‘temporary special
measures’ or ‘affirmative action’.154 This reflects its accepted function as a shortterm and exceptional means of challenging prejudices against individuals who would
normally suffer discrimination, by favouring members of a disadvantaged group.
In this context, the courts tended to treat differential treatment not as a distinct
form of discrimination in itself but as an exception to the prohibition of
discrimination. In other words, the courts accept that differential treatment has
occurred, but that it may be justified in the interests of correcting a pre-existing
disadvantage, such as underrepresentation in the workplace of particular groups.
Example: A case155 before German courts concerns a job advertisement
starting with the catchphrase: ‘Women come to power!’ An unsuccessful
male candidate complained that he as a man was discriminated against. The
154 For example, ICERD, Art. 1.4 and 2.2; CEDAW Art. 4; CRPD Art. 5.4; UN, Committee on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (2009) General comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in
economic, social and cultural rights, 2 July 2009, E/C.12/GC/20; UN,Committee on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) (2009), General comment No. 11: Indigenous children and their rights under the
Convention [on the Rights of the Child], 12 February 2009, CRC/C/GC/11; UN, Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (2009), General Recommendation No. 32: The
Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009; UN, CERD (2004),
General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3;
UN, CERD (1994), General Recommendation 14, Definition of Racial Discrimination,
U.N. Doc. A/48/18 at 114; UN, CESCR (1999), General Comment 13: The Right to Education,
UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999; UN, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (2004), General Recommendation No. 25: Art. 4, para. 1, of the Convention
(temporary special measures), UN Doc. A/59/38(SUPP), 18 March 2004; UN, Human Rights
Committee (1989), General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. A/45/40 (Vol. I.)
(SUPP), 10 November 1989; UN, CERD (2005), General Recommendation 30 on Discrimination
against Non-Citizens, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1, 4 May 2005.
155 Germany, Labour Court in Cologne, Az. 9 Ca 4843/15, 10 February 2016.
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labour court however dismissed the complaint. It accepted the arguments put
forward by the respondent company. It found that the difference in treatment
was justified as the company (car dealer) had no female employees and the
aim of the measure was to provide clients with both genders.
Under international law, the permissibility of taking positive measures in favour
of disadvantaged groups is further reinforced by guidance issued by several of
the monitoring bodies responsible for interpreting UN human rights treaties.
Namely, such measures should be appropriate to the situation to be remedied,
legitimate and necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, they should
respect the principles of fairness and proportionality, be temporary156 and they
shall not be continued after the objectives for which they have been taken have
been achieved.
According to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
in order to be permissible, the sole purpose of such measures should be the
elimination of existing inequalities and the prevention of future imbalances.157
State Parties should educate and raise the awareness of the public on the
importance of special measures to address the situation of victims of racial
discrimination, especially discrimination as a result of historical factors.158 In this
regard, the Committee observed that overcoming the structural discrimination
that affects people of African descent calls for the urgent adoption of special
measures.
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) emphasised
that treating in an equal manner persons or groups whose situations are
objectively different will, in effect, constitute discrimination. Moreover, it stated
that it is important that such measures are based on the realistic appraisal of
the current situation of individuals and communities, including accurate and
disaggregated data, and prior consultations with affected communities.159
156 UN, CERD (2009), General Recommendation 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc.
CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009, para. 16.
157 Ibid., paras. 21-26.
158 UN, CERD (2011), General recommendation No. 34: Racial discrimination against people of
African descent, 3 October 2011, CERD/C/GC/34.
159 CERD (2009), General Recommendation 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc.
CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009, paras. 21-26.
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The UN Human Rights Committee pointed out that the principle of equality
sometimes requires States Parties to take measures to diminish or eliminate
conditions which cause or perpetuate discrimination. In case “the general
conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their enjoyment
of human rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions.
Such action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population
concerned certain preferential treatment in specific matters as compared
with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action is needed to
correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the
Covenant.”160
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
elaborated that such ‘temporary special measures’ could include “preferential
treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and promotion; numerical goals connected
with time frames; and quota systems”.161 According to the case law of the CJEU,
discussed below, the proportionality of such measures will be measured strictly.
Under EU law, the EU non-discrimination directives expressly foresee the
possibility of positive action, stating: “[w]ith a view to ensuring full equality in
practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State
from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for
disadvantages linked to [a protected ground]”.162 The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights also affirms that special protection is necessary for certain groups, namely:
men and women (Article 23), children (Article 24), the elderly (Article 25) and
persons with disabilities (Article 26).
Under EU law, specific measures also appear as a justification of differential
treatment under the non-discrimination directives and in the case law of the
CJEU, as well as within the exception of a ‘genuine occupational requirement’,
as discussed later in Section 3.3.1.
160 UN, Human Rights Committee (1989), CCPR General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 10 November 1989.
161 UN, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (2004), General
Recommendation No. 25: Art. 4, para. 1, of the Convention (temporary special measures),
UN Doc. A/59/38 (SUPP), 18 March 2004, para. 22.
162 Racial Equality Directive, Art. 5; Employment Equality Directive, Art. 7; Gender Goods and
Services Directive, Art. 6; and also with a slightly different formulation: Gender Equality
Directive (recast), Art. 3.
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The principal CJEU cases concerning special measures have arisen in the context
of gender equality; namely the Kalanke case,163 the Marschall case164 and the
Abrahamsson case.165 Together, these cases defined the limits on how far special
measures can be taken to compensate for the previous disadvantages suffered
by, in these particular cases, female workers over the years.
Example: In Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, the CJEU took a strict approach to according preferential treatment to correct the underrepresentation
of women in particular posts. This case concerns legislation adopted at the
regional level, which accorded automatic priority to female candidates applying for posts or promotions. Where male and female candidates were equally
qualified, and where female workers were deemed to be underrepresented
in that sector, female candidates must be given preference. Underrepresentation was deemed to exist where female workers did not make up at least
half of the staff in the post in question. In this case, an unsuccessful male
candidate, Mr Kalanke, complained that he had been discriminated against
based on his sex before the national courts. The national courts referred the
case to the CJEU, asking whether this rule was compatible with Article 2 (4)
of the Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 (the predecessor to Article 3 of the
Gender Equality Directive on ‘positive action’), which states that: “This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity
for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which
affect women’s opportunities”.166
The CJEU stated that Article 2 (4) was designed to allow measures that,
“although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or
reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social
life”.167 It was accepted that the rule pursued the legitimate aim of eliminating
inequalities present in the workplace. Accordingly, measures that give
women a specific advantage in the workplace, including promotion, would
be acceptable, so long as these were introduced to bring an improvement in
women’s ability to compete in the labour market free of such discrimination.
163 CJEU, C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 17 October 1995.
164 CJEU, C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 11 November 1997.
165 CJEU, C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, 6 July 2000.
166 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC, OJ L 39, 14.02.1976, p. 40.
167 This wording has been largely adopted in the preambles to the discrimination directives:
para. 21 of the Gender Equality Directive (recast); para. 26 of the Employment Equality
Directive; para. 17 of the Racial Equality Directive.
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It was also stated, however, that any exception to the right to equal treatment
should be strictly construed. It was found that where the rule in question
guaranteed “women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or
promotion”, this would in fact be disproportionate to achieving the aim of
eliminating inequality relative to the right of equal treatment. Accordingly,
the preferential treatment could not be justified in this case.
Nevertheless, later cases show that specific measures may be acceptable where
the rule does not require automatic and unconditional priority to be accorded.
Example: The case of Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen168 concerns
legislation similar in substance to the Kalanke case. However, the rule in
question stated that equally qualified women should be given priority “unless
reasons specific to an individual male candidate tilt the balance in his favour”.
Mr Marschall, who was rejected for a post in favour of a female candidate,
contested the legality of this rule before the national courts, which referred
the case to the CJEU, once again asking if this rule was compatible with the
Equal Treatment Directive. The CJEU found that a rule of this nature was not
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of eliminating inequality as long as
“in each individual case, it provides for male candidates who are equally
as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that their candidatures
will be the subject of an objective assessment which will take account of
all criteria specific to the individual candidates and will override the priority
accorded to female candidates where one or more of those criteria tilts the
balance in favour of the male candidate”. Thus, discretion built into the rule
prevented the priority from being absolute and was therefore proportionate
to achieving the aim of addressing inequality in the workplace.
Example: The case of Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist169
concerns the validity of Swedish legislation, which falls in between the
unconditional priority of the rule in the Kalanke case and the discretion
created in the Marschall case. The rule stated that a candidate of an
underrepresented sex who possessed sufficient qualifications to perform
the post should be accorded priority, unless “the difference between the
candidates’ qualifications is so great that such applications would give rise to
a breach of the requirement of objectivity in the making of appointments”.
168 CJEU, C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 11 November 1997.
169 CJEU, C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, 6 July 2000.
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The CJEU found that in effect the legislation automatically granted candidates
from the underrepresented sex priority. The fact that the provision only
prevented this where there was a significant difference in qualifications was
not sufficient to prevent the rule from being disproportionate in its effects.
Example: In Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre
de la Justice and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités
locales,
170 the complainant was refused the right to early retirement. The
relevant national provisions provided this right for civil servants who have
three children and who have taken career breaks for each one of them.
The complainant was a father of three children, but he never took career
breaks. He complained this constituted indirect discrimination on grounds
of sex since biological mothers were automatically qualified. The CJEU found
that a measure such as an early retirement is limited to favouring an early
end to working life, but it does not compensate for the disadvantages that
the female servants may encounter in the course of their professional life.
Therefore, the measure cannot contribute to ensure full equality in practice
between men and women in working life. In conclusion, it held that the
contested provisions give rise to indirect discrimination, unless it can be
justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of
sex and it is appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim.
These cases highlight that the CJEU has generally been cautious in its approach
to allowing specific measures to override the principle of fairness. Only in limited
circumstances where the specific measures are not unconditional and absolute,
will the CJEU allow national rules to fall within the derogation of Article 2 (4).
When faced with an issue concerning specific measures under the EU nondiscrimination directives, practitioners must devote special attention to the
‘action’ that has been put in place to favour a particular grouping of persons. It is
clearly the position, as evinced by the CJEU case law above, that specific measures
are a last resort. Practitioners and court officials, if dealing with a case involving
specific measures, must ensure that all candidates considered by the employer in
question, including those that are not targeted by the special measures provision,
are assessed objectively and fairly for the position in question. Special measures
can only be utilised when an objective assessment has identified a number of
170 CJEU, C-173/13, Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice
and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités locales, 17 July 2014.
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candidates – including individuals from a targeted group – as equally capable
of fulfilling an available role. It is only in such circumstances that a member of
a targeted group, which is selected due to previous historic discrimination in
the workplace, can be selected ahead of an individual that falls outside of the
targeted group.
Furthermore, one positive action has been clearly distinguished from others.
Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive contains specific articulations
of the general rule of specific measures in relation to persons with disabilities,
which requires employers to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ to allow those
with physical or mental disabilities to be given equal employment opportunities.
This is defined as ‘appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to
enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance
in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose
a disproportionate burden on the employer’. Appropriate measures might include
installing a lift or a ramp or a disabled toilet in the workplace to allow wheelchair
access.171
Therefore, certain measures for the promotion of equality should be differentiated
from ‘affirmative action’ as they do not discriminate against any other individual
(for example, allowing breast-feeding in the workplace), and consequently there
is no reason for them to be temporary or used as a last resort.
Example: In European Commission v. Italian Republic,
172 the CJEU emphasised
that the obligation to adopt effective and practical measures where needed,
in particular cases as laid down in Article 5 of the Employment Equality
Directive, covers all employers. Under Italian law, not all categories of
employers were required to take appropriate measures, hence the CJEU
held that Italy had failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure the correct and full
implementation of Article 5 of the directive.
Under the ECHR, a state can be subject to positive obligations. The relevant ECtHR
case law of positive actions is mainly devoted to the issue of whether, in certain
situations, the state is obliged, rather than only allowed, to take positive actions.
171 For further details concerning reasonable accommodation, see Section 5.4.
172 CJEU, C-312/11, European Commission v. Italian Republic, 4 July 2013.
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Example: In Çam v. Turkey,
173 concerning the refusal of a music school
academy to enrol a student on the grounds of her visual impairment, the
ECtHR established that the state had failed to take positive steps to ensure
that students with disabilities could enjoy education in a non-discriminatory
manner. The ECtHR noted that discrimination based on disability also covered
the refusal to provide reasonable accommodation (for example, adaptation
of teaching methods to make them accessible to blind students).174
Example: In Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary,
175 a case concerning the placement
of Roma children in special schools, the ECtHR stressed that the state
had positive obligations to undo a history of racial segregation in special
schools.176 The ECtHR also observed that the state had specific positive
obligations to avoid the perpetuation of past discrimination or discriminative
practices disguised in allegedly neutral tests.177
Example: In Kurić and Others v. Slovenia,178 the applicants were nationals of
states that had formerly constituted part of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. Under one of the laws passed after Slovenia had declared
independence, the applicants were given six months to apply for citizenship
of Slovenia. As they did not do this, after the expiry of the six-month
deadline, their names were erased from the civil registry, resulting in their
statelessness and meaning they were residing illegally in Slovenia. The ECtHR
found that the prolonged refusal to resolve their residence status constituted
an interference with their right to private and/or family life, and that they had
been discriminated against because they were in a disadvantaged situation
compared with other foreigners in Slovenia. In doing so, the Court stressed
that “Article 14 does not prohibit Contracting Parties from treating groups
differently in order to correct ‘factual inequalities’ between them. Indeed,
in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through
different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification,
give rise to a breach of that Article”.179
173 ECtHR, Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 23 February 2016, discussed in Section 4.4.3.
174 Ibid., para. 67.
175 ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, 29 January 2013, see Section 4.4.3. See also
ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC] No. 15766/03, 16 March 2010.
176 ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, 29 January 2013, para. 127.
177 Ibid., 116.
178 ECtHR, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012.
179 Ibid., para. 388.
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Under the ESC, Article E prohibits all forms of discrimination including indirect
discrimination. According to the ECSR: “Such indirect discrimination may arise by
failing to take due and positive account of all relevant differences or by failing
to take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages that
are open to all are genuinely accessible by and to all”.180 A large number of ESC
provisions includes the obligation for States Parties to take positive measures.
For example, Article 23 of the ESC provides for the right of elderly persons to
social protection. Pursuant to this provision, states should adopt all appropriate
measures designed in particular to:
(i) enable elderly persons to remain full members of society for as long as
possible;
(ii) enable elderly persons to choose their life-style freely and to lead independent lives in their familiar surroundings for as long as they wish and
are able;
(iii) guarantee elderly persons living in institutions appropriate support, while
respecting their privacy, and participation in decisions concerning living
conditions in the institution.
The expression ‘full members’ means that elderly persons must not be excluded
on account of their age. The ECSR has interpreted this article as requiring the
introduction of legislation protecting elderly persons against discrimination.
Article 15 (2) of the ESC requires States Parties to promote an equal and effective
access to employment on the open labour market for persons with disabilities.181
To this end, legislation must prohibit discrimination on the grounds of disability182
to create genuine equality of opportunities in the open labour market,183 prohibit
the dismissal based on disability and confer an effective remedy on those who
are found to have been unlawfully discriminated.184 In addition, regarding working
conditions, there must be obligations on the employer to take steps in accordance
with the requirement of reasonable accommodation to ensure effective access to
employment and to keep in employment persons with disabilities, in particular
180 ECSR, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013,
12 October 2015, para. 237; ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint
No. 13/2002, 4 November 2003, para. 52.
181 ECSR, Conclusions XX-1 (2012), Czech Republic.
182 ECSR, Conclusions 2003, Slovenia.
183 ECSR, Conclusions 2012, Russian Federation.
184 ECSR, Conclusions XIX-1 (2008), Czech Republic.
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persons who have become disabled while in their employment as a result of an
industrial accident or occupational illness.185
Example: The case of The Central Association of Carers in Finland v. Finland186
concerns the reorganisation of long-term care services for elderly persons
in Finland. Service housing replaced the former institutional care facilities.
The main difference between the two care servive types was the pricing
system. Fees for long-term institutional care were fixed by law, making
the service available to persons with low income. In contrast, there were
no provisions regulating fees for service housing or service housing with
24-hour assistance, in particular there were no upper limits on fees. As
a result, persons in need of such services were charged much higher fees
than persons in institutional care. The complaining association alleged that
the lack of regulation and the pricing system created uncertainties and
prevented elderly persons from accessing services necessitated by their
condition. The Committee held that there had been a violation of Article 23
of the ESC. The ECSR considered the following arguments to be decisive in
its conclusion:
(i) insufficient regulation of fees and the fact that the demand for those
services exceeded supply caused legal uncertainties to elderly persons
in need of care owing to diverse and complex fee policies. It stressed
that “[w]hile municipalities may adjust the fees, there are no effective
safeguards to assure that effective access to services is guaranteed to
every elderly person in need of services required by their condition”;
(ii) the situation created an obstacle to the right to “the provision of
information about services and facilities available for elderly persons and
their opportunities to make use of them” as guaranteed by Article 23 (b)
of the ESC.
185 ECSR, Conclusions 2007, Statement of Interpretation on Article 15(2).
186 ECSR, The Central Association of Carers in Finland v. Finland, Complaint No. 71/2011,
4 December 2012.
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2.6. Hate crime
Key point
• Crimes motivated by prejudice, known as hate crimes or bias-motivated crimes, affect
not only the individuals targeted, but also their communities and societies as a whole.
Crimes such as threats, physical attacks, property damage or even murders
motivated by intolerance towards certain groups in society are described as hate
crimes or bias crimes. Hate crime can therefore be any crime that targets a person
because of their perceived characteristics. The essential element distinguishing
hate crimes from other crimes is the bias motive.
The other characteristic feature of hate crimes is that the impact of the offence
extends beyond the actual victims. It affects the whole group with which that
victim identifies himself or herself and can cause social division between the
victim group and society at large. Therefore, it poses particular danger to society.
For this reason, hate crimes should not be treated like ordinary crimes. To properly
deal with hate crimes, the bias motivation behind the act of violence must be
revealed. Hate crimes should thus be recognised in a legal order as a special
category of crimes. Special training, manuals, information and other appropriate
tools should be provided to improve the capacity to investigate and judge hate
crimes of persons (police officers, prosecutors, judges) dealing with them.
Under EU law, it is in principle established that hate crimes require a specific
criminal law response.187 Although the non-discrimination directives do not
oblige Member States to use criminal law to address acts of discrimination,
a Framework Decision of the European Council obliges all EU Member States
to provide for criminal sanctions in relation to incitement to violence or hatred
based on race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin, as
well as dissemination of racist or xenophobic material and condonation, denial
or trivialisation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity directed
187 European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2013 on strengthening the fight against racism,
xenophobia and hate crime (2013/2543(RSP)). See also FRA (2012), Making hate crime visible
in the European Union: acknowledging victims’ rights, Luxembourg, Publications Office, p. 15.
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against such groups.188 Member States are also obliged to consider racist or
xenophobic intent as an aggravating circumstance.
The only EU legal instrument that currently protects lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) victims of hate crime is the EU’s Victims’ Rights
Directive.189 It includes the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and
gender expression when recognising the rights of victims, helping to ensure
that victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and protection,
and are able to participate in criminal proceedings. Moreover, states are obliged
to carry out an individual assessment to identify specific protection needs of
the victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or discriminatory
motive (Article 22 of the directive).
It should be stressed that a victim does not have to be a member of the
group at which the hostility is targeted. Through the concept of discrimination
by association, protection is also provided to persons only assumed to have
a particular characteristic or otherwise associated with a group holding particular
characteristics.
Under the ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination entails an obligation to combat
crimes motivated by racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance or by a person’s
disability, sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, states have
a positive obligation to protect individuals against violence, specifically when
they were informed about the risk of lethal or serious bodily harm. The ECtHR has
stated in a number of cases190 that treating violence and brutality arising from
discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence, where there were
no such overtones, would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts
that were particularly destructive of fundamental rights. It also emphasised that,
while the choice of appropriate means of deterrence was in principle within the
state’s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against serious acts required
efficient criminal law provisions. The ECtHR has also ruled that states have an
obligation to investigate the existence of any possible discriminatory motive
188 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms
and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (Framework Decision on
racism and xenophobia), OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55.
189 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
190 See ECtHR, M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, No. 12060/12, 12 April 2016, para. 113.
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behind an act of violence and that overlooking the bias motivation behind a crime
amounted to a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR.191 This approach extends the
protection offered by the ECHR to members of vulnerable groups who are victims
of hate crime, regardless of whether that abuse is perpetrated by state agents or
third parties.192 In other words, violence with underlying discriminatory motives
constitutes an aggravated form of a human rights infringement. This should be
reflected in the way investigations are conducted, and victims supported and
protected.
Example: In Identoba and Others v. Georgia,
193 a case concerning
a homophobic attack against the participants of a peaceful assembly of LGBT
associations, the ECHR confirmed that ‘hate crime’ committed against
individuals based on sexual orientation amounted to a violation of Article 3
of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 14. The ECtHR emphasised
that the Georgian authorities had known or ought to have known the risks
surrounding the demonstration, considering the various reports on the
situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in Georgia. Since
the police protection had not been provided timely and adequately, the
authorities failed in their obligation to provide adequate protection.
Example: In M.C. and A.C. v. Romania,
194 the applicants were attacked by
a group of people on their way home from an annual gay pride march. They
were subjected to homophobic abuse and were punched and kicked. The
ECtHR found that the authorities had failed to take into account possible
discriminatory motives in the investigation of a homophobic attack and
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 (procedural limb)
read together with Article 14 of the ECHR.
Example: In Virabyan v. Armenia,
195 the applicant, a member of the opposition
party was arrested during an anti-governmental demonstration. He was
subsequently taken to the police station, where he sustained severe
injuries. He complained that he had been ill-treated in custody on account
of his political opinion. The ECtHR held that the state had failed to examine
a possible causal link between the alleged political motives and the abuse
191 See for example ECtHR, Abdu v. Bulgaria, No. 26827/08, 11 March 2014 discussed in Section 6.3.
192 For example, see ECtHR, R.B. v. Hungary, 64602/12, 12 April 2016, para. 39.
193 ECtHR, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, No. 73235/12, 12 May 2015, see also Section 4.7.
194 ECtHR, M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, No. 12060/12, 12 April 2016.
195 ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2 October 2012.
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suffered by the applicant. Therefore, it found a violation of Article 14 of the
ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3 in its procedural limb.
Example: In Nachova v. Bulgaria,196 two Roma men were shot dead while
fleeing from military police who sought to arrest them for being absent
without leave. A neighbour of one of the victims claimed that, immediately
following the shooting, the officer who had killed the victims shouted ‘You
damn gypsies’ at him. The ECtHR found that the state had violated the right
to life of the victims (under Article 2 of the ECHR), not only substantively,
but also procedurally, for failing to adequately investigate the deaths. It was
found that the failure to investigate also amounted to a violation of Article 2,
in conjunction with the right to be free from discrimination, since the State
was under a duty to specifically investigate possible discriminatory motives.
Example: The Škorjanec v. Croatia197 case concerns racially motivated acts
of violence. The ECtHR specified that the obligation on the authorities to
investigate possible racist motives concerns not only acts of violence based
on a victim’s actual or perceived personal status or characteristics, but also
those based on a victim’s actual or presumed association or affiliation with
another person who actually or presumably possesses a particular status or
protected characteristic. The ECtHR noted that the prosecuting authorities’
relied on the fact that the applicant herself was not of Roma origin and
refused to examine whether she was perceived to be of Roma origin by the
attackers. The authorities failed to take into account and establish the link
between the racist motive for the attack and the applicant’s association with
her partner, who was of Roma origin. As a result, ECtHR found a violation
of Article 3 under its procedural aspect in conjunction with Article 14 of the
ECHR.
In a series of cases, the ECtHR considered gender-based violence as a form of
discrimination against women.198
Example: In Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova,
199 the first applicant was
a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband, a police officer.
196 ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005.
197 ECtHR, Škorjanec v. Croatia, 25536/14, 28 March 2017.
198 See also ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009, discussed in Section 6.3.
199 ECtHR, Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, No. 3564/11, 28 May 2013.
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Their two daughters, the second and third applicants, regularly witnessed
the violence, which affected their psychological well-being. The ECtHR held
that the failure of the authorities to protect the applicants reflected the fact
that they did not appreciate the seriousness of violence against women. The
authorities’ lack of consideration for the problem of violence against women
in the Republic of Moldova amounted to discriminatory treatment based on
sex in violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR.
Example: In M.G. v. Turkey,
200 the applicant was beaten by her husband during
their marriage and threatened by him during their divorce. She complained
about the lack of protection by the authorities from such domestic violence,
and of systemic and permanent violence against women in Turkey. The
ECtHR found that, while the applicant had divorced in 2007, until the entry
into force of a new law in 2012 she had not had effective protection from
her ex-husband, despite her numerous requests submitted to the national
courts. Consequently, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 3 of the ECHR.
Example: In Halime Kiliç v. Turkey,
201 the applicant’s daughter had obtained
protection orders against her violent husband. However, the authorities
had not taken effective measures to protect her and she sustained fatal
injuries. The ECtHR found that the failure of the national authorities to punish
her husband for non-compliance with the protection order deprived them
of their effectiveness and he had continued to insult her with impunity.
Consequently, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 2 of the ECHR.
In addition to the obligation of investigation, states have a duty to prevent hatredmotivated violence on the part of private individuals of which the authorities had
or ought to have had knowledge202 or to intervene in order to protect victims of
crime in relation to the acts of private parties.
200 ECtHR, M.G. v. Turkey, No. 646/10, 22 March 2016.
201 ECtHR, Halime Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 63034/11, 28 June 2016.
202 ECtHR, Đorđević v. Croatia, No. 41526/10, 24 July 2012, paras. 138 and 149, discussed in
Section 2.4.2.
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Example: In 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and
4 Others v. Georgia,
203 an ultra-Orthodox group attacked a group of Jehovah’s
Witnesses. Although notified, the police did not intervene to prevent the violence.
The subsequent investigation was discontinued once the police asserted that it
was not possible to ascertain the identity of the defendants. The ECtHR found that
the failure of the police to intervene to protect the victims from racially motivated
violence and the subsequent lack of an adequate investigation amounted to
a violation of Article 3 (the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment) and Article 9 (the right to freedom of religion) in conjunction with
Article 14, since it was based on religious grounds, of the ECHR.
Under CoE law, the Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) condemns all forms of
discrimination against women.204
2.7. Hate speech
Hate speech encompasses any public expressions which spread, incite, promote or
justify hatred, discrimination or hostility towards a specific group. It is dangerous,
as it contributes to a growing climate of intolerance against certain groups. Verbal
attacks can convert into physical attacks.
According to European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,205 hate speech
is to be understood as the advocacy, promotion or incitement, in any form, of the
denigration, hatred or vilification of a person or group of persons, as well as any
harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatisation or threat with respect to such
a person or group of persons, as well as the justification of such types of expression.
203 ECtHR, 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 4 Others v. Georgia,
No. 71156/01, 3 May 2007.
204 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence, CETS No. 210, 2011. See Section 1.1.1.
205 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), General Policy Recommendation
No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, 8 December 2015.
Key point
• Hate speech is the advocacy of hatred based on one of the protected grounds.
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Discrimination categories
Hate speech may also take the form of public denial, trivialisation or the
justification of crimes against humanity or war crimes, and the glorification of
persons convicted for having committed such crimes.206
Hate crime and hate speech have the same aim of undermining the dignity and
value of a human being belonging to a particular group. However, unlike hate
crime, hate speech does not always have to a constitute criminal offence.
Under the ECHR, there is developing ECtHR case law on hate speech, including
hate speech on the internet, which involves balancing different rights: the
prohibition of discrimination, the right to private life and freedom of expression.
In the following examples, the ECtHR confirmed that the principle of nondiscrimination may limit the enjoyment of other rights.
Example: In M’Bala M’Bala v. France,
207 the applicant was a comedian,
convicted for expressing negationist and antisemitic views during his
live shows. He alleged that this conviction had breached his freedom of
expression. The ECtHR found that the expression of hatred and antisemitism,
and support for Holocaust denial could not fall within the protection of
Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court also found that the applicant “had sought
to deflect Article 10 from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of
expression for ends which were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the
Convention and which, if admitted, would contribute to the destruction of
Convention rights and freedoms”. His complaint was declared inadmissible.
Example: In Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden,
208 the applicants were
convicted for circulating homophobic leaflets in a school. The ECtHR held that
the interference with their freedom of expression had been necessary in
a democratic society because of the protection of the reputation and the rights
of others, and as such there had been no violation of Article 10 of the ECHR.
Example: In Karaahmed v. Bulgaria,
209 the applicant had attended a Sofia
mosque for regular Friday prayers. On the same day, around 150 supporters
of a right-wing political party came to protest against the noise emanating
from loudspeakers at the mosque during the call to prayer. They shouted
206 Ibid.
207 ECtHR, M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.), No. 25239/13, 20 October 2015.
208 ECtHR, Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, No. 1813/07, 9 February 2012.
209 ECtHR, Karaahmed v. Bulgaria No. 30587/13, 24 February 2015.
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insults at the gathered worshippers and threw eggs and stones. A scuffle
ensued between several demonstrators and worshippers when the former
installed their own loudspeakers on the roof of the mosque to cover the
sound of the prayers, and the latter attempted to remove them. Failure
by the domestic authorities to strike a proper balance in their measures to
ensure the effective and peaceful exercise of the rights of the demonstrators
and the rights of the applicant and the other worshippers to pray together,
as well as their subsequent failure to properly respond to those events and
particularly to hate speech, meant that the state had failed to comply with
its positive obligations under Article 9 (freedom of religion) of the ECHR.
Where third-party user comments are in the form of hate speech and direct
threats to the physical integrity of individuals, the Member States may be entitled
to impose liability on internet news portals if they fail to take measures to remove
clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the alleged
victim or from third parties.
Example: In Delfi AS v. Estonia,
210 the applicant company owned one of the
largest internet news portals in Estonia. Following the publication of an
article on the portal concerning a ferry company, a number of comments by
anonymous third parties, containing personal threats and offensive language
directed against the ferry company owner, were posted under the article.
The portal deleted the comments weeks later and only upon demand of
the applicant, but refused to pay damages. Defamation proceedings were
instituted against the applicant company, which was ultimately ordered
to pay € 320 in damages. The ECtHR found that the obligation to prevent
or remove unlawful comments and a sanction of € 320 imposed on the
applicant company had not constituted a disproportionate restriction on
its right to freedom of expression. As to the content of the comments, it
was found that expressions of hatred and blatant threats were manifestly
unlawful – amounting to hate speech – and therefore did not require any
further linguistic or legal analysis. 211
210 ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, 16 June 2015.
211 Compare with ECtHR, Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary,
No. 22947/13, 2 February 2016, where the Court observed that the use of vulgar phrases in
itself was not decisive and that it was necessary to have regard to the specificities of the style
of communication on certain internet portals. The expressions used in the comments, albeit
belonging to a low register of style, were common in communication on many internet portals,
so the impact that could be attributed to them was thus reduced.
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Discrimination categories
The ECtHR considered that an obligation for large news portals to take
effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech
inciting violence could not be equated to ‘private censorship’. In fact, the
ability of a potential victim of such speech to continuously monitor the
internet was more limited than the ability of a large commercial internet
news portal to prevent or remove unlawful comments.
The ECtHR is frequently called upon to balance competing rights. The following
examples are cases in which expressing opinions was considered to be more
important than the need to sanction hate speech.
Example: In Perinçek v. Switzerland,
212 the applicant, a Turkish academic, was
convicted for publically denying that there had been any genocide of the
Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire. Taking particularly into account
the context in which the statements were made, the fact that they had
not affected the dignity of the members of the Armenian community to
the point of requesting a criminal conviction, and the fact that there had
been no obligation under international law for Switzerland to criminalise
such statements, the ECtHR found that the applicant’s statements had
related to a matter of public interest and had not amounted to a call for
hatred or intolerance. The ECtHR concluded that it had not been necessary
in a democratic society to subject the applicant to a criminal punishment
in order to protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in the
present case.
Example: In Sousa Goucha v. Portugal,
213 the applicant, a well-known
homosexual TV host, was the subject of a joke during a live television
comedy show, which referred to him as female. The ECtHR did not consider
that a joke comparing gay men to women amounted to homophobic hate
speech. Therefore, the authorities’ decision not to prosecute did not violate
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.
Under international law, Article 20 of the ICCPR stipulates that any propaganda
for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
212 ECtHR, Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], No. 27510/08, 15 October 2015.
213 ECtHR, Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, No. 70434/12, 22 March 2016.
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In this regard, the Human Rights Committee pointed out that the prohibition
under Article 20, paragraph 1 extends to all forms of propaganda threatening or
resulting in an act of aggression or breach of the peace contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations. Paragraph 2 is directed against any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence, whether such propaganda or advocacy has aims which are internal
or external to the state concerned.214
Incitement to genocide is a crime under international law, punishable even if the
act in question was at the relevant time and place, and not illegal under local
law. In the famous judgment against Julius Streicher, the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg held that “in his speeches and articles, week after
week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of antiSemitism, and incited the German people to active persecution.”215 The IMT found
him guilty of crimes against humanity.
Article III of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide envisages that the acts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide
and complicity in genocide shall be punishable.
In 2003, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted three
former media executives of being key figures in the media campaign to incite
ethnic Hutus to kill Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994.216 They have been convicted of
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, and extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity. The
Chamber noted that “Hate speech is a discriminatory form of aggression that
destroys the dignity of those in the group under attack. It creates a lesser status
not only in the eyes of the group members themselves but also in the eyes of
others who perceive and treat them as less than human. The denigration of
a person on the basis of his or her ethnic identity or other group membership in
and of itself, as well as in its other consequences, can be an irreversible harm”.217
214 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 11.
215 International Military Tribunal, judgment of 1 October 1946, in: The Trial of German Major War
Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany,
Part 22, p. 501.
216 UN, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T.
217 Ibid.
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EU Issues covered CoE
Objective justification:
Racial Equality Directive, Art. 2 (2) (b);
Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (2) (b);
Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 2 (b);
Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 2 (1) (b)
Specific grounds of justification:
Genuine occupational requirement:
Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 14 (2);
Racial Equality Directive, Art. 4;
Employment Equality Directive, Art. 4 (1)
Religious institutions:
Employment Equality Directive, Art. 4 (2)
Age: Employment Equality Directive, Art. 6
Protection of public safety:
Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (5)
CJEU, C-354/16, Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH, 2017
CJEU, C-188/15, Bougnaoui and ADDH v. Micropole
SA [GC], 2017
CJEU, C-416/13, Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de
Oviedo, 2014
CJEU, C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 2000
CJEU, C-207/98, Mahlburg v. Land MecklenburgVorpommern, 2000
CJEU, Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986
Justification for
less favourable
treatment under
European nondiscrimination
law
ECHR, Art. 14
(prohibition of
discrimination)
3
Justification for less
favourable treatment
under European nondiscrimination law
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
In certain circumstances, the courts may accept that differential treatment
has been carried out but that it is acceptable. The approach to justification
under EU law, despite certain differences, is substantially similar to that of
the ECtHR.
Under the ECHR, the approach of the ECtHR is to operate a generally phrased
justification, in the context of both direct and indirect discrimination. In
contrast, under EU law, only specific limited exceptions to direct discrimination
are provided for, and a general justification is examined only in the context of
indirect discrimination. In other words, under the non-discrimination directives,
in cases of alleged direct discrimination, the difference in treatment can only
be justified where it is in pursuit of particular aims expressly set out in those
directives.
It should be noted that the justification test on objective grounds under the
ECHR and the justification test under the exceptions from non-discrimination
directives are very similar. Both tests involve the assessment of legitimacy of
goals pursued and of the proportionality of the means employed to achieve
those goals.
3.1. Application of objective justification
under ECHR
Key points
• Under the ECHR, differential treatment, in cases of alleged direct and indirect
discrimination, is subject to objective justification.
• Differential treatment may be justified where it pursues a legitimate aim and where
the means to pursue that aim are appropriate and necessary.
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Justification for less favourable treatment under European non-discrimination law
The objective justification is available
with regard to both direct and indirect
discrimination under the ECHR, According
to the ECtHR:
“a difference in the treatment of
persons in relevantly similar situations… is discriminatory if it has no
objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not
pursue a legitimate aim or if there
is not a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be
realised.”218
Accordingly, justified differential treatment will not constitute discrimination.
The ECtHR jurisprudence shows that
differential treatment relating to matters
considered to be at the core of personal
dignity, such as discrimination based on
race or ethnic origin, private and family life are more difficult to justify than
those relating to broader social policy considerations, particularly where these
have fiscal implications. The ECtHR uses in this connection the terminology of
the ‘margin of appreciation’, which refers to the state’s sphere of discretion in
determining whether differential treatment is to be justified. Where this margin
is deemed ‘narrow’, the ECtHR adopts a higher degree of scrutiny.
218 ECtHR, Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, para. 60; ECtHR,
Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 22 March 2016, para. 69.
To justify differential treatment, it must
be shown:
• that the rule or practice in question
pursues a legitimate aim;
• that the means chosen to achieve
that aim (that is, the measure which
has led to the differential treatment)
is proportionate to and necessary to
achieve that aim.
To determine whether the differential
treatment is proportionate, the court
must be satisfied that:
• there is no other means of achieving
that aim that imposes less of an
interference with the right to equal
treatment. Put otherwise, that the
disadvantage suffered is the
minimum possible level of harm
needed to achieve the aim sought;
• the aim to be achieved is important
enough to justify this level of
interference.
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3.2. Application of the objective
justification under EU law
Key point
• Under EU law, objective justification is available with regard to indirect discrimination.
Under EU law, a similar wording of possible objective justification is used by the
EU non-discrimination directives in relation to indirect discrimination. The Racial
Equality Directive states:
“[I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or
ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons,
unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary”.219
For example, in a case concerning placing electricity meters at an inaccessible
height,220 the CJEU held that, to justify such practice, the referring court should
determine whether there existed other appropriate and less restrictive means
to achieve the pursued aims (security of the electricity transmission and the
due recording of electricity consumption). If such measures did not exist, such
practice would not be disproportionate, only if the inhabitants of the district were
prejudiced in having access to electricity in conditions which are not of offensive
or stigmatising nature and which do enable them to monitor their electricity
consumption regularly.
In the context of employment, the CJEU has been reluctant to accept differential
treatment based on reasons of management that are related to the economic
concerns of employers, while it is more willing to accept differential treatment
based on broader social and employment policy goals with fiscal implications.
In cases concerning the latter considerations, the CJEU will accord states a broad
219 Racial Equality Directive, Art. 2 (b); Employment Equality Directive, Art. 2 (2) (b); Gender Goods
and Services Directive, Art. 2 (b); Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 2 (1) (b).
220 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015, (discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3).
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Justification for less favourable treatment under European non-discrimination law
‘margin of discretion’. For instance, the CJEU held that the aim to promote higher
education221 or to compensate the disadvantages of career breaks for bringing
up children222 were legitimate aims that can justify indirect discrimination. In
contrast, the CJEU stressed that the aim of restricting public expenditure cannot
serve as justification.223
The CJEU took similar approaches under the principle of non-discrimination, as
guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The CJEU indicated that
a difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable
criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by
the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the
treatment concerned.224
Example: The CJEU offered an in-depth explanation of the idea of objective
justification in Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von Hartz.
225 Here, parttime employees, who were excluded from the occupational pension scheme
of Bilka (a department store), complained that this constituted indirect
discrimination against women, since they made up the vast majority of
part-time workers. The CJEU found that this would amount to indirect
discrimination, unless the difference in enjoyment could be justified. In
order to be justified, it would need to be shown that: “the […] measures
chosen by Bilka correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking,
are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued, and are
necessary to that end”.
Bilka argued that the aim behind the difference in treatment was to
discourage part-time work and incentivise full-time work, since part-time
workers tended to be reluctant to work in evenings or on Saturdays, making
it more difficult to maintain adequate staffing. The CJEU found that this
could constitute a legitimate aim. However, it did not answer the question
of whether excluding part-time workers from the pension scheme was
221 CJEU, C-238/15, Maria do Céu Bragança Linares Verruga and Others v. Ministre de
l’Enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 14 December 2016.
222 CJEU, C-173/13, Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice
and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités locales, 17 July 2014.
223 CJEU, Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02, Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Mein and Silvia
Becker v. Land Hessen, 23 October 2003.
224 CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014.
225 CJEU, Case 170/84, Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber Von Hartz, 13 May 1986.
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proportionate to achieving this aim. The requirement that the measures taken
be ‘necessary’ implies that it must be shown that no reasonable alternative
means exists which would cause less of an interference with the principle
of equal treatment. It was for the national court to apply the law to the facts
of the case.
3.3. Specific grounds of justification
under EU law
Key points
• Under EU law there are specific exceptions to direct discrimination, which are tailored
to the context of field of protection.
• The specific exceptions include:
0 genuine occupational requirements;
0 exceptions in relation to religious institutions;
0 exceptions particular to age discrimination.
As noted above, under the non-discrimination directives a specific set of grounds
of justification exist allowing differential treatment to be justified in a limited set
of circumstances. The ‘genuine occupational requirement’ exception is present
in each of the directives226 (except the Gender Goods and Services Directive,
since it does not relate to employment). The requirement allows employers to
differentiate against individuals on the basis of a protected ground where this
ground has an inherent link with the capacity to perform or the qualifications
required for a particular job.227 The other two exceptions are found only in the
Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)228: first, the permissibility of
discrimination based on religion or belief by employers who are faith-based
organisations;229 and second, the permissibility of age discrimination in certain
226 Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 14 (2); Racial Equality Directive, Art. 4; Employment
Equality Directive, Art. 4 (1).
227 Ibid.
228 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, pp. 16–22.
229 Employment Equality Directive, Art. 4 (2).
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Justification for less favourable treatment under European non-discrimination law
circumstances.230 The strict approach of the CJEU to interpreting exceptions to
differential treatment suggests any exceptions will be interpreted narrowly,
since it places emphasis on the importance of any rights created for individuals
under EU law. 231
Additionally, Article 2 (5) of the Employment Equality Directive introduced
an exception from the prohibition of discrimination for reasons related to the
protection of public safety. The provision was intended to prevent and arbitrate
a conflict between the principle of equal treatment on the one hand, and the
necessity of ensuring public order, security and health, the prevention of criminal
offences and the protection of individual rights and freedoms on the other hand.
All of these are necessary for the functioning of a democratic society. Article 2 (5)
as an exception to the principle of the prohibition of discrimination must be
interpreted strictly. The CJEU held, for instance, that measures which aim to avoid
aeronautical accidents by monitoring pilots’ aptitude and physical capabilities to
ensure that human failure does not cause accidents are covered by Article 2 (5) of
the Directive. It found, however, that a provision prohibiting pilots from continuing
to work after the age of 60 was disproportionate.232 It also held that a provision
providing for an age limit of 60 yearsfor admission as a dentist under statutory
health insurance schemes may be regarded as compatible with Article 2 (5) of
the Directive, if it was to prevent a risk of serious harm to the financial balance
of the social security system to achieve a high level of protection of health.233
3.3.1. Genuine occupational requirement
According to the non-discrimination directives, in so far as they deal with the
sphere of employment:
“Member States may provide that a difference in treatment based on
a characteristic related to [the protected ground] shall not constitute
discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or the context in which they are carried out,
230 Employment Equality Directive, Art. 6.
231 See, for example, CJEU, Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, 15 May 1986, para. 36.
232 CJEU, C-447/09, Reinhard Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG [GC], 13 September 2011,
discussed in Section 3.3.3.
233 CJEU, C-341/08, Domnica Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe [GC], 12 January 2010, paras. 60-64.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement
is proportionate.”234
This justification allows employers to differentiate between individuals on the
basis of a protected characteristic, where this characteristic is directly related to
the suitability or competence to perform the duties required of a particular post.
Example: In Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo235 (discussed in
Section 5.5), the dispute concerns an age limit of 30 years for the recruitment
of local police officers. The CJEU confirmed that the possession of particular
physical capacities may be regarded as a ‘genuine and determining
occupational requirement’ within the meaning of Article 4 (1) of the
Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). Moreover, it noted that “the
possession of particular physical capacities is one characteristic relating to
age”.236 In this case, the CJEU concluded, however, that the age limit was
disproportionate.237
There are well established occupations that fall under the genuine occupational
requirement derogation: in Commission v. Germany, the CJEU, relying on
a Commission survey on the ambit of the derogation in relation to sex
discrimination, indicated particular professions where the exception was likely to
be applicable.238 Particular attention was given to artistic professions, which may
require particular attributes that belong to individuals as inherent characteristics,
such as requiring a female singer to fit with a taste in performance style, a young
actor to play a particular role, an able-bodied individual to dance, or men or
234 Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 14 (2); Racial Equality Directive, Art. 4; Employment
Equality Directive, Art. 4 (1).
235 CJEU, C-416/13, Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, 13 November 2014.
236 Ibid., para. 37.
237 See for CJEU reasoning Section 5.5. Compare with CJEU, C-229/08, Colin Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt
am Main [GC], 12 January 2010, para. 40 where the CJEU upheld the maximum recruitment age
of 30 for front-line officers. The CJEU stated that physical fitness was a characteristic related to
age and constituted a genuine and determining occupational requirement in the case. This was
because frontline duties requires exceptional high physical capacity. Compare also with CJEU,
C-258/15, Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de Policía y Emergencias [GC],
15 November 2016 discussed in Section 5.5, where the CJEU considered that the age limit at 35
years for recruitment as a police officer did not constitute discriminatory treatment.
238 CJEU, Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany,
21 May 1985.
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Justification for less favourable treatment under European non-discrimination law
women for particular types of fashion modelling. However, this was not an
attempt at providing an exhaustive list. Other examples might include employing
an individual of Chinese ethnicity in a Chinese restaurant to maintain authenticity,
or the employment of women in women-only fitness clubs.
Example: In Commission v. France, 239 the CJEU found that in certain
circumstances it is not unlawful to reserve employment positions primarily
for male candidates in male populated prisons and for female candidates
in female populated prisons. However, this exception could only be used in
relation to posts that entailed those activities where being of a particular
sex was relevant. In this case, the French authorities wished to retain
a percentage of posts for male candidates, as there may arise a need for
the use of force to deter potential troublemakers, along with other duties
for which male employees were deemed to be more suitable. Although the
CJEU accepted the arguments in principle, the French authorities failed to
satisfy the requirement of transparency regarding specific activities that
would need to be fulfilled by male candidates only; generalisations of sex
suitability will not suffice.
Example: In Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
240
a female police officer working in Northern Ireland complained that her
contract was not renewed. The Chief Constable justified this on the grounds
that female officers were not trained in the handling of firearms and this was
on the basis that “in a situation characterised by serious internal disturbances
the carrying of firearms by policewomen might create additional risks of their
being assassinated and might therefore be contrary to the requirements of
public safety”. The CJEU found that, while the threat to safety should be taken
into account, the threat applied equally to men and women, and women were
not at greater risk. Unless the justification related to biological factors specific
to women, such as the protection of her child during pregnancy, differential
treatment could not be justified on the grounds that public opinion demand
that women be protected.
Example: In Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
241 the complainant,
who was pregnant, was turned down for a permanent post as a nurse where
239 CJEU, Case 318/86, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 30 June 1988.
240 CJEU, Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
15 May 1986.
241 CJEU, C-207/98, Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 3 February 2000.
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a substantial amount of work was to be conducted in operating theatres.
This was justified on the basis that harm could be caused to the child
because of exposure to harmful substances in theatre. The CJEU found that
because the post was a permanent one, it was disproportionate to bar the
complainant from the post, because her inability to work in theatre would
only be temporary. While restrictions on the working conditions of pregnant
women were acceptable, these had to be strictly circumscribed to duties
that would cause her harm and could not entail a generalised bar to work.
Example: In Asma Bougnaoui and ADDH v. Micropole SA,
242 (discussed in
Section 5.8), the CJEU found that wearing an Islamic headscarf at work
could be seen as a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
The CJEU held that the Employment Equality Directive’s requirement of a
discriminatory rule being justified is only fulfilled if it is objectively dictated
by the nature of the occupational activities concerned or by the context
in which they are carried out. Therefore, the exception does not cover
subjective considerations, such as the employer taking into consideration
the particular request of the customer not wishing to be served by a worker
wearing an Islamic headscarf.
Example: In a case243 from Austria, a male gynaecologist complained about
the rules of the procedure for a contract award with the statutory health
insurance. Female candidates were automatically given 10 % more points in
the selection procedure. The complainant claimed that, although he received
the maximal number of points in all categories, he was placed third on the
list because of the point advantage that female physicians received. The
Austrian Supreme Court held that, in the circumstances of the case, sex
was a genuine occupational requirement because there was an insufficient
number of female gynaecologists (only 23 % of all gynaecologists were
female) and some patients prefer to have a female doctor.
Paragraph 18 of the preamble to the Employment Equality Directive contains
a more specific articulation of the genuine occupational requirement exception for
certain public services relating to safety and security. This is not of itself a separate
exception, but it should rather be regarded as making clear one of the consequences
of the genuine occupational requirement exception in a particular context:
242 CJEU, C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v.
Micropole SA [GC], 14 March 2017.
243 Austria, Austrian Constitutional Court, V 54/2014-20, 9 December 2014.
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“This Directive does not require, in particular, the armed forces and the
police, prison or emergency services to recruit or maintain in employment persons who do not have the required capacity to carry out the
range of functions that they may be called upon to perform with regard
to the legitimate objective of preserving the operational capacity of those
services.”244
Typically, this might apply to a situation of refusing certain posts that are deemed
to be highly physically demanding to those beyond a certain age, or with
a disability. In this respect, Article 3 (4) of the directive permits Member States
to expressly exclude the provision of its terms to the armed forces. While
this provision does not appear in the Gender Equality Directive (recast), it is
possible to appreciate how it might operate by examining two cases relating to
sex discrimination and the armed forces. These cases were considered under
Article 2 (2) of the Equal Treatment Directive, which contained the defence of
‘genuine occupational requirement’ now found in Article 14 (2) of the Gender
Equality Directive (recast).
Example: In Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence,
245
the complainant had served as a chef as part of a commando unit. She was
made redundant following cutbacks in military spending which introduced
the principle of ‘interoperability’ for commando units. ‘Interoperability’
required that each individual be capable of performing a combat role, due
to manpower shortages. The CJEU accepted that all-male commando units
were justified to guarantee combat effectiveness, and that the principle of
interoperability thereby excluded women. This was because the commandos
were a small, specialised force that was usually in the first wave of any
attack. The CJEU found the rule to be necessary in pursuit of the aim of
ensuring combat effectiveness.
Example: In Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
246 the complainant applied to
work as an electrical engineer in the armed forces. However, she was refused
the post, since women were barred from any military posts involving the use
of arms and could only participate in the medical and musical services of the
forces. The CJEU found that this exclusion was too wide, since it applied to
244 Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 17.
245 CJEU, C-273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence,
26 October 1999.
246 CJEU, C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 11 January 2000.
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almost all military posts, simply because women in those posts might have to
use weapons at some point. Any justification should be more closely related
to the functions typically performed in each particular position. The credibility
of the government’s justification was also questioned because in those
posts that were open to women, they were still obliged to undergo basic
weapon training for the purposes of self-defence or defence of others. The
measure was therefore not proportionate to achieving its aim. Furthermore,
distinctions should not be made between women and men on the basis that
women require greater protection, unless these relate to factors specific
to the circumstances of women, such as the need for protection during
pregnancy.
The ability to justify sex discrimination by referring to the effectiveness or
efficiency of particular security or emergency services may well prove more
difficult over time, as gender roles and social attitudes develop. In light of this,
Member States are under an obligation to reconsider restrictive measures
periodically.247
3.3.2. Religious institutions
The Employment Equality Directive specifically permits organisations that are
based around a ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ to impose certain conditions on employees.
Article 4 (2) of the Directive states that it does not interfere with “the right of
churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based
on religion or belief… to require individuals working for them to act in good faith
and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos”. Furthermore, employers connected
to religious organisations may fall within the scope of the ‘genuine occupational
requirement’ defence allowing for differential treatment based on religious tenets
of the organisation in question.
Article 4 (1) and 4 (2) thus allow organisations such as churches to refuse, for
instance, to employ women as priests, pastors or ministers, where this conflicts
with the ethos of that religion. While the CJEU has not yet had the opportunity
to rule on the interpretation of this provision, it has been applied at the national
level. Below are two cases relating to the invocation of this defence to justify
differential treatment on the basis of religion/belief.
247 Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 31 (3).
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Justification for less favourable treatment under European non-discrimination law
Example: In a case before the German courts,248 an employee in a childcare
centre run by a Catholic association was dismissed for leaving the Catholic
church. The Federal Labour Court found the complainant had violated his
obligation to loyalty. Although his work itself was not of religious nature, his
religion and belief constituted a genuine legitimate and justified occupational
requirement.
Example: In the Amicus case,249 the UK courts were asked to rule on the
compatibility of national regulations transposing the genuine occupational
requirement defence in the context of religious employers with the
Employment Equality Directive. It was emphasised that any exception
to the principle of equal treatment should be narrowly interpreted. The
wording of the national regulations permitted differential treatment where
the employment ‘is for the purposes of an organised religion’, and it was
underlined that this would be far more restrictive than ‘for purposes of
a religious organisation’. The court thus agreed with the submissions of the
government that this exception would apply in relation to a very limited
number of posts related to the promotion or representation of the religion,
such as religious ministers. It would not allow religious organisations, such as
faith schools or religious nursing homes, to argue that the post of a teacher
(which is for the purposes of education) or a nurse (which is for the purposes
of healthcare) was part of the ‘purpose of an organised religion.’
3.3.3. Exceptions on the basis of age
Article 6 of Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)250 provides two separate
justifications of differences of treatment on grounds of age.
Article 6 (1) allows age discrimination that pursues “legitimate employment
policy, labour market and vocational training objectives”, provided that this meets
the proportionality test. A limited number of examples for when differential
treatment may be justified is provided: Article 6 (1) (b) allows for the “fixing of
minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in service for
248 Germany, Federal Labour Court, 2 AZR 579/12, 25 April 2013.
249 United Kingdom, the United Kingdom High Court, Amicus MSF Section, R. (on the application of)
v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 860 (Admin), 26 April 2004.
250 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, pp. 16–22.
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access to employment”. However, this list is not intended to be exhaustive and
so could be expanded on a case-by-case basis.
The CJEU has repeatedly held that Member States enjoy a broad discretion in their
choice, not only to pursue a particular aim in the field of social and employment
policy, but also in the definition of measures capable of achieving it.251 The CJEU
accepted different aims that can be invoked by the respondent states, however,
it stressed that the social and employment policy objectives to be legitimate
must be of a ‘public interest nature’.252 For instance, it acknowledged that “the
aim of putting in place a balanced age structure in order to facilitate planning
of staff departures, ensure the promotion of civil servants, particularly the
younger ones among them, and prevent disputes that might arise on retirement”
was a legitimate policy aim.253 In a case concerning compulsory retirement for
university lecturers, it held that a legitimate aims could include the aim to provide
quality teaching and the best possible allocation of posts for professors between
the generations.254 In Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl,
255 the CJEU considered
whether the use of zero hour contracts for workers aged 25 years and under,
and provision for automatic dismissal on attaining the age of 25, constituted
unlawful age discrimination. It ruled that the provision was not precluded since it
pursued a legitimate aim of employment and labour market policy, and the means
laid down for the attainment of that objective are appropriate and necessary. In
Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH,
256 the CJEU found that the method of calculation of
early retirement pension for part-time workers did not amount to discrimination.
The CJEU also noted that an incentive to remain in the undertaking until the
statutory age of retirement cannot be created without giving the employee
making that choice an advantage compared to the employee who leaves the
undertaking early. It considered that such objectives, which aim to establish
a balance between the interests at issue, in the context of concerns falling within
251 CJEU, Joined cases C-501/12 to C-506/12, C-540/12 and C-541/12, Thomas Specht and Others v.
Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 19 June 2014, para. 46.
252 CJEU, C-388/07, The Queen, on the application of The Incorporated Trustees of the National
Council for Ageing (Age Concern England) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, 5 March 2009, para. 46.
253 CJEU, C-159/10 and C-160/10, Gerhard Fuchs and Peter Köhler v. Land Hessen, 21 July 2011,
para. 60.
254 CJEU, Joined cases C-250/09 and C-268/09, Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v. Tehnicheski universitet –
Sofia, filial Plovdiv, 18 November 2010, para. 52.
255 CJEU, C-143/16, Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v. Antonino Bordonaro, 19 July 2017.
256 CJEU, C-354/16, Ute Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH, 13 July 2017.
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employment policy and social protection, in order to guarantee the provision of
an occupational pension, may be considered public interest objectives.
Article 6 (2) permits age discrimination with regard to access to benefits under
occupational social security schemes, without the need to satisfy a test of
proportionality. The CJEU stressed that the exception provided for in Article 6 (2)
has to be interpreted restrictively257 and found that the age-related increases in
the pension contributions do not fall within the scope of this provision.258
Example: In David Hütter v. Technische Universität Graz,
259 the CJEU was
asked to consider a reference relating to an Austrian law providing that work
experience prior to attaining the age of 18 years could not be taken into
account for the purpose of determining pay. Mr Hütter and a colleague were
both apprentices for the TUG, who on completing their apprenticeships were
offered a three-month contract. On the basis of the legislation in question,
Mr Hütter, who was just over 18 years of age, had his pay determined with
reference to his acquired 6.5 months of work experience, whereas his
colleague who was 22 months older than him had her pay determined in line
with her acquired 28.5 months experience. This led to a difference in monthly
pay, despite each having gathered similar levels of experience. The CJEU
accepted that the legislation’s primary aims could be deemed legitimate: (1) so
as not to place persons who have pursued a general secondary education at
a disadvantage, compared with persons with a vocational qualification; and
(2) to avoid making apprenticeships more costly and thereby promote the
integration of young persons who had pursued that type of training into the
labour market. However, the CJEU found that an objective justification had
not been properly made out, as it had a disproportionate impact on younger
workers, especially in those cases where experience was equal, yet the age
of the applicant affected the value of remuneration, as in this case.
Example: The case Franz Lesar v. Telekom Austria AG260 relates also to Austrian
law which excludes taking into account periods of apprenticeship and of
employment completed by a civil servant before reaching the age of 18, for
257 CJEU, C-476/11, HK Danmark acting on behalf of Glennie Kristensen v. Experian A/S,
26 September 2013, para. 46.
258 Ibid., para. 54.
259 CJEU, C-88/08, David Hütter v. Technische Universität Graz, 18 June 2009.
260 CJEU, C-159/15, Franz Lesar v. Beim Vorstand der Telekom Austria AG eingerichtetes
Personalamt, 16 June 2016.
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the purpose of determining the entitlement to a retirement pension and the
calculation of its amount. The CJEU noted that the retirement scheme for civil
servants is a scheme which provides workers of a given occupational sector
with benefits designed to replace the benefits provided for by statutory social
security schemes, and seeks to ensure the “fixing […] of ages for admission
or entitlement to retirement or invalidity benefits” within the meaning of
Article 6 (2) of Directive 2000/78. Consequently, the CJEU found that this
difference in treatment that is based directly on the criterion of age may be
justified in so far as it seeks to guarantee within a civil service retirement
scheme a uniform age for admission to that scheme and a uniform age for
entitlement to the retirement benefits provided under that scheme.
Following the ruling in the Hütter case, Austrian law was amended. However,
transitional measures continued to disadvantage those persons who were
disadvantaged under the previous system and thus perpetuated age
discrimination.261 The Austrian government stated that the new law was
“motivated by budgetary considerations”. The CJEU held that budgetary
considerations may influence the measures chosen by the Member State, but that
they alone cannot constitute a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 6 (1)
of the Employment Equality Directive.262
The legitimate aims set out in Article 6 (1) have to relate to employment
policy, labour market and vocational training. Accordingly, only limited types of
legitimate aims may be put forward to justify the difference in treatment.
Example: In Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande AB263 the CJEU examined
a national measure, which allows an employer to terminate an employee’s
employment contract on the sole ground that the employee has reached
the age of 67 years and which does not take into account the retirement
261 According to the new law, periods of training and service prior to the age of 18 were taken into
account, but, at the same time, the law introduced – only for civil servants who suffered that
discrimination – a three-year extension to the period required for the promotion. See CJEU,
C-530/13, Leopold Schmitzer v. Bundesministerin für Inneres [GC], 11 November 2014,
paras. 9-15. See also C-417/13, ÖBB Personenverkehr AG v. Gotthard Starjakob, 28 January 2015
and CJEU, C-529/13, Georg Felber v. Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur,
2 January 2015.
262 CJEU, C-530/13, Leopold Schmitzer v. Bundesministerin für Inneres [GC], 11 November 2014,
para. 41.
263 CJEU, C-141/11, Torsten Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande AB, 5 July 2012.
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pension level that the person concerned will receive. The CJEU held that
such a measure can be objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate
aim of employment and labour-market policies, as long as it constitutes an
appropriate and necessary means by which to achieve that aim. The CJEU
noted that it is a mechanism which is based on the balance to be struck
between political, economic, social, demographic and/or budgetary
considerations and the choice to be made between prolonging people’s
working lives or, conversely, providing for early retirement.
Example: In Reinhard Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,
264 the
CJEU examined the mandatory retirement age of 60 for pilots employed by
Lufthansa. Pursuant to a clause in a collective agreement, the employment
contracts were automatically terminated at the end of the month in which
the sixtieth birthday fell. The age limits set in collective agreement were
lower than the limits set out in national legislation. The CJEU noted that
principles laid down in the Directive apply not only to legislative, regulatory
or administrative provisions, but also to collective agreements. With respect
to exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination on ground of age
provided for in Article 6, the CJEU held that air traffic safety did not constitute
a legitimate aim within the meaning of this Article.
The CJEU found that traffic safety considerations are a legitimate aim
under Article 2 (5) and Article 4 (1) of the Employment Equality Directive.
However, in the circumstances of the case, the automatic termination of
an employment contract at the age of 60 was disproportionate. The CJEU
referred in particular to national and international legislation permitting the
continuation of that activity, under certain conditions, until the age of 65.
Furthermore, the CJEU noted that there were no apparent reasons as to why
pilots, after having reached the age of 60, were considered to no longer
possess the physical capabilities to act in their profession.265
264 CJEU, C-447/09, Reinhard Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG [GC], 13 September 2011.
265 Compare with CJEU, C-45/09, Gisela Rosenbladt v. Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges.mbH [GC],
12 October 2010, where the CJEU held that collective agreements which provide for the
automatic termination of employment of employees who become entitled to an old-age
pension or who reach a set age (such as 65) can amount to justified age discrimination. The CJEU
took account of the fact that the retiring employees are entitled to financial compensation in the
form of a pension and that the compulsory retirement is based on an agreement, which makes
for considerable flexibility in the use of the mechanism, allowing the social partners to take
account of the overall situation in the labour market concerned and the specific features of the
jobs in question. The ECJ also observed that German law does not automatically force employees
to withdraw from the labour market as it prevents a person who intends to continue to work
beyond retirement age from being refused employment on the ground of age.
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Example: In the European Commission v. Hungary,
266 the CJEU examined
the proportionality of the law providing for the compulsory retirement of
judges, prosecutors and notaries on reaching the age of 62. The government
defended the disputed national measures on the grounds that they pursued
two objectives, first, the standardisation of the age-limit for compulsory
retirement in the public sector and second, the establishment of a ‘more
balanced age structure’ facilitating access for young lawyers to the professions
of a judge, prosecutor or solicitor, and guaranteeing them an accelerated
career. The CJEU held that those aims were legitimate. However, the CJEU
concluded that the lowering of the retirement age was not appropriate and
necessary to meet those aims. The reason for this conclusion was the abrupt
nature of the reduction in the retirement age from 70 to 62 within only
one year. The CJEU stated that the provisions “abruptly and significantly”
lowered the age-limit without introducing transitional measures. This meant
that the persons concerned could not prepare themselves. Furthermore, the
CJEU held that the amendments could not result in a balanced age structure
in the medium and long terms. The CJEU explained that, while in 2012 the
turnover of personnel would be significant owing to the fact that eight age
groups would be replaced by one single age group, that turnover rate will
slow down in 2013 when only one age group would have to be replaced.267
The CJEU held that the test formulated for objective justification of alleged indirect
justification is very similar to justification of direct age discrimination, however,
as the CJEU stressed it is not identical. Article 6 (1) of the Employment Equality
Directive imposes on states the burden of establishing to a high standard of proof
the legitimacy of the aim relied on as a justification.268
It should be noted that the approach of the CJEU is also consistent with that
of the ECtHR which examined the issue of different pensionable ages in the
context of the ECHR, discussed in Andrle v. the Czech Republic,
269 in Sections 4.2
and 5.1. In this sense, the exceptions relating to age are consistent with the courts’
approaches to employment and social policy justifications.
266 CJEU, C-286/12, European Commission v. Hungary, 6 November 2012.
267 A new law adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 11 March 2013 lowered the retirement age
for judges, prosecutors and notaries to 65 over a period of 10 years.
268 CJEU, C-388/07, The Queen, on the application of The Incorporated Trustees of the National
Council for Ageing (Age Concern England) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, 5 March 2009, para. 65.
269 ECtHR, Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08, 17 February 2011.
109
EU Issues covered CoE
TFEU, Art. 157
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 3 (1) (a)
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 3 (1) (a)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC), Art. 1,
Art. 14 (1) (a)
Council Directive (2003/109/EC),
Art. 11 (1) (a)
CJEU, C-548/15, de Lange v.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën,
2016
CJEU, C-122/15, C., 2016
CJEU, C-267/12, Hay v. Crédit
agricole mutuel, 2013
CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept
v. Consiliul Naţional pentru
Combaterea Discriminării, 2013
CJEU, C-7/12, Riežniece v.
Zemkopības ministrija and
Lauku atbalsta dienests, 2013
CJEU, C-147/08, Römer v. Freie
und Hansestadt Hamburg [GC],
2011
CJEU, C-79/99, Schnorbus v.
Land Hessen, 2000
CJEU, C-116/94, Meyers v.
Adjudication Officer, 1995
Employment ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, I.B. v. Greece, No. 552/10,
2013
ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others v.
Russia, No. 67336/01, 2009
4
Selected areas
of protection
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
TFEU, Art. 18
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC)
Council Directive (2003/109/EC),
Art. 11 (1) (d)
CJEU, C-299/14, Vestische Arbeit
Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen
v. García-Nieto, 2016
CJEU, C-318/13, X., 2014
CJEU, C-20/12, Giersch v. État du
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg,
2013
CJEU, Case 32/75, Cristini v.
SNCF, 1975
Welfare and
social security
ECHR, Art. 8 (right to respect for
private and family life), Art. 14
(prohibition of discrimination),
Protocol No. 1, Art. 1 (Protection
of property)
ECtHR, Gouri v. France (dec.),
No. 41069/11, 2017
ECtHR, Bah v. the United
Kingdom, No. 56328/07, 2011
ECtHR, Stummer v. Austria [GC],
No. 37452/02, 2011
ECtHR, Andrle v. the Czech
Republic, No. 6268/08, 2011
TFEU, Art. 18
Regulation on freedom of
movement of workers within
the Community (1612/68),
Art. 12
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 3 (1) (g)
Council Directive (2003/109/EC),
Art. 11 (1) (b)
CJEU, C-491/13, Ben Alaya v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
2014
CJEU, Joined cases C-523/11
and C-585/11, Prinz v. Region
Hannover and Seeberger v.
Studentenwerk Heidelberg,
2013
CJEU, C-147/03, Commission of
the European Communities v.
Republic of Austria, 2005
CJEU, Case 9/74, Casagrande v.
Landeshauptstadt München,
1974
Education ECHR, Art. 8 (right to respect for
private and family life), Art. 14
(prohibition of discrimination),
Protocol No. 1, Art. 1 (Protection
of property)
ECtHR, Çam v. Turkey,
No. 51500/08, 2016
ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria,
No. 5335/05, 2011
111
Selected areas of protection
EU Issues covered CoE
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive, Paragraph 13 of the
Preamble
Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, Art. 57
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC), Art. 3 (1) (h)
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 7, Art. 34 (3)
Council Directive (2003/109/EC),
Art. 11 (1) (f)
CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ
Razpredelenie Bulgaria”
AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot
diskriminatsia [GC], 2015
CJEU, C-571/10, Kamberaj v.
IPES [GC], 2012
Access to
supply of goods
and services,
including housing
ECHR, Art. 3 (prohibition of
torture), Art. 8 (right to respect
for private and family life),
and Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination), Protocol No. 1,
Art. 1 (Protection of property)
ESC (Revised), Art. E, Art. 13 (4),
and 31 (1)
ECtHR, Hunde v. the Netherlands
(dec.), No. 17931/16, 2016
ECtHR, Vrountou v. Cyprus,
No. 33631/06, 2015
ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v.
Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98
and 64320/01, 2005
ECSR, CEC v. the Netherlands,
No. 90/2013, 2014
ECSR, FEANTSA v. the
Netherlands, No. 86/2012, 2014
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 47
Access to justice ECHR, Art. 6 (right to fair trial)
ECtHR, Paraskeva Todorova v.
Bulgaria, No. 37193/07, 2010
ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v.
Belgium, No. 45413/07, 2009
ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v.
Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98
and 64320/01, 2005
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 7
CJEU, C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn
and Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto
savivaldybės administracija,
2011
CJEU, C-104/09, Roca Álvarez v.
Sesa Start España ETT SA, 2010
Right for respect
of private and
family life
ECHR, Art. 8 (right to respect for
private and family life), Art. 12
(right to marry) and Art. 14
(prohibition of discrimination)
ECtHR, Kacper Nowakowski v.
Poland, No. 32407/13, 2017
ECtHR, A.H. and Others v. Russia,
Nos. 6033/13 and 15 other
applications, 2017
ECtHR, Pajić v. Croatia,
No. 68453/13, 2016
ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v.
Greece [GC], Nos. 29381/09 and
32684/09, 2013
ECtHR, X and Others v. Austria
[GC], No. 19010/07, 2013
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 12
Political
participation
ECHR, Art. 10 (freedom of
expression), Art. 11 (freedom
of assembly and association),
Protocol No. 1, Art. 3 (Right to
free elections)
ECtHR, Pilav v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, No. 41939/07, 2016
ECtHR, Partei Die Friesen v.
Germany, No. 65480/10, 2016
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21
TFEU, Art 18 and 21
CJEU, C-182/15, Petruhhin
v. Latvijas Republikas
Ģenerālprokuratūra [GC], 2016
CJEU, C-42/11, Proceedings
concerning the execution of
a European arrest warrant
issued against João Pedro Lopes
Da Silva Jorge [GC], 2012
Criminal law
matters
ECHR, Art. 2 (right to life), Art. 3
(prohibition of torture), Art. 5,
Art. 6 (right to fair trial), Art. 7
(No punishment without law)
and Protocol No. 7, Art. 4 (Right
not to be tried or punished twice)
ECtHR, Martzaklis and Others v.
Greece, No. 20378/13, 2015
ECtHR, Stasi v. France,
No. 25001/07, 2011
ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland,
No. 39474/98, 2002
ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium,
No. 9106/80, 1988
Key point
• The scope of the ECHR is much wider than the EU non-discrimination directives – both
in terms of the substantive rights and the manner that these are interpreted for the
purposes of applying Article 14 of the Convention.
While European non-discrimination law prohibits direct and indirect discrimination,
it does so only in certain contexts.
Article 14 of the ECHR applies in relation to the enjoyment of all substantive rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, and Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR covers any right which
is guaranteed at the national level, even where this does not fall within the scope
of an ECHR right. Whereas the scope of the prohibition on discrimination under EU
non-discrimination directives extends to three areas: employment, the welfare
system, and goods and services. Currently, as discussed in Chapter 1, only the
Racial Equality Directive applies to all three areas. While legislation which will
extend the Employment Equality Directive to all three areas is under discussion,
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Selected areas of protection
this directive currently only applies to the context of employment. The Gender
Equality Directive (recast) and the Gender Goods and Services Directive apply to
the context of employment and access to goods and services but not to access
to the welfare system.
This chapter will set out the scope of application of European non-discrimination
law. In particular, it will examine substantive areas of protection covered.
4.1. Employment
Under EU law, protection against discrimination in the field of employment
is extended across all the protected grounds provided for under the nondiscrimination directives. It covers access to employment, conditions of
employment, including dismissals and pay, access to vocational guidance and
training, and worker and employer organisations.
The concept of ‘access to employment’ under the non-discrimination directives
has been interpreted widely by the CJEU. It applies to a person seeking
employment,270 and also in regard to the selection criteria271 and recruitment
conditions272 of that employment.273
Example: In Meyers v. Adjudication Officer,
274 the CJEU held that access to
employment covers “not only the conditions obtaining before an employment
relationships comes into being”, but also all those influencing factors that
need to be considered before the individual makes a decision of whether or
not to accept a job offer. Therefore, the granting of a particular state benefit
(payable depending on level of income) was capable of falling in this area.
This was because the candidate would be influenced by whether they would
be entitled to this benefit when considering their decision to take up a post.
Consequently, such a consideration had an impact on access to employment.
270 CJEU, C-415/10, Galina Meister v. Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, 19 April 2012.
271 CJEU, C-317/14, European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 5 February 2015.
272 CJEU, C-416/13, Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, 13 November 2014.
273 Racial Equality Directive, Art. 3 (1) (a); Employment Equality Directive, Art. 3 (1) (a); Gender
Equality Directive (recast), Art. 1 and 14 (1) (a).
274 CJEU, C-116/94, Jennifer Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, 13 July 1995.
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Example: In Schnorbus v. Land Hessen,275 the complainant applied for
a training post as part of her qualification to join the judiciary. Under national
law, it was necessary to pass a national exam, followed by a period of
training and a second exam. The complainant had passed the first exam,
but was refused a training post on the grounds that there were no vacancies.
Her entry was consequently delayed until the next round of posts became
available. The complainant argued that she had been discriminated against
because priority was accorded to male candidates who had completed their
military service. The CJEU found that national legislation regulating the date of
admission to the training post fell within the scope of ‘access to employment’
since such a period of training was itself considered as ‘employment’ both
in its own right and as part of the process of obtaining a post within the
judiciary.
Example: In Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării,276 concerning homophobic remarks made by financial patron
of a football, the CJEU held that the Employment Equality Directive applies to
statements concerning the recruitment policy of the club even though there
was no actual recruitment procedure open and there was no identifiable
complainant who claims to have been the victim of discrimination.277
Similarly, in interpreting what falls within the conditions of employment, the
CJEU has applied a rather broad interpretation. This has ultimately led to any
condition derived from the working relationship to be considered as falling within
this category.
Example: In Meyers v. Adjudication Officer,
278 the applicant, a single parent,
complained of indirect sex discrimination due to the method used for
calculating the eligibility of single parents for family credit. It fell to the CJEU
to clarify whether the provision of family credit (a state benefit) was solely
a social security issue, or whether it constituted a condition of employment,
an important factor in determining this consideration. The CJEU took into
275 CJEU, C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, 7 December 2000.
276 CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
25 April 2013.
277 See also CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma
Feryn NV, 10 July 2008.
278 CJEU, C-116/94, Jennifer Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, 13 July 1995.
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consideration that the family credit in question was payable when the
following three conditions were satisfied: the income of the claimant does
not exceed a specified amount; the claimant or their partner was working;
the claimant or their partner had responsibility for a child. The CJEU held that
the Equal Treatment Directive (now replaced by the Gender Equality Directive
(recast)) would not be considered inapplicable solely because the benefit in
question formed part of a social security system. Instead, a wider approach
was adopted looking at whether the benefit was given in connection to
a working relationship. In this case, to benefit from the family credit system,
the applicant had to establish that either they, or their partner, were engaged
in remunerative work. This requirement to establish a working relationship
brought the family credit system within the category of a working condition.
Applying such a wide definition to the concept of employment and working
conditions led the CJEU to find that the provision of workplace nurseries;279 the
reduction of working time,280 the conditions for granting parental leave281 also
fell within its ambit.
The CJEU has also adopted a fairly inclusive approach to the issues of dismissals
and pay. In relation to the ambit of dismissals, this covers almost all situations
where the working relationship is brought to an end. This has been held to
include, for example, where the working relationship has been brought to an
end as part of a voluntary redundancy scheme,282 or where the relationship has
been terminated through compulsory retirement.283
Example: In Riežniece v. Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta dienests,
284
the claimant, a civil servant, had been dismissed after taking parental leave.
The official reason for dismissal was the suppression of the applicant’s post.
The CJEU ruled that the method for assessing workers in the context of the
279 CJEU, C-476/99, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij,
19 March 2002.
280 CJEU, C-236/98, Jämställdhetsombudsmannen v. Örebro läns landsting, 30 March 2000.
281 CJEU, C-222/14, Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon
Dikaiomaton, 16 July 2015.
282 CJEU, Case 19/81, Arthur Burton v. British Railways Board, 16 February 1982.
283 CJEU, C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA [GC], 16 October 2007.
284 CJEU, C-7/12, Nadežda Riežniece v. Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta dienests,
20 June 2013.
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suppression of a post must not place workers who have taken parental leave
in a less favourable situation than other workers. The CJEU concluded that
there had been indirect discrimination because parental leave is taken by
a higher proportion of women than men.
The concept of pay has been defined in Article 157 of the Treaty of the Functioning
of the EU as being the “ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or
indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer”. This covers a wide
variety of benefits that a worker receives due to having entered a working
relationship. The ambit of this definition has been considered in a range of cases
before the CJEU, and this has been held to cover all benefits associated with
a job, including concessionary rail travel,285 expatriation allowances,286 Christmas
bonuses,287 and occupational pensions,288 taking account of periods of military
service,289 and continued payment of wages in the event of illness.290 What one
is essentially looking for in determining whether the issue falls within the term
‘pay’ is some form of benefit, which is derived from the existence of a working
relationship.
Example: In Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,291 the
complainant worked for the City of Hamburg as an administrative employee
until he became incapacitated for work. After he entered a civil partnership
with his long-term partner, he requested his supplementary retirement
pension to be recalculated on the basis of a more favourable tax deduction
category available for married couples. The competent administration
refused on the ground that the applicant was not married but in a registered
partnership. The CJEU confirmed that supplementary retirement pensions
such as those paid to the complainant constitute pay. Consequently, if
285 CJEU, Case 12/81, Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Limited, 9 February 1982.
286 CJEU, Case 20/71, Luisa Sabbatini, née Bertoni, v. European Parliament, 7 June 1972.
287 CJEU, C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v. Lothar Denda, 21 October 1999.
288 CJEU, C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group,
17 May 1990.
289 CJEU, C-220/02, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten v.
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 8 June 2004.
290 CJEU, C-171/88, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG,
13 July 1989.
291 CJEU, C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [GC], 10 May 2011.
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a Member State has a registered partnership putting same-sex couples into
a legal position comparable to married couples, exclusion from marriage
benefits constitutes direct discrimination. Protection of marriage and the
family as such, cannot serve as valid justification for such discrimination. The
CJEU ruled that same-sex couples must have access to employment, benefits
including the right to retirement pensions granted to married couples.
Example: In the case of C.,292 concerning supplementary tax on income from
a retirement pension, the CJEU pointed out that the meaning of ‘pay’ should
be interpreted broadly within the scope of the Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78). The CJEU stressed that the notion of ‘pay’ covers any benefit that
the employee receives in respect to their employment. The concept of ‘pay’ is
also independent of whether it is received under a contract of employment,
by virtue of legislative provisions, or on a voluntary basis. It might also
include benefits that are paid after the termination of employment or to
ensure that a worker receives income even where they are not performing
any work. However, the CJEU held that tax on retirement pension income is
external to the employment relationship and, therefore, does not fall within
the scope of the Employment Equality Directive and Article 157 of the TFEU.
It directly and exclusively derives from national tax legislation, applicable to
a certain category of persons as specified in relevant tax provisions.
Example: In Frédéric Hay v.Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des
Deux-Sèvres,
293 the CJEU considered that benefits envisaged for employees
on the occasion of their marriage form a part of an employee’s pay. The
claimant, a homosexual man in a relationship with another man, had been
refused the benefit on the ground that he did not fulfil the condition of
getting married, a requirement for obtaining it. The CJEU found that the
difference in treatment between married persons and those in a civil
partnership amounted to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
292 CJEU, C-122/15, C., 2 June 2016.
293 CJEU, C-267/12, Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres,
12 December 2013. See Section 2.1.2.
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The definition of ‘vocational guidance and training’ has received attention from
the CJEU in the context of free movement of persons.294 The CJEU has adopted
a broad interpretation of this term.
Example: In Gravier v. City of Liège,295 a student who was a French national
wished to study strip cartoon art at the Académie de Beaux-Arts in Liège.
The complainant was charged a registration fee, whereas students from
the host state were not. The CJEU stated that vocational training includes:
“any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a particular
profession, trade or employment or which provides the necessary training
and skills for such a profession, trade or employment …, whatever the age
and the level of training of the pupils or students, and even if the training
programme includes an element of general education”.
Example: The above definition of vocational training was applied in Blaizot v.
University of Liège and Others,
296 where the complainant applied for a course
to study veterinary medicine. The CJEU found that in general a university
degree will also fall within the meaning of ‘vocational training’ even where
the final qualification awarded at the end of the programme does not directly
provide for the qualification required of a particular profession, trade or
employment. It was sufficient that the programme in question provides
knowledge, training or skills required within a particular profession, trade
or employment. Thus, where particular trades do not require a formal
qualification, or where the university degree does not of itself constitute
the formal entry requirement to a profession, this will not prevent the
programme being regarded as ‘vocational training’. The only exceptions
to this are “certain courses of study, which of their particular nature, are
intended for persons wishing to improve their general knowledge rather
than prepare themselves for an occupation”.
Example: In J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën297 (discussed in
Section 5.5), the CJEU ruled that the tax treatment of vocational training costs
incurred by a person may affect the actual accessibility to such training.
294 According to Art. 7 (3) of Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement of workers within the
Community, a worker shall “have access to training in vocational schools and retraining
schools” without being subject to less favourable conditions when compared to national
workers (OJ L 271, 19.10.1968, p. 2).
295 CJEU, Case 293/83, Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège, 13 February 1985.
296 CJEU, Case 24/86, Vincent Blaizot v. University of Liège and Others, 2 February 1988.
297 CJEU, C-548/15, J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 10 November 2016.
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In this case, the right to deduct the costs of vocational training from their
taxable income differed, depending on age. The CJEU left it to the national
court to determine if the national legislation was necessary to attain the
objective of promoting the position of young people in the labour market.
Under EU law, the prohibition of discrimination also applies in relation to worker
and employer organisations. This does not only deal with membership and access
to a worker or employer organisations, but it also covers the involvement of
persons within these organisations. According to guidance issued by the European
Commission, this aims to ensure that discrimination is removed as regards
membership or benefits derived in the context of these bodies.298
As regards pregnancy and maternity related discrimination, please see Section 5.1.
The national courts also interpret the prohibition of discrimination in the field of
employment widely.
Example: In a case from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,299 an
employer decided not to extend the contract of an employee, nor to offer her
a new one, after he discovered that she was pregnant. The domestic court
held that this constituted discrimination owing to pregnancy.
Example: In a case from Poland,300 the complainant was an English teacher
of Ukrainian nationality. She had been employed for over 12 years in a Polish
school on the basis of a number of definite duration contracts, unlike some
other teachers who were employed under indefinite duration contracts. The
school authorities argued that the reason for offering fixed-term contracts
was, among others, the limited duration of her residence permits. The
Supreme Court noted that prohibition of discrimination covered all stages
of employment, including this type of employment contract. It stated that
this differential treatment, if it resulted only from Ukrainian nationality and
residence permits, constituted discrimination on grounds of nationality.
298 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM (1999) 566 final, 25.11.1999.
299 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Primary Court II Skopje, I RO No. 618/15,
3 March 2016, Source: European Equality Law Review (2016), vol. 2, p. 97.
300 Poland, Polish Supreme Court, III PK 11/16, 7 November 2016; the court quashed the judgment
and remitted the case to determine if the reasons for concluding definite contracts were
discriminatory.
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Although the ECHR does not guarantee a right to employment, Article 8 has been
interpreted as covering the sphere of employment under certain circumstances.
In Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania,
301 a government ban on former KGB agents
accessing employment in the public sector and parts of the private sector was
held to fall within the ambit of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14. Namely, it
“affected their ability to develop relationships with the outside world to a very
significant degree and has created serious difficulties for them in terms of earning
their living, with obvious repercussions on the enjoyment of their private lives”.302
Similarly in Bigaeva v. Greece, it was held that Article 8 can also apply in the
sphere of employment, such as in the context of access to a profession.303
Example: In I.B. v. Greece,
304 the applicant had been dismissed from his
job, following complaints by staff members that he was HIV-positive. The
ECtHR found that issues concerning employment and situations involving
persons with HIV came within the scope of private life, and held that the
applicant’s dismissal had been in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken
in conjunction with Article 8. The ECtHR based its conclusion on the fact that
the Court of Cassation had failed to adequately explain how the employer’s
interests in maintaining a harmonious working environment had prevailed
over those of the applicant. In other words, it had failed to balance the
competing interests of the applicant and the employer in a manner required
by the Convention.
The ECtHR has also prohibited discrimination on the basis of membership of
a trade union. The right to form trade unions is guaranteed as a stand-alone
right in the ECHR.305
Example: In Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, 306 the applicants had
experienced harassment and less favourable treatment from their employer
on the basis of their membership in a trade union. Their civil claims before the
301 ECtHR, Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, Nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, 27 July 2004,
discussed in Section 6.4.
302 Ibid., para. 48.
303 ECtHR, Bigaeva v. Greece, No. 26713/05, 28 May 2009.
304 ECtHR, I.B. v. Greece, No. 552/10, 3 October 2013.
305 For example, ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], No. 34503/97, 12 November 2008.
306 ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, No. 67336/01, 30 July 2009.
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national courts were dismissed, since discrimination could only be established
in criminal proceedings. However, the public prosecutor refused to bring
criminal proceedings because the standard of proof required the state to
show ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that discrimination had been intended
by one of the company’s managers. The ECtHR found that the absence
of effective judicial protection of freedom of association for trade unions
in national law amounted to a violation of Article 11 in conjunction with
Article 14.
Under the ESC, Article 1 (2) requires that national legislation prohibits any
discrimination in employment, inter alia on grounds of sex, race, ethnic origin,
religion, disability, age,307 sexual orientation and political opinion, including
on grounds of conscientious objection or non-objection.308 Discrimination is
prohibited regarding recruitment or employment conditions in general (in
particular, remuneration, training, promotion, transfer and dismissal or other
detrimental action).309 There must be adequate legal safeguards against
discrimination in regard to part-time work. In particular, there must be rules to
prevent non-declared work through overtime, and equal pay, in all its aspects,
between part-time and full-time employees.310
Article 4 (3) of the ESC guarantees the right to equal pay for work of equal value
without discrimination on grounds of sex. Article 20 of the Charter also concerns
matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on grounds of sex,
including pay. Article 27 of the ESC aims at ensuring that all persons with family
responsibilities and who are engaged or wish to engage in employment have
a right to do so without being subject to discrimination and as far as possible
without conflict between their employment and family responsibilities.
307 ECSR, Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway, Complaint No. 74/2011, Decision on the
merits of 2 July 2013, paras. 115-117.
308 ECSR, Confederazione Generale italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013,
Decision on the merits of 12 October 2015, para. 238; ECSR, Conclusions 2006, Albania; ECSR,
Conclusions 2012, Iceland, Moldova and Turkey.
309 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1 (2002), Austria.
310 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1 (2002), Austria.
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4.2. Access to welfare and social security
Under EU law, only the Racial Equality Directive provides broad protection against
discrimination in accessing the welfare system and other forms of social security.
Encompassed within this is access to benefits in kind that are held ‘in common’
by the state, such as public healthcare, education and the social security system.
The precise ambit of the area of social protection, including social security
and healthcare, is uncertain, since it is not explained within the Racial Equality
Directive and has yet to be interpreted through the CJEU case law. The Social
Security Directive (79/7)311 provides for equal treatment on the basis of sex, only
in relation to ‘statutory social security schemes’ as opposed to ‘occupational social
security’ schemes, which is dealt with in the Gender Equality Directive (recast).
Article 3 of the Social Security Directive defines these as schemes which provide
protection against sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents at work and occupational
diseases and unemployment, in addition to “social assistance, in so far as it is
intended to supplement or replace” the former schemes. The material scope of
the Gender Equality Directive (recast) is defined in its Article 7. It covers the same
risks as the Social Security Directive. According to Article 7 (1) (b) of the Gender
Equality Directive, it also applies to occupational social security schemes which
provide for other social benefits, in cash or in kind, and in particular survivors'
benefits and family allowances, if such benefits constitute a consideration paid
by the employer to the worker by reason of the latter's employment.
The distinction between statutory social security schemes and occupational
schemes of social security is relevant, since certain exceptions are allowed under
the Social Security Directive but not under the Gender Equality Directive (recast).
Example: The case of X.312concerns the criteria for the granting of disability
allowance which was part of the statutory social security system falling
within the scope of the Social Security Directive (79/7/EEC). The claimant,
a man, had received compensation for a work accident. The awarded
amount was smaller than the amount that a woman of the same age and
in a comparable situation would have been paid. The CJEU rejected the
government’s justification that this difference in the level of compensation
311 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.
312 CJEU, C-318/13, X., 3 September 2014.
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is justified because the life expectancies of men and women are different.313
The CJEU pointed to the fact that from the general statistical data, according
to sex, it cannot be concluded that a female insured person always has
a greater life expectancy than a male insured person of the same age, placed
in a comparable situation.
The scope of ‘social advantages’ is well developed through the CJEU case law in
the context of the law on free movement of persons and has been afforded an
extremely broad definition.
Example: In the Cristini case,314 the complainant was an Italian national living
with her children in France, whose late husband had been a ‘worker’ under
EU law. The French railways offered concessionary travel passes for large
families, but refused such a pass to Ms Cristini on the basis of her nationality.
It was argued that ‘social advantages’ for the purposes of EU law were only
those advantages that flowed from a contract of employment. The CJEU
disagreed, finding that the term should include all advantages regardless
of any contract of employment, including passes for reduced rail fares.315
Example: In Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v. Jovanna
García-Nieto and Others,316 a German employment centre refused to grant
subsistence benefits to a Spanish national and his son for their first three
months of residency in Germany. Under German legislation, foreign nationals
do not have a right to obtain any social benefits during the first three months
of residency in Germany. The CJEU found that this rule complied with EU
legislation. The Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC establishes a right for EU
citizens to reside in other EU states for up to three months without any
formalities apart from the obligation to hold a valid ID card or passport.
Therefore, the directive allows the state to refuse social assistance to EU
citizens during the first three months of their residency in that territory. They
should have sufficient means of subsistence and personal medical cover
313 Ibid. paras. 37-40.
314 CJEU, Case 32/75, Anita Cristini v. Société nationale des chemins de fer français,
30 September 1975.
315 See also CJEU, C-75/11, European Commission v. Republic of Austria, 4 October 2012 concerning
the scheme of reduced fares on public transport in Austria.
316 CJEU, C-299/14, Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v. Jovanna García-Nieto and
Others, 25 February 2016.
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during this period. The CJEU concluded that such refusal does not require
assessment of the individual situation of the person concerned.
Example: In Elodie Giersch and Others v. État du Grand-Duché de
Luxembourg,
317 the claimants, children of frontier workers employed in
Luxembourg, were not eligible for financial aid for higher education studies
because they had not resided in Luxembourg. The CJEU noted that a Member
State may reserve student aid for individuals who have a sufficiently close
connection to that Member State. However, states assessing the actual
degree of attachment that an individual has with the society or with the
labour market of that Member State cannot rely solely on a residency
condition. They should also take into account other elements. For example,
the fact that one of the parents, who continues to support that student, is
a frontier worker who has stable employment in that Member State and has
already worked there for a significant period of time.
The CJEU defined ‘social advantages’ in the Even case as advantages:
“which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally
granted to national workers primarily because of their objective status as
workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national
territory and the extension of which to workers who are nationals of other
Member States therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within
the Community”.318
The term applies to virtually all rights so long as they satisfy the Even definition:
there is no distinction between a right that is granted absolutely or those rights
granted on a discretionary basis. Further, the definition does not preclude those
rights granted after the termination of the employment relationship being
deemed a social advantage such as a right to a pension.319 Essentially, in the
context of free movement, a social advantage relates to any advantage that
is capable of assisting the migrant worker to integrate into the society of the
host state. The courts have been quite liberal in finding an issue to be a social
advantage, for example:
317 CJEU, C-20/12, Elodie Giersch and Others v. État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 20 June 2013.
318 CJEU, Case 207/78, Criminal proceedings against Gilbert Even and Office national des pensions
pour travailleurs salariés (ONPTS), 31 May 1979, para. 22.
319 CJEU, C-35/97, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic,
24 September 1998.
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• the payment of an interest-free ‘childbirth loan’ – despite the rationale
behind the loan being to stimulate childbirth, the CJEU considered this to
be a social advantage as it was viewed as a vehicle to alleviate financial
burdens on low-income families;320
• the awarding of a grant under a cultural agreement to support national
workers to study abroad;321
• the right to hear a criminal prosecution against an individual in the language of their home state;322
• payment of disability benefits which are intended to compensate for the
extra expenses connected with their disability.323
Under the ECHR, there is no right to social security, though it is clear from the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR that some forms of social security such as benefit
payments and pensions may fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1324
or of Article 8.325
Example: In Andrle v. the Czech Republic,
326 the applicant complained that,
unlike for women, there was no lowering of the pensionable age for men
who had raised children. The ECtHR found that this difference in treatment
between men and women was objectively and reasonably justified to
compensate for the inequalities women face (such as generally lower salaries
and pensions) and the hardship generated by the expectation that they would
work on a full-time basis and take care of the children and the household.
Consequently, the timing and the extent of the measures taken to rectify
the inequality in question had not been manifestly unreasonable and there
320 CJEU, Case 65/81, Francesco Reina and Letizia Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg,
14 January 1982.
321 CJEU, Case 235/87, Annunziata Matteucci v. Communauté française of Belgium and
Commissariat général aux relations internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium,
27 September 1988.
322 CJEU, Case 137/84, Criminal proceedings against Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 11 May 1985.
323 CJEU, C-206/10, European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 May 2011.
324 See for example ECtHR, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], No.53080/13, 13 December 2016,
concerning the right to disability pension.
325 In particular, see the following cases: ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], No. 55707/00,
18 February 2009; ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria, No. 17371/90, 16 September 1996; and ECtHR,
Koua Poirrez v. France, No. 40892/98, 30 September 2003, all discussed in Section 5.7.
326 ECtHR, Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08, 17 February 2011.
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had not been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.327
Example: In Stummer v. Austria,
328 the applicant had spent about twentyeight years of his life in prison and had worked for lengthy periods during that
time. The national pension scheme did not take work in prison into account
when calculating his pension rights. The ECtHR held that the affiliation of
working prisoners to the old-age pension system remained a question of
choice of social and economic policy within a large margin of appreciation
of the state and found no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Example: In Fábián v. Hungary,
329 the applicant, a pensioner employed by
the civil service, complained about legislative amendment which upended
the payment of old-age pensions to persons simultaneously employed in
certain categories of the public sector, whereas pensioners working in the
private sector remained eligible to receive the pension. The ECtHR held
that the applicant had not demonstrated that, as a pensioner employed
by the civil service, he was in a relevantly similar situation to pensioners
employed in the private sector as regards his eligibility for the payment
of old-age pensions. As such, there had been no violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The ECtHR found that, following
the amendment, it was the applicant’s post-retirement employment in the
civil service that entailed the suspension of his pension payments. It was
precisely the fact that, as a civil servant, he was in receipt of a salary from
the state that was incompatible with the simultaneous disbursement of an
old-age pension from the same source. As a matter of financial, social and
employment policy, the impugned bar on simultaneous accumulation of
pension and salary from the state budget had been introduced as part of
legislative measures aimed at correcting financially unsustainable features
in the pension system of the respondent state. That did not prevent the
accumulation of pension and salary for persons employed in the private
sector, whose salaries, in contrast to those of persons employed in the civil
service, were funded not by the state but through private budgets outside
the latter’s direct control.
327 See Section 2.5 on special measures.
328 ECtHR, Stummer v. Austria [GC], No. 37452/02, 7 July 2011.
329 ECtHR, Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 78117/13, 5 September 2017.
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Although there is no right to healthcare under the ECHR, the ECtHR has held
that issues relating to healthcare,330 such as access to medical records,331 will
fall under Article 8 (such as access to medical records332) or Article 3, where
a lack of access to health services is sufficiently serious to amount to inhuman
or degrading treatment or interference with a person’s private life.333 Therefore,
the complaints relating to discrimination in accessing healthcare may fall within
the ambit of the Article 14.
Example: In Durisotto v. Italy,
334 the applicant complained that his daughter
had been refused authorisation for experimental treatment unlike some
other patients. The domestic court established that the relevant clinical
testing method was available during a certain period and the applicant’s
daughter had not begun the treatment during this period. Consequently,
the authorisation criterion as required by the relevant law was not satisfied
in the applicant’s daughter case. The ECtHR held that although there was
a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations, that
difference was justified. The domestic court’s decision had been properly
reasoned and was not arbitrary. Furthermore, it pursued the legitimate
aim of protecting health and was proportionate to that aim. In addition,
the therapeutic value of the experimental treatment had not been proved
scientifically at the relevant time. Therefore, the ECtHR rejected this part of
the application as manifestly ill-founded.
Access to other social benefits, particularly where they are intended to benefit
the family unit, may also fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR. However,
the margin of appreciation accorded to states in this area is relatively wide.
The ECtHR has emphasised that states, due to their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, are in principle better placed to appreciate what is in the
public interest on social or economic grounds. Therefore, the ECtHR generally
330 See CoE, ECtHR (2015), Health-related issues in the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights, Thematic report.
331 ECtHR, K.H. and Others v. Slovakia, No. 32881/04, 28 April 2009.
332 Ibid.
333 ECtHR, Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 10511/10, 26 April 2016; ECtHR, Sławomir Musiał v.
Poland, No. 28300/06, 20 January 2009.
334 ECtHR, Durisotto v. Italy, 62804/13, 6 May 2014.
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respects the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without reasonable
foundation”.335
Example: In Bah v. the United Kingdom,
336 the applicant, a Sierra Leonean
national, was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The
authorities allowed her minor son to join her on the condition that he would
not have recourse to public funds. Shortly after his arrival, the applicant
was obliged to leave her accommodation and find new housing. She applied
to the local authority for assistance in finding accommodation; however,
taking account of the immigration rules and her son’s immigration status,
the priority to which her status as an unintentionally homeless person with
a minor child would ordinarily have entitled her, was refused. The ECtHR
found that the applicant’s differential treatment had resulted from her son’s
conditional immigration status, not his national origin. It was the applicant’s
choice to bring her son into the country in full awareness of the condition
attached to his leave to enter. The legislation pursued the legitimate aim of
allocating a scarce resource fairly, between different categories of claimants.
The local authority had helped the applicant to find a private-sector tenancy
and had offered her social housing within seventeen months. The difference
in treatment in the applicant’s case was reasonably and objectively justified.
Example: In Gouri v. France,
337 the applicant, an Algerian national living
in Algeria, was refused an additional disability benefit in France on the
grounds that she did not satisfy the requirement of residence in France.
She complained that a refusal of a payment of the benefit to a person
living abroad while it is awarded to a person living in France constitutes
discriminatory treatment based on the place of residence. The ECtHR found
that the applicant received a widow pension from the respondent state and
only the additional disability benefit was suspended. Since the allowance
pursued the goal of guaranteeing a minimum level of income to individuals
residing in France, taking account of the cost of living in the country, she was
not in a situation comparable to that of people living in France. Consequently,
the applicant did not suffer discriminatory treatment.
335 See for example, ECtHR, Stummer v. Austria [GC], No. 37452/02, 7 July 2012, para. 89.
336 ECtHR, Bah v. the United Kingdom, 56328/07, 27 September 2011.
337 ECtHR, Gouri v. France (dec.), No. 41069/11, 23 March 2017.
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Several Articles of the ESC relate to access to social security, welfare and health.
These include: Article 11 (the right to protection of health), Article 12 (the right
to social security), Article 13 (the right to social and medical assistance) and
Article 14 (the right to benefit from social welfare services).
The ECSR has considered, for example, discrimination on grounds of territorial
and/or socio-economic status between women who have relatively unimpeded
access to lawful abortion facilities and those who do not have such access. In
the same case, it also examined discrimination on the grounds of gender and/or
health status between women seeking access to lawful termination of pregnancy
procedures, and men and women seeking access to other lawful forms of medical
procedures which are not provided on a similar restricted basis. The ECSR noted
that, as a result of the lack of non-objecting medical practitioners and other
health personnel in a number of health facilities in Italy, in some cases women
are forced to move from one hospital to another within the country or to travel
abroad, which amounted to discrimination.338
The ECSR also held that as part of the positive obligations that arise by virtue of
the right to the protection of health, States Parties must provide appropriate and
timely care on a non-discriminatory basis, including services relating to sexual
and reproductive health. As a result, a health care system which does not provide
for the specific health needs of women will not be in conformity with Article 11,
or with Article E of the Charter taken together with Article 11.339
4.3. Education
Under EU law, protection from discrimination in access to education was originally
developed in the context of the free movement of persons under Article 12 of
Regulation 1612/68, particularly directed at the children of workers. Article 14 of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to education and to
access continuing and vocational training. The CJEU case law relating to education
concerns in particular equal access to educational institutions in another Member
State and equal access to education funding.
338 ECSR, International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (IPPF EN) v. Italy,
Complaint No. 87/2012, decision on the merits of 10 September 2013, paras. 189-194.
339 ECSR, International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (IPPF EN) v. Italy,
Complaint No. 87/2012, 10 September 2013, para. 66; ECSR, Confederazione Generale italiana
de Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013, Decision on the merits of 12 October 2015,
paras. 162 and 190.
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Example: In Commission v. Austria,
340 students who wanted to pursue their
university studies at an Austrian university, and possessed a secondary
education diploma from a Member State other than Austria, had to produce
that diploma and show that they met the specific entrance requirements for
the relevant course of study in the country which had issued the diploma. The
CJEU found that the access conditions to a University education for holders of
Austrian and holders of non-Austrian diplomas were different, and that this
placed holders of non-Austrian diplomas at a disadvantage and constituted
indirect discrimination.
Example: In the case of Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, the
complainant was the daughter of an Italian national who was working in
Germany.341 The German authorities paid a monthly maintenance grant to
schoolchildren who were of school age, with the aim to facilitate ‘educational
attendance’. The CJEU held that any general measures intended to facilitate
the educational attendance fell within the scope of education.
Example: In Laurence Prinz v. Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v.
Studentenwerk Heidelberg,
342 the CJEU found residency as a sole condition
for the award of an education grant for studies in another Member State as
disproportionate.
Example: In Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
343
a Tunisian national applied several times to German universities to study
maths (in conjunction with a preparatory language course) and was accepted.
However, the German authorities refused to grant him a residence permit,
arguing that there were doubts as to his motivation for wishing to study in
Germany, that he possessed a weak knowledge of German and that there
was in fact no connection between his proposed course of study and his
intended career. The CJEU found that if third-country national students satisfy
the conditions for admission, in such circumstances, they do have a right of
entry.
340 CJEU, C-147/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, 7 July 2005.
341 CJEU, Case -9/74, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, 3 July 1974.
342 CJEU, Joined cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, Laurence Prinz v. Region Hannover and Philipp
Seeberger v. Studentenwerk Heidelberg, 18 July 2013.
343 CJEU, C-491/13, Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 10 September 2014.
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Selected areas of protection
Under the ECHR, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR contains a freestanding
right to education.344 Accordingly, the ECtHR regards complaints of discrimination
in the context of education as falling within the ambit of Article 14.345
Example: In Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary,346 Roma children were placed
in schools for children with disabilities. The ECtHR found that this was
discriminatory treatment of members of a disadvantaged group. The state
had failed to establish an adequate arrangement to permit Roma children
to follow the programme in ordinary schools.347
Example: In Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria,
348 the applicants were two Russian
schoolchildren lawfully living with their mother in Bulgaria, but without
a permanent residence permit. As such, they had been required to pay fees
to pursue their secondary education unlike Bulgarian nationals and aliens
with permanent residence permits who were dispensed from paying. The
ECtHR found that the applicants’ treatment was discriminatory, because they
were required to pay school fees exclusively because of their nationality and
immigration status. The national authorities had not advanced any reason
justifying the difference in treatment and the ECtHR concluded that there had
been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2
of Protocol No. 1.
The ECtHR has examined cases of discrimination in relation to the provision of
reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities.
Example: In Çam v. Turkey,
349 the ECtHR found that the refusal of a music
academy to enrol a student on the grounds of her visual disability, despite
her having passed a competitive entrance examination, was in breach
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The ECtHR
344 See CoE, ECtHR (2017), Guide on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on
Human Rights – Right to education.
345 Discrimination on the grounds of education under the ECHR is discussed in the case of D.H. and
Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007 in Section 2.2.1 and in the
case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], No. 15766/03, 16 March 2010 in Section 6.3.
346 ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, 29 January 2013.
347 See also ECtHR, Lavida and Others v. Greece, No. 7973/10, 30 May 2013.
348 ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 21 June 2011.
349 ECtHR, Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 23 February 2016.
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stressed that Article 14 of the Convention had to be read in the light of the
European Social Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, as regards the reasonable accommodation which persons
with disabilities were entitled to expect. The ECtHR emphasised that the
competent national authorities had made no effort to identify the applicant’s
needs and had failed to explain how or why her blindness could impede
her access to musical education. Further, the music academy had not tried
to adjust its educational approach in order to make it accessible to blind
students.
Under the ESC, Article 15 (1) provides for effective equal access of children
and adults with disabilities to education and vocational training. Additionally,
Article 17 guarantees the right of all children to education in its both paragraphs.
According to the ECSR, equal access to education must be ensured for all children.
In this respect, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable groups such as
children from minorities, children seeking asylum, refugee children, children in
hospital, children in care, pregnant teenagers, teenage mothers, children deprived
of their liberty, etc. Children belonging to these groups must be integrated into
mainstream educational facilities and ordinary educational schemes. Where
necessary, special measures should be taken to ensure equal access to education
for these children.350
The ECSR stressed, in the context of health education, that the principle of nondiscrimination covered not only the way the education was provided but also
the content of educational materials. Thus, in that regard, the principle of nondiscrimination had two aims: children could not be subject to discrimination
in accessing such education and the education could not be used as a tool for
reinforcing demeaning stereotypes and perpetuating forms of prejudice against
certain groups.351
350 ECSR, Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 41/2007, decision
on the merits of 3 June 2008, para. 34.
351 ECSR, International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v. Croatia,
Complaint No. 45/2007, 30 March 2009, para. 48.
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4.4. Access to supply of goods and
services, including housing
Under EU law, Protection from discrimination in the field of access to the supply
of goods and services, including housing, applies to the ground of race under
the Racial Equality Directive, and to the ground of sex under the Gender Goods
and Services Directive. Paragraph 13 of the Preamble to the Gender Goods
and Services Directive gives more precision to prohibition of discrimination,
stating that it relates to all goods and services “which are available to the public
irrespective of the person concerned as regards both the public and private
sectors, including public bodies, and which are offered outside the area of private
and family life and the transactions carried out in this context”. It expressly
excludes application to ‘the content of media or advertising’ and ‘public or private
education’, though this latter exclusion does not narrow the scope of the Racial
Equality Directive, which expressly covers education. The Gender Goods and
Services Directive also refers to Article 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union:
“Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of this
Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration […]
‘Services’ shall in particular include:
(a) activities of an industrial character
(b) activities of a commercial character
(c) activities of craftsmen
(d) activities of the professions.”
It would thus seem that this area covers any context where a good or a service
is normally provided in return for remuneration, so long as this does not take
place in an entirely personal context, and with the exclusion of public or private
education. For example, in "CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria" AD v. Komisia za
zashtita ot diskriminatsia,
352 the CJEU confirmed that the supply of electricity is
covered by Article 3 (1) (h) of the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43).353
352 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015.
353 Ibid., para. 43.
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Case law from national bodies suggest that this will cover scenarios such as
gaining access to or the level of service received in bars,354 restaurants and night
clubs,355 shops,356 purchasing insurance,357 as well as the acts of ‘private’ sellers,
such as dog breeders.358 Although healthcare is covered specifically under the
Racial Equality Directive, it may also fall under the scope of services, particularly
where this is private healthcare or where individuals are obliged to purchase
compulsory sickness insurance to cover health costs. In this sense, the CJEU
has interpreted services in the context of free movement of services to cover
healthcare that is provided in return for remuneration by a profit-making body.359
The Racial Equality Directive does not define housing. It is suggested, however,
that this should be interpreted through the lens of international human rights law,
in particular the right to respect for one’s home under Article 7 of the EU Charter
and Article 8 of the ECHR (given that all EU Member States are party) and the
right to adequate housing contained in Article 11 of the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (to which all EU Member States are party).
According to the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, adequate
housing must satisfy a range of requirements. In particular, housing should: be
of sufficient quality to ensure protection from the elements; reflect the cultural
requirements of inhabitants (and so include vehicles, caravans, encampments and
other non-permanent structures); be connected to public utilities and sanitation
services; and connected to public services and work opportunities through an
354 Hungary, Equal Treatment Authority, Case No. 72, April 2008. For an English summary, see
European Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field (2009), ‘Hungary’,
European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, No. 8, July 2009, p. 49.
355 Sweden, Supreme Court, Escape Bar and Restaurant v. Ombudsman against Ethnic
Discrimination T-2224-07, 1 October 2008. For an English summary, see European Network of
Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field (2009), ‘Sweden’, European Anti-Discrimination
Law Review, No. 8, July 2009, p. 68.
356 Austria, Bezirksgericht Döbling, GZ 17 C 1597/05f-17, 23 January 2006.
357 France, Nîmes Court of Appeal, Lenormand v. Balenci, No. 08/00907, 6 November 2008; France,
Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, No. M 08-88.017 and No. 2074, 7 April 2009. For an
English summary, see European Network of Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination
Field (2009), ‘France’, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, No. 9, December 2009, p. 59.
358 Sweden, Court of Appeal, Ombudsman Against Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation
v. A.S., T-3562-06, 11 February 2008. For an English summary, see European Network of Legal
Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field (2009), ‘Sweden’, European Anti-Discrimination Law
Review, No. 8, July 2009, p. 69.
359 CJEU, C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, 28 April 1998; CJEU, C-157/99,
B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep
Zorgverzekeringen, 12 July 2001; and CJEU, C-385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, 13 May 2003.
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adequate infrastructure. It should also include adequate protection against forced
or summary eviction, and be affordable.360 This understanding of housing also
appears in FRA’s approach in its report The state of Roma and Traveller housing
in the European Union – Steps towards equality.
361
Adopting this approach, access to housing would not only include ensuring that
there is equality of treatment on the part of public or private landlords and estate
agents in deciding whether to let or sell properties to particular individuals.
It would also include the right to equal treatment in the way that housing is
allocated (such as allocation of low quality or remote housing to particular ethnic
groups), maintained (such as failing to upkeep properties inhabited by particular
groups) and rented (such as a lack of security of tenure, or higher rental prices or
deposits for those belonging to particular groups). In addition, Article 34 (3) of the
EU Charter provides: “In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union
recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure
a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with
the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices.”
Example: In Servet Kamberaj v. IPES and Others,
362 an Albanian national
with a residence permit for an indefinite period in Italy, was denied certain
housing benefits because the budget for the grant of that benefit to thirdcountry nationals was already exhausted. With regard to housing benefit, the
CJEU stated that the treatment of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents cannot be less favourable than that granted to citizens of the Union.
However, if the benefit does not fall under the concept of social security and
social protection under Article 11 (1) (d) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC,
Article 11 (4) of that directive does not apply (the possibility to limit equal
treatment to core benefits).
Under the ECHR, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 8 to include cases relating to
activities capable of having consequences for private life, including relations of
an economic and social character. The ECtHR has also taken a broad approach
360 UN, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1991), General comment No. 4: The
right to adequate housing (Art. 11 (1)), UN Doc. E/1992/23, 13 December 1991.
361 FRA (2010), The state of Roma and Traveller housing in the European Union – Steps towards
equality, Summary report, Vienna, FRA.
362 CJEU, C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], 24 April 2012.
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to the interpretation of the right to respect for home under Article 8. The ECtHR
has construed the right to respect for home widely to include mobile homes
such as caravans or trailers, even in situations where they are located illegally.363
Where state-provided housing is in particularly bad condition, causing hardship
to the residents over a sustained period, the ECtHR has also held that this may
constitute inhuman treatment.
Example: In Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), 364 the applicants
had been chased from their homes, which were then demolished under
particularly traumatic circumstances. The process of rebuilding their houses
was slow, and the accommodation that was granted in the interim was of
low quality. The ECtHR stated:
“the applicants’ living conditions in the last ten years, in particular the
severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment and its detrimental effect
on the applicants’ health and well-being, combined with the length of the
period during which the applicants have had to live in such conditions and
the general attitude of the authorities, must have caused them considerable
mental suffering, thus diminishing their human dignity and arousing in them
such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasement”.365
This finding, among other factors, led the ECtHR to conclude that there had
been degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.366
Example: In Vrountou v. Cyprus,
367 the applicant had been refused a refugee
card that would have made her eligible for a range of benefits – including
housing assistance – from the authorities. The decision had been based on the
fact that she was a child of a displaced woman and not a displaced man. The
ECtHR found that this difference of treatment had no objective and reasonable
justification and that this unequal treatment had resulted in a breach of
Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
363 ECtHR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, No. 20348/92, 25 September 1996.
364 ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 12 July 2005.
365 Ibid., para. 110.
366 Case law of the ECtHR indicates that, in certain circumstances, discriminatory treatment can
amount to degrading treatment. For example, see ECtHR, Smith and Grady v. the United
Kingdom, Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 1999, para. 121.
367 ECtHR, Vrountou v. Cyprus, No. 33631/06, 13 October 2015.
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Selected areas of protection
Example: In Hunde v. the Netherlands,368 the applicant, a failed asylum
seeker, complained that the denial of shelter and social assistance diminished
his human dignity in a manner incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.
The ECtHR noted that, after his asylum proceedings had come to an end,
the applicant had been afforded a four-week grace period during which
he retained his entitlement to state-sponsored care and accommodation.
Following this, he had the possibility to apply for a “no-fault residence
permit” and/or to seek admission to a centre where his liberty would have
been restricted. Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that the authorities had
not failed in their obligation under Article 3 by having remained inactive or
indifferent to the applicant’s situation, and rejected the case as manifestly
ill-founded.
Under the ESC, the right to adequate housing is guaranteed in Article 31 (1), and
the right of adequate housing in respect of families in Article 16. The ECSR clarified
this provision as meaning a dwelling which possess all basic amenities such as
water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation facilities and electricity. It must not be
overcrowded and must be secured. The relevant rights thus provided must be
guaranteed without discrimination, particularly in respect of Roma or travellers.369
Example: In the complaint against France, FEANTSA370 alleged that the
manner in which legislation related to housing was implemented resulted
in a situation of non-conformity with the right to housing under Article 31
and prohibition of non-discrimination under Article E of the ESC. It argued
specifically that despite having improved the quality of housing for the
majority of the population in France during the last 30 years, the country had
effectively failed to implement the right to housing for all, and in particular in
meeting the housing needs of the most vulnerable. ECSR found six violations
of Article 31 by France, which concerned:
• insufficient progress as regards the eradication of substandard housing
and lack of proper amenities of a large number of households;
368 ECtHR, Hunde v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 17931/16, 5 July 2016.
369 ECSR, International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France, complaint No. 33/2006,
5 December 2007, paras. 149-155. See also, ECSR, International Centre for the Legal Protection
of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v. Greece, Complaint No. 49/2008, 11 December 2009; ECSR,
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. France, Complaint No. 51/2008, 10 October 2010.
370 ECSR, European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v.
France, Complaint No. 39/2006, 5 December 2007.
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• unsatisfactory implementation of the legislation on the prevention of
evictions and the lack of measures to provide rehousing solutions for
evicted families;
• measures in place to reduce the number of homeless being insufficient,
both in quantitative and qualitative terms;
• insufficient supply of social housing accessible to low-income groups;
• malfunctioning of the social housing allocation system, and the related
remedies;
• deficient implementation of legislation on stopping places for Travellers
(in conjunction with Article E).
Example: In FEANTSA v. the Netherlands,
371 the ECSR found that the
Netherlands had not complied with the ESC by failing to provide adequate
access to emergency assistance (food, clothing and shelter) to adult migrants
in an irregular situation.
Under International Law, Article 9 of the CRPD provides for an obligation to take
appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities have access, on
an equal basis with others to information, communications and other services,
including electronic services. This obligation can be fulfilled by identifying and
eliminating obstacles and barriers to accessibility.372
Example: This case373 from Romania concerns the criteria for access to social
housing. An assessment as to whether or not an applicant has the right
to access social housing was based on a points system. A certain number
of points were awarded for different categories, including four points for
persons with disabilities, compared to 10 points for persons with a higher
371 ECSR, European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v.
the Netherlands, Complaint No. 86/2012, 2 July 2014. See also ECSR, Conference of European
Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands, No. 90/2013, 1 July 2014.
372 See UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2010), Communication No.
1/2010, CRPD/C/9/D/1/2010, 16 April 2013 concerning accessibility of the banking card services
provided by private financial institution for persons with visual impairments on an equal basis
with others.
373 Romania, National Council for Combating Discrimination, Decision 349, 4 May 2016; European
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination (2016), National equality
body decision on social housing criteria in Bucharest, News report, Romania, 20 September 2016.
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Selected areas of protection
education and 15 points for veterans and war widows, revolutionaries and
former political detainees. The National Council for Combating Discrimination
found that these rules limited access to public housing by persons with
disabilities, and therefore constituted direct discrimination on the ground
of disability.
4.5. Access to justice
Under EU law and the ECHR,
374 the relation of the right to access to justice to the
prohibition of discrimination can be seen from two perspectives:
(i) Access to justice in cases of discrimination: this relates to the possibility of
obtaining redress in situations where individuals have been discriminated
against. This situation is discussed in Section 6.4 (Enforcement of non-discrimination law).375
(ii) Non-discriminatory access to justice: this relates to barriers to justice faced
by certain persons irrespective of whether they were victims of discrimination. It means that ensuring effective access to justice for all requires
that the justice system be organised in such a way that nobody is prevented from accessing justice for physical, linguistic, financial or other reasons.
For example, financial barriers for persons who do not have sufficient
means to initiate court proceedings can be addressed through a system of
legal aid.376
Under EU law, access to justice is set out in Article 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Moreover, Article 20 confirms that everybody is equal before
the law and Article 21 prohibits discrimination.
In relation to access to justice under EU law, the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities stressed that the EU should take appropriate action
to combat discrimination faced by persons with disabilities in accessing justice,
374 For detailed information see FRA and CoE (2016), Handbook on European law relating to access
to justice, Luxembourg, Publications Office.
375 See also FRA (2012), Access to justice in cases of discrimination in the EU – Steps to further
equality, Luxembourg, Publications Office.
376 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2015), Equality and non-discrimination in the
access to justice, Resolution 2054, 24 April 2015. See also: UN, CEDAW (2015), General
Recommendation No. 33 “On women’s access to justice”, CEDAW/C/GC/33, 23 July 2015.
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by ensuring that full procedural accommodation and funding for training justice
personnel on the Convention are provided in its Member States.377
Under the ECHR, the right of access to justice is guaranteed by Article 13 and in
the context of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. The ECtHR has dealt with
several cases relating to discrimination in access to justice.
Example: In Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria,
378 the national courts, when
sentencing an individual of Roma origin, expressly refused the prosecution’s
recommendation for a suspended sentence, stating that a culture of impunity
existed among the Roma minority and implying that an example should be made
of the particular individual. The ECtHR found that this violated the applicant’s
right to a fair trial in conjunction with the right to be free from discrimination.
Example: In Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2),
379 it was found that
excessive delays in resolving criminal and civil proceedings (taking seven
years to deliver a first judgment) amounted to a violation of Article 6. The
delays were found to be due to a high number of procedural errors and taken
in conjunction with the pervading discriminatory attitude of the authorities
towards the Roma applicants, it was found to amount to a violation of
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 (and 8).
Example: In Anakomba Yula v. Belgium,
380 national law, which made it
impossible for the applicant to obtain public assistance with funding
a paternity claim on the basis that she was not a Belgian national, was
found to amount to a violation of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 14.
This is not to suggest that non-nationals have an absolute right to public
funding. In the circumstances, the ECtHR was influenced by several factors,
including that the applicant was barred because she did not have a current
valid residence permit, even though at the time she was in the process of
having her permit renewed. Furthermore, the ECtHR further observed that
a one-year time bar existed in relation to paternity cases, which meant that
it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to wait until she had renewed
her permit to apply for assistance.
377 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2015), Concluding observations on
the initial report of the European Union, CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, 2 October 2015, para. 39.
378 ECtHR, Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, No. 37193/07, 25 March 2010.
379 ECtHR, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 12 July 2005.
380 ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, No. 45413/07, 10 March 2009, discussed in sections 4.5 and 5.7.
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4.6. The ‘personal’ sphere: private and
family life, adoption, home and
marriage
Under both EU law and the ECHR, the right for respect for private and family
life is guaranteed (Article 8 of the ECHR381 and Article 7 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights).
Under the ECHR, over the years the ECtHR developed its case law under Article 8
covering a variety of issues related to private and family life. The ECtHR set out
the general reach of Article 8:
“the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to
establish and develop relationships with other human beings […] the right
to “personal development” […] or the right to self-determination as such.
It encompasses elements such as names […] gender identification, sexual
orientation and sexual life, which fall within the personal sphere protected
by Article 8 […] and the right to respect for both the decisions to have and
not to have a child”.382
Example: In Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy,
383 a married couple was unable to
give their child the mother’s surname because, under domestic legislation,
legitimate children were automatically given the father’s surname at birth.
The ECtHR found that the choice of surname of legitimate children was
determined solely on the basis of discrimination arising from the parents’
sex. While the rule that the husband’s surname was to be handed down
to legitimate children could be necessary to respect the tradition of family
unity by giving to all its members the father’s surname, the fact that it was
impossible to derogate from this rule when registering a new child’s birth
was excessively rigid and discriminatory towards women.
381 An explanation as to the scope of Article 8 ECHR can be found on the ECHR website: Roagna, I.
(2012), Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention
on Human Rights.
382 ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC], No. 43546/02, 22 January 2008, para. 43.
383 ECHR, Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, No. 77/07, 7 January 2014.
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The ECtHR has examined a number of cases involving differential treatment
regarding rules on inheritance, access of divorced parents to children, adoption
and issues of paternity.384
The cases of Mazurek v. France,
385 Sommerfeld v. Germany386 and Rasmussen v.
Denmark387 involved consideration of differential treatment in relation to rules
on inheritance, access of fathers to children born out of wedlock, and paternity
issues. Article 8 will also extend to matters of adoption. Many cases, such as
E.B. v. France (discussed in Section 5.3), illustrate that adoption may fall within
the scope of the ECHR, even though there is no actual right to adopt in the ECHR.
Example: In Gas and Dubois v. France,
388 a biological mother’s homosexual
civil partner was refused simple adoption of her partner’s child. Under French
law, a simple adoption resulted in all the rights associated with parental
responsibility being removed from the child’s father or mother in favour
of the adoptive parent, except where an individual adopted the child of his
or her spouse. The ECtHR held that the situation of the applicants was not
comparable to that of married couples because under French law, marriage
conferred a special status on those who entered into it and the ECHR did not
go so far as to compel states to provide for same-sex marriage. The ECtHR
noted that a heterosexual couple in a civil partnership would also have had
their application refused under the relevant provisions and as such, while the
applicants were in a comparable legal situation, there was no difference in
treatment based on their sexual orientation and consequently, no violation
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.
Example: In X and Others v. Austria,
389 the applicants were also an unmarried
same-sex couple in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s
child. Unlike in Gas and Dubois v. France, the relevant provisions of Austrian
law allowed for second-parent adoption for unmarried heterosexual couples.
Given that the law contained an absolute prohibition on second-parent
adoption by a same-sex couple, the national courts did not examine the
384 See also FRA and CoE (2015), Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child,
Luxembourg, Publications Office.
385 ECtHR, Mazurek v. France, No. 34406/97, 1 February 2000.
386 ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], No. 31871/96, 8 July 2003.
387 ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark, No. 8777/79, 28 November 1984.
388 ECtHR, Gas and Dubois v. France, No. 25951/07, 15 March 2012.
389 ECtHR, X and Others v. Austria [GC], No. 19010/07, 19 February 2013.
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merits of the adoption request, nor did the father’s refusal to consent to the
adoption play any role in the national courts’ considerations of the applicants’
case. The ECtHR found that this fact constituted a difference in treatment of
the applicants in comparison to heterosexual unmarried couples, which had
not been reasonably and objectively justified.
Example: In A.H. and Others v. Russia,
390 the applicants, US nationals, were
couples in the final stage of adopting Russian children when a new law was
adopted by the Russian Duma, banning the adoption of Russian children
by US nationals. The ongoing procedures were stopped. The applicants
complained that this ban violated their right to respect for family life and
was discriminatory on the grounds of their nationality. The ECtHR found that
the legislative ban on the adoption of Russian children was imposed only to
US prospective parents. The government had failed to show that there were
compelling reasons to justify the blanket ban being applied retroactively and
indiscriminately to all prospective adoptive parents from the US, irrespective
of the stage of the adoption proceedings and their individual circumstances.
The ECtHR therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14
taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.
States have a relatively broad margin of appreciation in organising their
immigration policy. Although the ECHR does not guarantee the right of an ‘alien’
to enter or to reside in a particular country, in some cases a refusal to allow family
reunification might breach the rights guaranteed by Article 8.
Example: In Pajić v. Croatia,
391 the applicant had applied for a residence
permit on the grounds of family reunification with her partner. The national
authorities had refused the request because the relevant domestic law
excluded such a possibility for same-sex couples. By contrast, a residence
permit would have been allowed for an unmarried different-sex couple in
a similar situation. The ECtHR found that the domestic authorities had not
advanced any justification or convincing and weighty reasons to justify the
difference in treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples in
obtaining family reunification. Indeed, a difference in treatment based solely
390 ECtHR, A.H. and Others v. Russia, Nos. 6033/13 and 15 other applications, 17 January 2017.
391 ECtHR, Pajić v. Croatia, No. 68453/13, 23 February 2016.
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or decisively on the applicant’s sexual orientation amounted to a distinction,
which was not acceptable under the Convention.392
The ambit of Article 8 is extremely wide. The ECHR also has implications for
other areas, such as entering into a civil union or marriage, which is specifically
protected under Article 12.
Example: In Muñoz Díaz v. Spain,
393 the authorities had refused to recognise
the validity of the applicant’s Roma marriage when establishing her
entitlement to a survivor’s pension, despite having previously treated
her as if she were married. The ECtHR found that because the state had
treated the applicant as if her marriage was valid, she was in a comparable
situation to other ‘good faith’ spouses (those who were not validly married
for technical reasons, but believed themselves to be so), who would have
been entitled to a survivor’s pension. Although the ECtHR found that there
was no discrimination in the refusal to recognise the marriage as valid (within
the meaning of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 12), there was
discrimination in refusing to treat the applicant similarly to other good faith
spouses and accord the pension, in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Example: The case of Vallianatos and Others v. Greece394 was lodged to
challenge Greek law, which in 2008 introduced a possibility for different-sex
couples to enter into a civil union, which was less formal and more flexible
than marriage, but which excluded same-sex couples from its scope. The
ECtHR noted that 19 out of 47 Council of Europe member states had authorised
registered partnerships and that 17 of those 19 states had recognised both
heterosexual and homosexual couples. It further concluded that there were
no convincing and weighty reasons to prohibit same-sex couples from
entering into a civil union. In other words, when a state introduces a form
of registered partnership it must be accessible to all couples regardless of
their sexual orientation. A violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with
Article 8 was found.
392 See also ECtHR, Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, 30 June 2016.
393 ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, No. 49151/07, 8 December 2009.
394 ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013.
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Subsequently, the ECtHR had to determine whether Article 8 encompassed
a positive obligation on a state to introduce a legal framework providing for the
recognition and protection of same-sex couples.
Example: In Oliari and Others v. Italy,
395 three homosexual couples complained
that under Italian law they had no possibility to get married or enter into
any other type of civil union. The ECtHR noted European and international
trends towards legal recognition of same-sex couples. It also observed that
the Italian Constitutional Court had repeatedly called for a legal recognition
of the relevant rights and duties of homosexual unions. Therefore, the ECtHR
held that in those circumstances, Italy was under a positive obligation to
ensure effective respect for the applicants’ private and family lives by official
recognition of same-sex couples. The legal framework for recognition of
same-sex couples must at least provide for the “core rights relevant to
a couple in a stable and committed relationship”.396 In conclusion, the ECtHR
held that, by failing to enact such legislation, Italy had overstepped its
margin of appreciation and failed to fulfil their positive obligation in breach
of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.
While protection of the core of human dignity customarily calls for a narrower
margin of appreciation by the ECtHR, this had to be balanced against the concerns
of protecting others in a position of vulnerability whose rights might be abused.
Example: In Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland,
397 the applicant was a deaf and
mute father whose contact with his son, who also had a hearing impairment,
was restricted. The applicant complained in particular about the domestic
courts’ refusal to extend this contact. The ECtHR found that the domestic
courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted the
applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability, and had thus
not taken all appropriate steps that could have been reasonably demanded
with a view to facilitating contact. Therefore, the ECtHR concluded a violation
of Article 8 of the Convention, considering it unnecessary to separately
examine the complaint under Article 14, taken together with Article 8 of
the Convention.
395 ECtHR, Oliari and Others v. Italy, Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015.
396 Ibid., para. 174.
397 ECtHR, Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, No. 32407/13, 10 January 2017.
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In the above case, the ECtHR considered that the interests of the father went
hand in hand with those of the child – that is, it was in the child’s interests to
have contact with the father. However, where the child’s interests potentially
conflict with those of the parent, the state enjoys a wider margin of appreciation
in determining how best to protect the child.
Example: In Rasmussen v. Denmark,
398 a father complained of a statute of
limitations barring him from contesting paternity. The ECtHR found that this
did amount to differential treatment on the basis of sex, but was justified.
This pursued the legitimate aim of providing the child with security and
certainty over their status, by preventing fathers from abusing the possibility
of contesting paternity later in life. Since there was little uniformity of
approach to this issue among the member states of the ECHR, the ECtHR
accorded the state a wide margin of appreciation, finding the differential
treatment was justified.399
Under EU law, the substantive family law remains under the sole competence
of EU Member States. However, some issues with cross border implications are
covered by the EU law. The case law of the CJEU regarding the right to family
life developed mainly in the field of free movement of persons with regard to
family members of EU citizens.400 The CJEU held that “if Union citizens were not
allowed to lead a normal family life in the host member state, the exercise of the
freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed”.401
Another area where family considerations and principle of non-discrimination
can play a role is in the field of asylum and immigration law. For example, in
determining who qualifies as beneficiaries of international protection, states
must ensure protection for family life.402 Furthermore, relevant case law of the
CJEU for family rights concerns discrimination between men and woman as
398 ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark, No. 8777/79, 28 November 1984.
399 Ibid.
400 See for example, CJEU, C-165/14, Alfredo Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado [GC],
13 September 2016, discussed in Section 5.7.
401 CJEU, C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform [GC], 25 July 2008, para. 62.
402 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries
of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ L 337, 20.12.2011,
pp. 9–26.
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regards parental rights. In a case concerning the right of a father to parental
leave, the CJEU held that the different condition attached to the entitlement
to parental leave “is liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of the roles
of men and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in
relation to the exercise of their parental duties” and found that it constituted
direct discrimination on grounds of sex.403
Example: In Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA,
404 the
claimant was refused so-called ‘breastfeeding’ leave, because his child’s mother
was self-employed. The CJEU held that this constituted discrimination against men.
Example: In Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus
miestosavivaldybės administracija and Others,
405 the applicants were
a Lithuanian national belonging to the Polish minority and a Polish national.
They complained that the spelling of their names on the marriage certificate
issued by the Vilnius Civil Registry Division was incorrect. According to the
applicants, this spelling was not in accordance with the applicant’s official
national language. The CJEU held that Article 21 of the TFEU does not preclude
a refusal to amend surnames and forenames appearing on certificates of
civil status, on condition that such a refusal is not liable to cause serious
inconvenience to those concerned.406
Example: In Mircea Florian Freitag,
407 Mr Mircea Florian, a man with Romanian
nationality, was born in Romania under the surname ‘Pavel’. His mother
divorced his father and married a German national, Mr Freitag. Mircea
Florian thus obtained dual nationality, and his surname was changed to
‘Freitag’. Years after, Mircea Florian, still habitually residing in Germany, went
to Romania to change his surname back to the original ‘Pavel’. He then
requested that the German Registry Office change his name and update
403 CJEU, C-222/14, Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon
Dikaiomaton, 16 July 2015, discussed in Section 5.1.
404 CJEU, C-104/09, Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA, 30 September 2010.
405 CJEU, C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto
savivaldybės administracija and Others, 12 May 2011.
406 Compare with CJEU, C-438/14, Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v. Standesamt der Stadt
Karlsruhe and Zentraler Juristischer Dienst der Stadt Karlsruhe, 2 June 2016, where the CJEU held
that a name containing several tokens of nobility and freely chosen by a German in another
Member State of which he also holds the nationality does not necessarily have to be recognised in
Germany, if it is justified on public policy grounds, in that it is appropriate and necessary to ensure
compliance with the principle that all citizens of that Member State are equal before the law.
407 CJEU, C-541/15, Proceedings brought by Mircea Florian Freitag, 8 June 2017.
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the civil register accordingly so that his name change was recognised under
German law. However, under German law, this was only possible if the
name in question had been acquired during a period of habitual residence
in another EU Member State. The CJEU stressed that:
i. the rules governing the way in which a person’s surname is entered on
certificates of civil status are matters coming within the competence of
the Member States;
ii. national legislation which places certain nationals of the Member State
concerned at a disadvantage, simply because they have exercised their
freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction
on the freedoms conferred by Article 21 (1) of the TFEU;
iii. the discretion enjoyed by the competent authorities must be exercised
by in such a way as to give full effect to Article 21 of the TFEU.
Consequently, the CJEU held that refusing to recognise a legally acquired
surname, and the same as birth name, in a specific Member State, on the
basis that the name was not acquired during a period habitual residence
in that other Member State, hinders the exercise of the right, enshrined
in Article 21 of the TFEU, to move and reside freely in the territories of the
Member States.
4.7. Political participation: freedom of
expression, assembly and association,
and free elections
EU law confers a limited range of rights in this respect. Article 10 (3) of the TEU
provides that every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic
life of the Union and decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible
to the citizen. Article 11 of the TEU408 obliges the institutions to give citizens
and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly
exchange their views in all areas of Union action. Article 20 of the TFEU provides,
in particular, the right for EU nationals to vote and stand as a candidate in
municipal elections and European Parliament elections. The EU Charter guarantees
408 See, for example, CJEU, T-754/14, Michael Efler and Others v. European Commission,
10 May 2017, where the CJEU concluded that the Commission infringed, inter alia, Art. 11 (4) of
the TEU by refusing to register the proposed European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop TTIP’.
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freedom of expression and information (Article 11),409 freedom of assembly and
of association (Article 12), and political rights regarding the European Parliament
and municipal elections (Articles 39 and 40).
Example: In Spain v. United Kingdom,
410 the CJEU held, as regards Article 20 (2) (b) of the TFEU, that that provision is confined to applying the
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in exercising the
right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, by providing that every
citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he or she is not a national is to have the right to vote in those elections in the Member State in
which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state.
Example: In Delvigne,
411 a French national contested domestic provisions
automatically and permanently stripping him of electoral rights, including the
right to vote and stand for elections to the European Parliament, following
his conviction for murder and the imposition of a custodial sentence of
12 years. Unable to benefit from subsequent changes to the law, Mr Delvigne
continued to be deprived of his civic rights, as that deprivation resulted from
a conviction that had become final before the new Criminal Code entered
into force. He therefore alleged unequal treatment. The CJEU found that
the French law was a permissible limitation on the rights contained in the
Charter: a limitation such as that at issue is proportionate, in so far as it takes
into account the nature and gravity of the criminal offence committed and
the duration of the penalty. Furthermore, the new Code provided for the
possibility of a person in Mr Delvigne’s situation to apply for, and obtain,
the lifting of the ban.
One of the main goals of the CoE is the promotion of democracy. This is reflected
in many of the rights in the ECHR, which facilitate the promotion of political
participation. The ECHR contains broad guarantees creating not only a right to
vote and stand in elections (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1),412 but also flanking rights
409 See, for example, CJEU, C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others v. Secretary of State for
Health, 4 May 2016.
410 CJEU, C-145/04, Kingdom of Spain v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [GC],
12 September 2006.
411 CJEU, C-650/13, Thierry Delvigne v. Commune de Lesparre Médoc and Préfet de la Gironde [GC],
6 October 2015.
412 CoE, ECtHR (2016), Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human
Rights – Right to free elections.
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of freedom of expression (Article 10) and the right to freedom of assembly and
association (Article 11).
Example: In Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
413 a Bosnian politician was
deprived of the right to stand for election for the national presidency because
of his place of residence. The state Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed
of two political entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska. To effectively exercise the right to participate in elections
to the Presidency, the applicant was required to move from Republika
Srpska to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, while
theoretically eligible to stand for election to the Presidency, in practice, he
could not use this right as long as he lived in Republika Srpska. The ECtHR
found that the applicant was subjected to discriminatory treatment by the
national authorities because of his place of residence and his ethnic origin.
Consequently, it concluded that there had been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.
Example: In Identoba and Others v. Georgia,
414 the applicants had organised
a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi to mark the International Day against
Homophobia. The demonstration had been interrupted by a violent counterdemonstration and the applicants had suffered verbal and physical assaults.
In light of the fact that the national authorities had failed to ensure that the
march took place peacefully, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 11.415
Example: In Partei Die Friesen v. Germany,
416 the applicant party had failed
to obtain a minimum of 5 % of votes required to obtain a parliamentary
mandate. The ECtHR had to decide whether a 5 % threshold violated the right
of minority parties to participate in elections. It noted that the applicant’s
disadvantage in the electoral process resulted from only representing the
interests of a small part of the population. Examining whether, as a national
minority party, the applicant party should have enjoyed special treatment,
the ECtHR concluded that, even interpreted in the light of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the ECHR did not require
the state to exempt national minority parties from electoral thresholds.
413 ECtHR, Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 41939/07, 9 June 2016.
414 ECtHR, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, No. 73235/12, 12 May 2015.
415 See also ECtHR, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 1543/06, 3 May 2007.
416 ECtHR, Partei Die Friesen v. Germany, No. 65480/10, 28 January 2016.
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The aim of the said Framework Convention was to promote the effective
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public affairs. It
provided for the exemption from the minimum threshold as an instrument
for enhancing national minority participation in elected bodies, but did not
establish an obligation to exempt national minority parties from electoral
thresholds. Therefore there had been no violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
The right to freedom of association has also been taken to include protection
for the formation of political parties, for which the ECtHR has accorded a high
level of protection against interference.417 Similarly, as noted in Section 5.11, any
interference with the right to free speech in the context of political debate is
scrutinised very closely.418
Under international law, pursuant to Article 29 of the CRPD, states are required
to ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in
political and public life on an equal basis with others, including by guaranteeing
their right to vote. According to Article 12 (2) of the CRPD, states should recognise
and uphold the legal capacity of persons with disabilities “on an equal basis with
others in all aspects of life”, including political life. The Committee recognised
that an exclusion of the right to vote on the basis of a psychosocial or intellectual
disability constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability.419
4.8. Criminal law matters
Under the ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination can relate to criminal law
matters across a variety of rights, including the right to a fair trial (Article 6), the
right to liberty (Article 5), the prohibition on retroactive punishment (Article 7)
and double jeopardy (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7), the right to life (Article 2)
and the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(Article 3). There is also important case law concerning violence against women
and other vulnerable groups, such as Roma or LGBT people, where the ECtHR has
emphasised the states’ obligation to investigate the discriminatory motives of
417 See for example ECtHR, Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v. Turkey,
Nos. 3840/10, 3870/10, 3878/10, 15616/10, 21919/10, 39118/10 and 37272/10, 12 January 2016.
418 ECtHR, Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], Nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, 17 May 2016.
419 See for example, UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2013),
Communication No. 4/2011, CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011, 9 September 2013, para. 9.2 ff.
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violence. In a number of rulings, the ECtHR acknowledged that a lack of response
to violence constituted a violation of Article 14.420
In addition to the previous topics already discussed elsewhere, the ECHR also
protects the right to be free from arbitrary detention based on discriminatory
grounds, and the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment based on discriminatory grounds during detention.421
Example: In Martzaklis and Others v. Greece,
422 HIV-positive prisoners
detained in a prison hospital complained in particular about poor sanitary
conditions and lack of appropriate medical treatment, detention in
overcrowded and insufficiently heated rooms, food of poor nutritional
value, and irregular and not individually prescribed medical treatment. The
prison authorities justified their isolation as necessary for better monitoring
and treatment of their conditions. The ECtHR held that the placement in
isolation to prevent the spread of disease was not necessary, because the
prisoners were HIV-positive and had not developed AIDS. They were exposed
to physical and mental suffering going beyond the suffering inherent in
detention. In conclusion, the ECtHR found that inadequate physical and
sanitary conditions, irregularities in administration of appropriate treatment
and lack of objective and reasonable justification for isolation of HIV-positive
prisoners amounted to a violation of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14
of the ECHR.
Example: In D.G. v. Ireland and Bouamar v. Belgium,
423 (discussed in
Section 5.5), the applicants, who were minors, had been placed in detention
by the national authorities. Here, the ECtHR considered that, although there
had been violations of their right to liberty, there had been no discrimination
because the differential treatment had been justified in the interests of
protecting minors.
420 See among others ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009 relating to violence
against women; ECtHR, Boacă and Others v. Romania, No. 40355/11, 12 January 2016 relating to
violence against Roma and ECtHR, M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, No. 12060/12, 12 April 2016
relating to violence against LGBT persons. For further discussion and examples, see Section 2.6
concerning hate crime.
421 See, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 24 January 2017.
422 ECtHR, Martzaklis and Others v. Greece, No. 20378/13, 9 July 2015.
423 ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland, No. 39474/98, 16 May 2002; ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium, No. 9106/80,
29 February 1988.
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Example: In Stasi v. France,
424 the applicant complained that he had been ill
treated in prison because of his homosexuality and that the authorities had
not taken the necessary measures to protect him. For example, the applicant
claimed that he was forced to wear a pink star and that he was beaten and
burned with cigarettes by other inmates. The ECtHR, noted that in response
to each allegation the authorities took measures to protect him: the applicant
had been segregated from the other inmates and had been seen by the
building supervisor, a doctor and a psychiatrist. The ECtHR found that the
authorities had taken all effective measures to protect him from physical
harm during detention and that there had not been a breach of Article 3
without separately examining his complaint under Article 14.
Article 14 of the ECHR may also be applicable where provisions of criminal law are
found to be discriminatory425 or where convictions based on those discriminatory
provisions remain on a person’s criminal record.426
Under EU law, according to well-established case law of the CJEU,427 even if the
areas where criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters
for which the Member States are responsible, the national legislative provisions
may not discriminate against persons to whom EU law gives the right to equal
treatment. In the following case, the principle of non-discrimination was raised
in proceedings relating to the execution of a European arrest warrant.428
Example: In João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge,
429 a Portuguese national was
sentenced in Portugal to five years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking.
Subsequently, he married a French national with whom he was resident
in France. He was also employed by a French company under an indefinite
duration contract. Not wishing to be surrendered to the Portuguese
authorities, he requested to be imprisoned in France. However, the French
424 ECtHR, Stasi v. France, No. 25001/07, 20 October 2011.
425 ECtHR, S.L. v. Austria, No. 45330/99, 9 January 2003.
426 ECtHR, E.B. and Others v. Austria, Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07 and 48779/07,
7 November 2013.
427 CJEU, Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public, 2 February 1989.
428 Compare CJEU, C-182/15, Aleksei Petruhhin v. Latvijas Republikas Ģenerālprokuratūra [GC],
6 September 2016, concerning an extradition to a third state of an EU citizen exercising
freedom of movement.
429 CJEU, C-42/11, Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued
against João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge [GC], 5 September 2012.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
provision allowing non-execution of the European arrest warrant was
restricted solely to French nationals. The CJEU stated that Member States
cannot limit the non-execution of arrest warrants solely to their own
nationals, by automatically and absolutely excluding nationals of other
Member States who are staying or resident in the territory of the Member
State of execution, irrespective of their connections with that Member State.
This would constituted discrimination on the grounds of nationality within
the meaning of Article 18 of the TFEU.
155
EU Issues covered CoE
TFEU, Art. 8 and Art. 157
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21 and 23
Gender Equality Directive (recast)
(2006/54/EC)
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC)
CJEU, C-222/14, Maïstrellis v.
Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias
kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton, 2015
CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v. A Government
department and The Board of
Management of a Community
School [GC], 2014
CJEU, C-167/12, C. D. v. S. T. [GC],
2014
CJEU, C-427/11, Kenny v. Minister
for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform, Minister for Finance
and Commissioner of An Garda
Síochána, 2013
CJEU, C-243/95, Hill and Stapleton
v. The Revenue Commissioners and
Department of Finance, 1998
CJEU, C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena,
1976
Sex ECHR, Art. 2 (right to life),
Art. 3 (prohibition of torture),
Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, Emel Boyraz v. Turkey,
No. 61960/08, 2014
ECtHR, Konstantin Markin v.
Russia [GC], 30078/06, 2012
ECtHR, Andrle v. the Czech
Republic, No. 6268/08, 2011
ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey,
No. 29865/96, 2004
5
Protected grounds
156
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC), Art. 4 (1)
CJEU, C-423/04, Richards v.
Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, 27 April 2006
CJEU, C-117/01, K.B. v. NHS Pensions
Agency et Secretary of State for
Health, 7 January 2004
Gender identity ECHR, Art. 8 (right to respect
for private and family life)
and Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, Y.Y. v. Turkey, 14793/08,
2015
ECtHR, Hämäläinen v. Finland
[GC], No. 37359/09, 2014
ECtHR, Van Kück v. Germany,
No. 35968/97, 2003
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC)
CJEU, C-528/13, Léger v. Ministre
des Affaires sociales, de la Santé
et des Droits des femmes and
Etablissement français du sang,
2015
CJEU, Joined cases C-148/13
to C-150/13, A and Others v.
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en
Justitie [GC], 2014
CJEU, Joined cases C-199/12,
C-200/12, C-201/12, X and Y, and
Z v. Minister voor Imigratie en
Asiel, 2013
CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept
v. Consiliul Naţional pentru
Combaterea Discriminării, 2013
Sexual
orientation
ECHR Art. 5, Art. 8 (right
to respect for private and
family life), Art. 12 (right to
marry), Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, Taddeucci and McCall v.
Italy, No. 51362/09, 2016
ECtHR, O.M. v. Hungary,
No. 9912/15, 2016
ECtHR, E.B. and Others v.
Austria, Nos. 31913/07,
38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07
and 48779/07, 2013
ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria, No. 30141/04, 2010
ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC],
No. 43546/02, 2008
ECtHR, S.L. v. Austria,
No. 45330/99, 2003
ECtHR, Karner v. Austria,
No. 40016/98, 2003
ECSR, INTERIGHTS v. Croatia,
No. 45/2007, 2009
157
Protected grounds
EU Issues covered CoE
UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC)
CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v. A Government
department and The Board of
Management of a Community
School [GC], 2014
CJEU, C-354/13, FOA v. KL, 2014
CJEU, Joined cases C-335/11 and
C-337/11, HK Danmark, 2013
Disability ECHR, Art. 8 (right to respect
for private and family
life), Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC, Art. E
ECtHR, Guberina v. Croatia,
No. 23682/13, 2016
ECtHR, Glor v. Switzerland,
No. 13444/04, 2009
ECtHR, Pretty v. the United
Kingdom, No. 2346/02, 2002
ECtHR, Price v. the United
Kingdom, No. 33394/96, 2001
ECSR, AEH v. France, Complaint
No. 81/2012, 2013
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC)
CJEU, C-548/15, de Lange v.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën,
2016
CJEU, C-441/14, DI, acting on behalf
of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten
Eigil Rasmussen [GC], C-441/14,
2016
CJEU, C-258/15, Salaberria Sorondo
v. Academia Vasca de Policía
y Emergencias [GC], 2016
CJEU, Joined cases C-501/12 and
others, Specht v. Land Berlin and
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2014
CJEU, C-416/13, Vital Pérez v.
Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, 2014
CJEU, C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm
[GC], 2005
Age ECHR, Art. 5 (right to liberty
and security), Art. 6 (right to
fair trial) and Art. 8 (right to
respect for private and family
life)
ESC, Art. 1 (2), Art. 23 and
Art. 24
ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland,
No. 39474/98, 2002
ECtHR, Schwizgebel v.
Switzerland, No. 25762/07,
2010
ECtHR, V.v. the United Kingdom
[GC], No. 24888/94, 1999
ECtHR, T. v. the United
Kingdom [GC], No. 24724/94,
1999
ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium,
No. 9106/80, 1988
ECSR, Fellesforbundet for
Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway,
Complaint No. 74/2011, 2013
158
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
EU Issues covered CoE
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)
Council’s Framework Decision on
combating racism and xenophobia
CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie
Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita
ot diskriminatsia [GC], 2015
CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor
gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 2008
Race, ethnicity,
colour and
membership
of a national
minority
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition
of discrimination), Protocol
No. 12, Art. 1 (General
prohibition of discrimination)
ECtHR, Boacă and Others v.
Romania, No. 40355/11, 2016
ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark [GC],
38590/10, 2016
ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC],
Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06,
2009
ECSR, ERRC v. Ireland,
No. 100/2013, 2015
TFEU, Art. 18
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 45
Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC
Council Directive concerning the
status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents
(2003/109/EC)
CJEU, C-392/15, European
Commission v. Hungary, 2017
CJEU, C-165/14, Alfredo Rendón
Marín v. Administración del Estado
[GC], 2016
CJEU, C-571/10, Kamberaj v. IPES
[GC], 2012
CJEU, C-508/10, European
Commission v. the Netherlands,
2012
CJEU, C-200/02, Chen v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department,
2004
CJEU, C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa
di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000
CJEU, Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor
public, 1989
Nationality or
national origin
Council of Europe’s Convention
on Nationality
ECHR, Art. 3 (prohibition of
torture), Art. 5 (right to liberty
and security), Art. 8 (right to
respect for private and family
life), Protocol No. 4, Art. 3,
Protocol No. 1, Art. 2
ECtHR, Dhahbi v. Italy,
No. 17120/09, 2014
ECtHR, Rangelov v. Germany,
No. 5123/07, 2012
ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v.
Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 2011
ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia
[GC], No. 55707/00, 2009
ECtHR, Zeïbek v. Greece,
No. 46368/06, 2009
ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v.
Belgium, No. 45413/07, 2009
ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France,
No. 40892/98, 2003
ECtHR, C. v. Belgium,
No. 21794/93, 1996
ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium,
No. 12313/86, 1991
159
Protected grounds
EU Issues covered CoE
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 10 and 21
CJEU, C-188/15, Bougnaoui and
ADDH v. Micropole SA [GC], 2017
CJEU, C-157/15, Achbita and
Centrum voor gelijkheid van
kansen en voor racismebestrijding
v. G4S Secure Solutions NV [GC],
2017
Religion
or belief
ECHR, Art. 3 (prohibition of
torture), Art. 8 (right to respect
for private and family life),
Art. 9 (freedom of religion),
Art. 10 (right to respect for
private and family life),
Protocol No. 1, Art. 2 (right to
education)
ECtHR, İzzettin Doğan and
Others v. Turkey [GC],
No. 62649/10, 2016
ECtHR, Ebrahimian v. France,
No. 64846/11, 2015
ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France [GC],
No. 43835/11, 2014
ECtHR, Eweida and Others
v. the United Kingdom,
Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10,
51671/10 and 36516/10, 2013
ECtHR, Vojnity v. Hungary,
No. 29617/07, 2013
ECtHR, Milanović v. Serbia,
No. 44614/07, 2010
ECtHR, O’Donoghue and
Others v. the United Kingdom,
No. 34848/07, 2010
ECtHR, Alujer Fernandez and
Caballero García v. Spain (dec.),
No. 53072/99, 2001
ECtHR, Cha’are Shalom
Ve Tsedek v. France [GC],
No. 27417/95, 2000
Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)
CJEU, C-317/14, European
Commission v. Belgium, 2015
Language Council of Europe Framework
Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities
ECHR, Art. 6 (3) and Art. 14
(prohibition of discrimination)
ECtHR, Macalin Moxamed Sed
Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.),
No. 12209/10, 2015
ECtHR, Case ‘relating to certain
aspects of the laws on the
use of languages in education
in Belgium’ v. Belgium,
No. 1474/62 and others, 1968
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EU Issues covered CoE
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21
CJEU, C-149/10, Chatzi v. Ypourgos
Oikonomikon, 2010
Social origin,
birth and
property
ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination), Protocol No. 1,
Art. 1 (Protection of property)
ECtHR, Wolter and Sarfert v.
Germany, Nos. 59752/13 and
66277/13, 2017
ECtHR, Chassagnou and Others.
v. France [GC], No. 25088/94
and others, 1999
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
Art. 21
Political or other
opinion
ECHR, Art. 3 (prohibition
of torture), Art. 10 (right to
respect for private and family
life), Art. 11 (freedom of
assembly and association),
Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, Redfearn v. the United
Kingdom, No. 47335/06, 2012
ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia,
No. 40094/05, 2012
CJEU, C-406/15, Milkova
v. Izpalnitelen direktor na
Agentsiata za privatizatsia
i sledprivatizatsionen kontrol, 2017
Other status ECHR, Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ESC, Art. E
ECSR, Associazione Nazionale
Giudici di Pace v. Italy,
Complaint No. 102/2013, 2016
ECtHR, Varnas v. Lithuania,
No. 42615/06, 2013
Key points
• The principle of non-discrimination does not prohibit all differences in treatment, but
only those differences based on one of the protected grounds.
• Protected ground is an identifiable, objective or personal characteristic, or ‘status’, by
which individuals or groups are distinguishable from one another.
• Under the EU non-discrimination directives, the protected grounds are expressly fixed
to: sex, racial or ethnic origin, age, disability, religion or belief and sexual orientation.
• Under the ECHR there is an open-ended list which may be developed on a case-bycase basis.
161
Protected grounds
Under EU law, the non-discrimination directives prohibit differential treatment
based on certain ‘protected grounds’, containing a fixed and limited list of
protected grounds. These grounds cover sex (Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC)430, Gender Equality Directive (recast) (2006/54/EC)),431
sexual orientation, disability, age or religion or belief (Employment Equality
Directive (2000/78/EC)432), and racial or ethnic origin (Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)433). Article 21 of the EU Charter also contains a prohibition on
discrimination, which contains a non-exhaustive list of grounds, implied by
a formulation ‘such as’.434 The EU Charter binds the EU institutions, but it will
also apply to the Member States when they are interpreting and applying EU law.
Under the ECHR, Article 14 contains an
open-ended list, which coincides with
the directives, but goes beyond them.
Article 14 states that there shall be no
discrimination “on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The category of ‘other status’ has allowed the ECtHR to include those grounds
(among others) that are expressly protected by the non-discrimination directives,
namely: disability, age and sexual orientation.
430 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services,
OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, pp. 37–43.
431 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women
in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, pp. 23–36.
432 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, pp. 16–22.
433 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, pp. 22–26.
434 As regards the relation between the EU Charter and Directives, in CJEU, C-529/13, Georg Felber
v. Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur, 21 January 2015, the CJEU was asked to
interpret the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as enshrined in Article 21 of the
EU Charter and given expression in Directive 2000/78. The CJEU recalled that where Member
States adopt measures which fall within the scope of Directive 2000/78, which gives specific
expression, in the domain of employment and occupation, to the principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of age, they must respect the Directive. Consequently, the
CJEU
decided to examine the questions referred solely in the light of Directive 2000/78.
A ‘protected ground’ is a characteristic of
an individual that should not be
considered relevant to the differential
treatment or enjoyment of a particular
benefit.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
5.1. Sex
Sex discrimination is relatively self-explanatory, in that it refers to discrimination
that is based on the fact that an individual is either a woman or a man. Under
EU law, this is the most highly developed aspect of the EU social policy and has
long been considered a core right. The development of the protection on this
ground served a dual purpose: first, it served an economic purpose in that it
helped to eliminate competitive distortions in a market that had grown evermore
integrated; and second, on a political level, it provided the Community with a facet
aimed at social progress and the improvement of living and working conditions.
Consequently, the protection against discrimination on the ground of sex has
been, and has remained, a fundamental function of the EU: gender equality is
a ‘fundamental value’ (Article 2 of the TEU) and an ‘objective’ (Article 3 of the
TEU) of the Union. The acceptance of the social and economic importance of
ensuring equality of treatment was further crystallised by the central position it
was given in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Cases of sex discrimination may involve either men or women receiving less
favourable treatment than persons of the opposite sex.
Example: In Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai
Anthropinon Dikaiomaton,
435 the complainant worked as a civil servant. He
requested parental leave while his wife did not have any employment. The
CJEU found that, in accordance with the principle of equal opportunities and
treatment of men and women in employment and occupation, a male civil
servant has a right to take parental leave even if his wife is unemployed.
Example: In Defrenne v. Sabena, 436 the applicant complained that she
was paid less than her male counterparts, despite undertaking identical
employment duties. The CJEU held that this was clearly a case of sex
discrimination. In reaching this decision, the CJEU highlighted both the
economic and social dimension of the Union, and that non-discrimination
assists in progressing the EU towards these objectives.
435 CJEU, C-222/14, Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon
Dikaiomaton, 16 July 2015.
436 CJEU, C-43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena,
8 April 1976.
163
Protected grounds
Example: In Margaret Kenny and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and
Law Reform, Minister for Finance and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána,
437
the claimants were female civil servants assigned to clerical duties employed
by the Minister. They complained that their salaries were lower than those
of their male colleagues who were also performing administrative work in
specific posts reserved for members of the police. The national authorities
justified the difference in pay by the fact that members of the police
must always comply with the needs of the operational forces. The CJEU
explained that, to determine whether two different groups perform the
same work, it is not sufficient to establish that the tasks performed by those
groups are similar. The nature of work, the training requirements and the
working conditions have to be taken into account. Professional training is
consequently one of the criteria for determining whether or not the work
performed is comparable.
Example: The case of Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats
ASBL and Others v. Conseil des ministres438 concerns the principle of equal
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and
services. In particular, it relates to the Gender Goods and Services Directive
which permitted EU Member States to apply sex-specific risk factors in the
calculation of premiums and benefits in insurance contracts. As a result,
women and men paid different amounts of contributions under private
insurance schemes. Relying on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the
CJEU ruled that taking into account the gender of the insured individual as
a risk factor in insurance contracts constitutes discrimination and declared
Article 5 (2) of the Gender Goods and Services Directive invalid. Thus,
as of 21 December 2012 it is no longer possible to permit proportionate
differences in individuals’ premiums and benefits where the ground of sex
is a determining factor.
The CJEU emphasised that, to justify any differential treatment between men
and women, it must be shown that such treatment is based on objective factors
unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. This will be the case where the
measures reflect a legitimate social-policy objective, are appropriate to achieve
437 CJEU, C-427/11, Margaret Kenny and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
Minister for Finance and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, 28 February 2013.
438 CJEU, C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil
des ministres [GC], 1 March 2011.
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
that aim and are necessary to do so. 439 Therefore, justifications for a measure
that is realised solely to the detriment of women or one that is based only on
the financial or management considerations of employers cannot be accepted.
Pregnancy and maternity related discrimination is a particular form of sex
discrimination. To protect pregnancy, maternity and parenthood, the EU has
gradually developed a complex array of primary and secondary legislation.440
Article 157 of the TFEU establishes the obligation of equal pay between men
and women and provides a general legal basis for the adoption of measures in
the field of gender equality, which includes equality and antidiscrimination on
the ground of pregnancy or maternity within the workplace. Article 33 (2) of
the EU Charter states that “to reconcile family and professional life, everyone
shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with
maternity, and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following
the birth or adoption of a child.” Besides the recast Gender Equality Directive,
among others, the Pregnant Workers Directive441 is primarily aimed at improving
health and safety at work for pregnant workers, workers who have recently given
birth and workers who are breastfeeding. It is supplemented by the Parental
Leave Directive,442 which sets minimum standards designed to facilitate the
reconciliation of work with family life.
The CJEU has also greatly contributed to the development of this field of law,
by further clarifying and applying the principles expressed in legislation and
providing broad interpretations of relevant rights. According to the CJEU,
protection of pregnancy and maternity rights not only translates into promoting
substantive gender equality, but it also promotes the health of the mother
following the birth and the bond between the mother and her new-born child.
439 CJEU, C-173/13, Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice
and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités locales, 17 July 2014, para. 79.
440 For more details, see for example, European Commission, European Network of Legal Experts
in the Field of Gender Equality (2012), ‘Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy,
Maternity and Parenthood - The application of EU and national law in practice in 33 European
countries’.
441 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have
recently given birth or are breastfeeding, OJ L 348, 28.11.1992.
442 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and
repealing Directive 96/34/EC, OJ L 68, 18 March 2010.
165
Protected grounds
In the early cases of Dekker443 and Hertz,
444 the CJEU established that as only
women can become pregnant, a refusal to employ or the dismissal of a pregnant
woman based on her pregnancy or her maternity amounts to direct discrimination
on the grounds of sex, which cannot be justified by any other interest, including
the employer’s economic interest. In Melgar,
445 for example, it clearly stated that
“where non renewal of a fixed term contract is motivated by the worker’s state of
pregnancy, it constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex” contrary to EU
law. Moreover, a women is not obliged to disclose her pregnancy to the employer
during recruitment process, or at any other stage of employment.446 The CJEU
further held that any unfavourable treatment directly or indirectly connected to
pregnancy or maternity constitutes direct sex discrimination.447
However, the existing legal framework fails to regulate non-traditional ways of
becoming a mother/parent. In particular, the practice of surrogacy is increasing
across Europe and this creates a gap between social reality and legislation. Such
an issue was highlighted by two cases decided by the CJEU in 2014.
Example: In cases C. D. v. S. T.448 and Z. v. A Government Department and the
Board of Management of a Community School,
449 the CJEU held that EU law
does not require that a mother who has had a baby through a surrogacy
agreement should be entitled to paid leave equivalent to maternity or
adoption leave. Ms D., who was employed in a hospital in the United Kingdom,
and Ms Z., a teacher working in Ireland, both used surrogate mothers to have
a child. Both women applied for paid leave equivalent to maternity leave or
adoption leave. The applications were refused on the ground that Ms D. and
Ms Z. had never been pregnant and the children had not been adopted by
443 CJEU, C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, 8 November 1990.
444 CJEU, C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, 8 November 1990. Note that the Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes
Forbund i Danmark was acting on behalf of Birthe Vibeke Hertz.
445 CJEU, C-438/99, Maria Luisa Jiménez Melgar v. Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, 4 October 2001.
446 CJEU, C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., 14 July 1994; CJEU, C-320/01,
Wiebke Busch v. Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG, 27 February 2003.
447 CJEU, C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., 14 July 1994; CJEU, C-421/92,
Gabriele Habermann-Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./Opf. e.V.,
5 May 1994.
448 CJEU, C-167/12, C. D. v. S. T. [GC], 18 March 2014.
449 CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v. A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community
School [GC], 18 March 2014.
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the parents. In both cases, the CJEU found that the intended mother could
not rely on the provisions of either the Gender Equality Directive (recast)
or the Pregnant Workers Directives, nor the provisions of the Employment
Equality Directive, which prohibit discrimination on grounds of disability.
For the Pregnant Workers Directive, the CJEU found that granting maternity leave
presupposes that the worker concerned has been pregnant and has given birth
to a child. Therefore, a commissioning mother450 does not fall within the scope
of the directive, even in circumstances where she may breastfeed the baby
following the birth or where she does breastfeed the baby.
Regarding the Gender Equality Directive, the CJEU found that a refusal to grant
maternity leave to a commissioning mother does not constitute discrimination
on grounds of sex, given that a commissioning father is not entitled to such leave
either and that the refusal does not put female workers at a particular disadvantage
compared with male workers. Furthermore, a refusal to grant paid leave equivalent
to adoption leave to a commissioning mother is outside the scope of that directive.
Lastly, the CJEU considered that the inability to have a child does not constitute
a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the Employment Equality Directive.451
Example: The De Weerd452 case concerns national legislation relating to
incapacity benefit. In 1975, national legislation had introduced incapacity
benefit for men and unmarried women, irrespective of their income before
becoming incapacitated. In 1979, this was amended and the benefit also made
available to married women. However, a requirement that the recipient must
have received a particular level of income during the preceding year was also
introduced. The legislation was challenged on the ground (among others)
that the income requirement discriminated indirectly against women (who
were less likely to earn the required income than men). The state argued
that the differential enjoyment was justified out of budgetary considerations
to contain national expenditure. The CJEU found that while EU law does not
prevent the state from regulating which categories of person benefit from
social security benefits, it could not do so on a discriminatory manner.
450 A mother who has used a surrogate mother in order to have a child.
451 See Section 5.4.
452 CJEU, C-343/92, M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor
de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others, 24 February 1994.
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Example: In Hill and Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and Department
of Finance,
453 the CJEU made it clear that the principle of reconciliation
between work and family life follows from the principle of equality. The
government introduced a job-sharing scheme in the civil service, whereby
a post could be shared by two individuals on a temporary basis, working
50 % of the hours of the full-time post and receiving 50 % of the regular
salary. Workers were entitled to then return to their post full time where
these posts were available. The rules allowed individuals in full-time
employment to advance one increment on the pay scale per year. However,
for individuals who were job sharing the increment was halved, with two
years of job sharing equivalent to one increment. The two complainants in
the present case returned to their posts as full-time workers and complained
about the means by which the increment was applied to them. The CJEU
found this to constitute indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex since
it was predominantly women who took part in job-sharing. The government
argued that the differential treatment was justified since it was based on
the principle of applying the increment in relation to the actual length of
service. The CJEU found that this merely amounted to an assertion that
was not supported by objective criteria (in that there was no evidence that
other individuals’ length of service was calculated in terms of actual hours
worked). The CJEU then stated “an employer cannot justify discrimination
arising from a job-sharing scheme solely on the ground that avoidance of
such discrimination would involve increased costs.”
Similarly, under the ECHR, protection against discrimination on the ground of sex
is well developed. The ECtHR has stated that gender equality is a major goal in
the member states of the Council of Europe.454 The case law relating to gender
equality encompasses a variety of legal issues.
A very important area of gender equality in the ECtHR jurisprudence concerns
cases where women are victims of violence (discussed in Section 2.6). The ECHR
held that gender-based violence was a form of discrimination against women in
violation of Articles 2 and 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR.455
453 CJEU, C-243/95, Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and Department
of Finance, 17 June 1998.
454 ECtHR, Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], No. 30078/06, 22 March 2012, para. 127.
455 For example, see ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009, ECtHR, Halime Kılıç v.
Turkey, No. 63034/11, 28 June 2016 and ECtHR, M.G. v. Turkey, No. 646/10, 22 March 2016,
discussed in Section 2.6.
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The principle of equality between men and women has also led the ECtHR to find
a violation in context of employment and parental leave.
Example: In Emel Boyraz v. Turkey,
456 the applicant was dismissed from her
post as a security officer on the grounds that the tasks of security officers
involved risks and responsibilities that women were unable to assume, such
as working at night in rural areas and using firearms and physical force.
The ECtHR found that the authorities had not given sufficient justification
to explain this purported inability of women to work as security officers
in contrast to men. The ECtHR also pointed to the fact that the applicant
had been working as a security officer for four years, and there were
no indications that she had failed to fulfil her duties because of her sex.
Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 14.
In Konstantin Markin v. Russia,
457 the applicant, a divorced radio intelligence
operator in the armed forces, applied for three years’ parental leave to bring
up his three children. This was refused on the grounds that there was no
basis for his claim in domestic law. However, he was subsequently granted
two years’ parental leave and financial aid by his superiors in view of his
difficult personal circumstances. The applicant complained that male military
personnel, contrary to female, were not entitled to three years’ parental
leave to take care of minor children. He considered that this difference in
treatment was discriminatory on the grounds of sex. The ECtHR found that
men were in an analogous situation to women regarding parental leave.
The ECtHR did not accept that the difference in treatment was reasonably
and objectively justified by either the traditional distribution of gender roles
in society or the argument that parental leave for servicemen would have
a negative effect on the fighting power and operational effectiveness of
the armed forces. Therefore, the automatic restriction applied to a group
of people on the basis of their sex fell outside any acceptable margin of
appreciation and the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.
Another category of cases on gender equality concerns challenges to different
age requirements in respect of the enjoyment of social benefits. In the field of
social security and fiscal matters, the ECtHR allows a wide margin of appreciation
456 ECtHR, Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, No. 61960/08, 2 December 2014.
457 ECtHR, Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], No. 30078/06, 22 March 2012.
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to national authorities. In the Andrle case, the ECtHR reaffirmed that gender
equality allows for taking special measures that compensate for factual
inequalities between men and women.
Example: In Andrle v. the Czech Republic,
458 the applicant complained that,
unlike the position with women, there was no lowering of the pensionable
age for men who had raised children. The Czech government argued that
this difference in treatment was due to the position under the old communist
system where women with children were required to work full time, as
well as care for children and take care of the household. The measure
aims to compensate for this double burden on women. The authorities had
already started a gradual reform of its pension scheme towards equalising
the retirement age. However, the old system still applied to people of the
applicant’s age. The ECtHR accepted that the measure was rooted in these
specific historical circumstances and in the need for special treatment for
women. The Court found that this was still reasonably and objectively
justified. The ECtHR also held that the timing and the extent of the measures
taken to rectify the inequality in question were not manifestly unreasonable
and did not exceed the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the states in
this area. Therefore, the state did not violate the non-discrimination principle.
In the Andrle case, the ECtHR clearly distinguished different treatment of men
and women in the field of parental leave from that of pensions. According to that,
gender could not provide sufficient justification for the exclusion of fathers from
the entitlement to take parental leave, which is a short-term measure, and its
reform would not entail serious financial repercussions as could be in the case in
the pension scheme reform. Therefore, regarding pension schemes, states enjoy
a wide margin of appreciation. However, for example in Di Trizio v. Switzerland,
459
(discussed in detail in Section 6.3), the ECtHR found that the method of calculating
disability benefits which disadvantaged women who reduced their working hours
after childbirth amounted to discrimination.
In Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia,
460 (discussed in detail in Section 1.3.2),
the ECtHR examined the difference in treatment in life sentencing between men
458 ECtHR, Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08, 17 February 2011.
459 ECtHR, Di Trizio v. Switzerland, No. 7186/09, 2 February 2016.
460 ECtHR, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 24 January 2017.
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and women who were exempt from life imprisonment. It concluded on the basis
of statistics, the needs of women for protection against gender-based violence,
abuse and sexual harassment in the prison environment, as well as the needs for
protection of pregnancy and motherhood, that there existed a public interest in
the exemption of female offenders from life imprisonment by way of a general
rule.
In the context of gender equality, the ECtHR also examined national provisions
concerning the choice of name and transmission of parents’ surnames to their
children. For instance, in Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy,
461 (discussed in detail in
Section 4.6), it found a rule not allowing a married couple to give their child the
mother’s surname discriminatory towards women.
Example: In Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey,
462 the applicant complained that national
law obliged a woman to bear her husband’s name upon marriage. Although
the law permitted a woman to retain her maiden name in addition to her
husband’s name, the ECtHR found that this constituted discrimination on
the basis of sex, because national law did not oblige a husband to alter his
surname.
Under international law, gender equality is also recognised as central to human
rights. Various United Nations bodies have addressed gender based discrimination
in particular faced by women. They also stressed that women are often victims of
multiple discrimination (when they experience discrimination on two or several
grounds) and intersectional discrimination (where several grounds operate
and interact with each other at the same time in such a way that they are
inseparable).463 A number of UN human bodies has also emphasised the harms
of gender stereotypes464 and the need to address harmful gender stereotypes
461 ECHR, Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, No. 77/07, 7 January 2014.
462 ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, No. 29865/96, 16 November 2004.
463 See for example, UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016), General
comment No. 3 (2016) on women and girls with disabilities, CRPD/C/GC/3, 2 September 2016;
UN, CEDAW (2010), General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties
under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, 19 October 2010, para. 18.
464 For an overview on how the UN human treaty bodies have applied those treaties in relation to
gender stereotypes/stereotyping with a view to advancing women’s human rights, see OHCHR
Commissioned Report (2013), Gender Stereotyping as a Human Rights Violation, pp. 20–43.
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in order to promote gender equality.465 Differences in treatment that are based
on gender stereotypes may constitute discrimination against women. The
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that “Gender-based
assumptions and expectations, generally place women at a disadvantage with
respect to substantive enjoyment of rights […]. Gender-based assumptions
about economic, social and cultural roles preclude the sharing of responsibility
between men and women in all spheres that is necessary to equality.”466
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
stressed that gender stereotypes are a root cause and consequence of genderbased discrimination.467 For instance, in a case concerning discrimination in
employment, the Committee found the violation of the Convention in the fact
that the national courts were influenced by the stereotypical prejudices that
extramarital relationships were acceptable for men and not for women.
5.2. Gender identity
Key points
• Under the ECHR, gender identity is protected under the category of ‘other status’.
• Under EU law, gender identity is protected to a limited extent under the protected
ground of sex. It covers individuals who intend to undergo or have undergone gender
reassignment surgery.
Thus, the more broadly accepted definition of gender identity encompasses not
only those who undertake gender reassignment surgery (‘transsexuals’), but also
persons who choose other means to express their gender, such as transvestism
or cross-dressing, or simply adopting a manner of speech or cosmetics usually
associated with members of the opposite sex.
465 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016), General comment No. 3 (2016)
on women and girls with disabilities, CRPD/C/GC/3, 2 September 2016.
466 UN, CESCR (2005), General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the
Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant), E/C.12/2005/4,
11 August 2005, para. 11.
467 UN, CEDAW (2010), Communication No. 28/2010, CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010, 24 February 2012,
para. 8.8.
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It should be stressed, however, that
under EU non-discrimination law, currently there is no specific provision for
protection against discrimination on
grounds of a person’s gender identity or
gender expression.468 Following the case
of P v. S and Cornwall County Council,
469
the non-discrimination ground of gender identity is only partly covered by the
principle of equal treatment for men and
women. The CJEU held that the scope of
the principle of equal treatment for men
and women could not be confined to the
prohibition of discrimination based on
the fact that a person is of one sex or
the other. Accordingly, the ground of sex
encompasses discrimination against an
individual because he/she “intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment”. Therefore, the ground of sex as construed under EU law currently
protects gender identity only in a narrow sense. This approach is reaffirmed in
the Gender Equality Directive (recast) (2006/54/EC).470 Similarly, studies of national legislation regulating this area show no consistent approach across Europe,
with states largely divided between those that address ‘gender identity’ as part
of ‘sexual orientation’, and those that address it as part of ‘sex discrimination’.
Example: The case of K.B. v. NHS Pensions Agency471 concerns the refusal
of KB’s transsexual partner a widower’s pension. This refusal was because
the transsexual couple could not satisfy the requirement of being married;
transsexuals were not capable of marrying under English law at the time.
In considering the issue of discrimination, the CJEU held that there was
468 Explicit prohibition of discrimination on the ground of gender identity is foreseen in Directive
2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, pp. 57–73, recital 9.
469 CJEU, C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 30 April 1996.
470 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women
in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, pp. 23–36.
471 CJEU, C-117/01, K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for
Health, 7 January 2004.
Gender identity refers to “each person’s
deeply felt internal and individual
experience of gender, which may or may
not correspond with the sex assigned at
birth, including the personal sense of the
body (which may involve, if freely
chosen, modification of bodily
appearance or function by medical,
surgical or other means) and other
expressions of gender, including dress,
speech and mannerisms”.
Source: Yogyakarta Principles (2007), Yogyakarta
Principles on the application of international
human rights law in relation to sexual orientation
and gender identity, March 2007. An independent
body of experts in International Human Rights
Law adopted these principles.
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no discrimination on the ground of sex because, in determining who was
entitled to the survivor’s pension, there was no less favourable treatment
based on being male or female. The CJEU then changed the direction of
the consideration. It then concentrated on the issue of marriage. It was
highlighted that transsexuals were never able to marry, and thus never
able to benefit from the survivor’s pension, whereas, heterosexuals could.
Consideration was then given to the ECtHR case of Christine Goodwin.472
Based on these considerations, the CJEU concluded that the British legislation
in question was incompatible with the principle of equal treatment as it
prevented transsexuals from benefitting from part of their partners pay.
Example: Similar considerations arose in Richards v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions.
473 Richards, who was born a man, underwent gender
reassignment surgery. The case surrounded the state pension entitlement in
the United Kingdom, as at the time, women received their state pension at
the age of 60 years, while men received their state pension at the age of 65
years. When Richards applied for state pension at the age of 60 years, she
was refused, with an explanation stating that legally she was recognised as
a man and therefore she could not apply for state pension until she reached
the age of 65 years. The CJEU held that this was unequal treatment on the
grounds of her gender reassignment, and as a consequence this was regarded
as discrimination contrary to Article 4 (1) of the Directive on the progressive
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in
matters of social security.474
Under the ECHR, the notion of gender identity is interpreted more widely.
The ECtHR has held that the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of
the Convention also covers questions related to gender identity.475 The ECtHR
stressed that “gender and sexual orientation are two distinctive and intimate
characteristics […]. Any confusion between the two will therefore constitute an
attack on one’s reputation capable of attaining a sufficient level of seriousness
for touching upon such an intimate characteristic of a person.”476
472 ECtHR, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 28957/95, 11 July 2002.
473 CJEU, C-423/04, Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,
27 April 2006.
474 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.
475 ECtHR, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, No. 73235/12, 12 May 2015, para. 96.
476 ECtHR, Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, No. 70434/12, 22 March 2016, para. 27.
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Discrimination based on ‘gender identity’ can derive “from traditional social
perceptions and legal settings linked to being a transsexual person”.477 There
are two main legal issues relating to discrimination based on gender identity.
The first relates to access to gender reassignment. The second relates to legal
gender recognition procedures, which can enable transgender persons to live in
accordance with their preferred gender identity.
Example: The case of Hämäläinen v. Finland478 concerns the refusal to change
the applicant’s male identity number to a female one following her gender
reassignment surgery, unless her marriage was transformed into a civil
partnership. The ECtHR confirmed that states have an obligation to recognise
the change of gender undergone by post-operative transsexuals through,
inter alia, the possibility of amending all data relating to a person’s civil
status. However, in the applicant’s case, the ECtHR dismissed the complaint
under Article 14. The Court found that the problems experienced in relation
to her request for a female identity number did not result from discrimination
because her situation and the situation of cissexuals were not sufficiently
similar to be compared with each other. The ECtHR also dismissed the
Article 8 complaint, finding that the conversion of the applicant’s marriage
into a registered partnership would have no implications for her family life.
The legal concepts of marriage and registered partnership were almost
identical in Finland and the conversion would not have had any implications
on the paternity of her biological child or on the responsibility for the care,
custody and maintenance of the child.
The above judgment confirmed the states’ obligation to enable legal gender
recognition. However, at the same time, a legal requirement that a person must
first change their civil status, as a prior condition for access to a legal change of
gender, does not contravene the Convention if it does not affect the family life of
the person concerned (for example their rights and obligations regarding a child).
477 FRA (2015), Protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity
and sex characteristics in the EU – Comparative legal analysis – Update 2015, Luxembourg,
Publications Office, p. 15.
478 ECtHR, Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], No. 37359/09, 16 July 2014.
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Protected grounds
Example: In Y.Y. v. Turkey,
479 the applicant had been refused gender
reassignment surgery on the grounds that he was not ‘permanently unable
to procreate’ as required by domestic law. He complained that, by refusing
to grant him authorisation for gender reassignment surgery (without which
it was not possible to obtain legal recognition of his preferred gender), the
Turkish authorities had discriminated against him. The ECtHR stressed the
importance of the freedom to define one’s gender identity and held that
the principle of respect for the applicant’s physical integrity precluded any
obligation for him to undergo treatment aimed at permanent sterilisation.
Example: In Van Kück v. Germany,
480 the private medical insurance company of
the applicant, who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and hormone
treatment, refused to reimburse the costs of her treatment. The German
Court of Appeal, which heard the applicant’s claim against the insurance
company, determined that the medical procedures were not ‘necessary’ as
required under the agreement. Therefore, the applicant was not entitled
to reimbursement. The ECtHR found that, considering the nature of gender
identity and the gravity of a decision to undergo irreversible medical
procedures, the national court’s approach had not only failed to ensure the
applicant received a fair trial, violating Article 6 of the ECHR, but also violated
her right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR.
Example: In its ruling,481 the Athens Justice of Peace confirmed the right to
the recognition of gender identity without gender reassignment surgery. At
his birth, the applicant was registered in the public registry as a ‘girl’. From
early childhood, however, the applicant showed symptoms of a gender
identity disorder. He underwent hormone therapy (testosterone injections)
and a double mastectomy. The court held that a requirement to undergo
gender reassignment surgery to modify the existing entry in the public
registry would be excessive and would violate Article 8 of the ECHR, as well
as Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR. The court concluded that, in the applicant’s
case, the male sex was prevailing. Moreover, as the male sex and a male name
are fundamental features of the applicant’s personality, they must appear in
the public registry; therefore, the existing entry must be modified accordingly.
479 ECtHR, Y.Y. v. Turkey, 14793/08, 10 March 2015.
480 ECtHR, Van Kück v. Germany, No. 35968/97, 12 June 2003, paras. 30 and 90-91.
481 Greece, Athens Justice of Peace, Decision No. 418/2016, 23 September 2016, see European
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination (2016), Recognition of
gender identity without gender reassignment surgery.
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Under CoE law, the Istanbul Convention prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. ECRI has started to monitor LGBTI-related issues
in Council of Europe member states.482
Apart from the issues discussed above, there are other legal issues connected
with discrimination on the basis of gender identity. For example, it is considered
equally problematic that many states require the registration of a baby’s sex at
birth as either male or female.483 Another issue which is highly criticised concerns
medical intervention in babies in order to impose a specific sex where the newborn baby’s sex is unclear.484
5.3. Sexual orientation
Cases relating to sexual orientation discrimination typically involve individuals
receiving less favourable treatment because they are gay, lesbian or bisexual,
but the ground also prohibits discrimination on the basis of being heterosexual.
The following examples illustrate how
the CJEU interprets the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation.
482 See Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2012),
Information document on the fifth monitoring cycle of the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance, 28 September 2012, point 9.
483 FRA (2015), The fundamental rights situation of intersex people, Luxembourg, Publications
Office; Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights (2011), Study on Discrimination on
Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe.
484 Several CoE documents condemned this controversial practice; see, for example,
Resolution 1952 (2013), ‘Children’s right to physical integrity’.
Sexual orientation can be understood to
refer to “each person’s capacity for
profound emotional, affectional and
sexual attraction to, and intimate
relations with, individuals of a different
gender or the same gender or more than
one gender.”
Source: Yogyakarta Principles (2007), Yogyakarta
Principles on the application of international
human rights law in relation to sexual orientation
and gender identity, March 2007. An independent
body of experts in International Human Rights
Law adopted these principles.
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Protected grounds
Example: In Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării,485 Accept, an NGO promoting and protecting LGBT rights in
Romania, complained that the principle of equal treatment as specified in
the Employment Equality Directive was breached in recruitment matters by
a professional football club. They referred in particular to homophobic public
statements made by a patron of this club, who stated in an interview that he
would never hire a homosexual player. The CJEU stated that it would have
been sufficient for the club to have distanced itself from discriminatory public
statements and proved the existence of express provisions in its recruitment
policy aimed at ensuring compliance with the principle of equal treatment.
Example: In Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et
des Droits des femmes and Etablissement français du sang,
486 a man who had
a sexual relationship with another man was not allowed to give blood. The
national authorities considered that the claimant was exposed to a high risk
of contracting severe infectious diseases that could be transmitted through
the blood. The CJEU concluded that, although such a permanent ban from
giving blood for homosexual men was compatible with EU law (Article 21
of the EU Charter), including its prohibition of discrimination, it was only
the case when less onerous methods of ensuring a high level of health
protection did not exist. The CJEU left it in the hands of the domestic courts
to ascertain whether there were any effective techniques for detecting
infectious diseases, in particular HIV. In the absence of such techniques,
the courts would have to verify whether a questionnaire and individual
interview with a medical professional could establish the existence of a risk
to the health of recipients.
The methods of assessing the credibility of declared sexual orientation of asylum
applicants have been a matter of CJEU case law.487
485 CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
25 April 2013.
486 CJEU, C-528/13, Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des
femmes and Etablissement français du sang, 29 April 2015.
487 For more information, see FRA (2017), Current migration situation in the EU: Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers, Luxembourg, Publications Office.
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Example: In A and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie v.
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie,
488 the CJEU clarified how national
authorities, in accordance with EU standards, could ascertain the sexual
orientation of asylum applicants. Directives 2004/83/EC and 2005/85/EC
provide the minimum requirements that third-country nationals must fulfil
to be able to claim refugee status; they provide the minimum standards
for the procedures for examining asylum applications and the rights of
asylum seekers. National authorities are not allowed to carry out detailed
questioning about the sexual practices of asylum applicants or submit them
to any ‘tests’ to establish their homosexuality, because such evidence would
of its nature infringe human dignity, the respect of which is guaranteed by
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the CJEU held that not
declaring one’s homosexuality at the beginning of an asylum procedure
before the relevant authorities must not lead to the conclusion that the
individual’s declaration lacked credibility.
Example: In X, Y, and Z v. Minister voor Imigratie en Asiel,
489 the CJEU found
that homosexual persons can constitute a particular social group under the
refugee definition because of existing criminal laws specifically targeting
them. The right to asylum can be justified when the person risks persecution.
A penalty of imprisonment for homosexual acts will be considered as
a sufficient serious risk of persecution if this penalty is actually applied. The
sexual orientation is a characteristic so fundamental for a person’s identity
that nobody should be forced to renounce it or conceal it in the country of
origin to avoid persecution.490
Under the ECHR, Article 14 does not explicitly list ‘sexual orientation’ as
a protected ground. In a series of cases, the ECtHR has stated, however, that
sexual orientation is included among the ‘other’ grounds protected by Article 14.491
488 CJEU, Joined cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, A and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en
Justitie [GC], 2 December 2014.
489 CJEU, Joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X and Y and Z v.
Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, 7 November 2013.
490 For other case law relating to sexual orientation see in particular CJEU, C-267/06, Tadao Maruko
v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [GC], 1 April 2008, discussed in detail in
Section 2.2.3 and CJEU, C-267/12, Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et
des Deux-Sèvres, 12 December 2013, discussed in Section 2.1.2.
491 See, for example, ECtHR, Fretté v. France, No. 36515/97, 26 February 2002, para. 32.
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Example: In S.L. v. Austria,
492 the applicant complained that national law, as
it stood at the time, criminalised consensual sexual relations between men
where one of the parties was under eighteen. The contested provision did
not apply to opposite-sex or female same-sex sexual relationships. The
ECtHR found this to constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The Austrian Parliament subsequently repealed the criminal provision – the
subject matter of the above case. But the criminal convictions based on the
repealed provision were not deleted from the criminal records of those people
who had been convicted.
Example: In E.B. and Others v. Austria,
493 the applicants complained about the
Austrian authorities’ refusal to erase the criminal convictions for consensual
homosexual relations from their criminal records, although the offence in
question had been abolished. The ECtHR noted that a legal provision losing its
force of law was not in itself a sufficient reason for deleting a conviction from
a person’s criminal record. However, both the Austrian Constitutional Court
and the ECtHR had found that the contested provision violated the Austrian
Constitution and the ECHR, respectively. Both held that the provision had
been abolished to bring the situation into conformity with the law and the
principle of equality, and that maintaining criminal record entries may have
a serious negative impact on the private life of the individual concerned.
Since the national authorities had failed to provide any justification as to
why it was necessary to maintain the criminal record entries, the ECtHR
found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.
The ECtHR also examined a number of cases involving discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the context of adoption and marriage.
Example: In E.B. v. France, 494 the applicant was refused adoption of a child
because there was no male role model in her household. Given that national
law permitted single parents to adopt children, the ECtHR found that the
authorities’ decision was primarily based on the fact that the applicant had
492 ECtHR, S.L. v. Austria, No. 45330/99, 9 January 2003.
493 ECtHR, E.B. and Others v. Austria, Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07 and 48779/07,
7 November 2013.
494 ECtHR, E.B. v. France [GC], No. 43546/02, 22 January 2008.
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been in a relationship and living with another women. Accordingly, the ECtHR
found that discrimination had occurred based on sexual orientation.
Example: In Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy,
495 the applicants, an Italian national
and a New Zealand national, had lived together as a homosexual couple since
1999. When they decided to settle in Italy, the second applicant’s application
for a residence permit on family grounds was turned down, because the
applicants were not married and therefore the Italian national’s partner
was not considered a family member. At the same time, only heterosexual
couples could get married. Consequently, the condition of getting married
could not be fulfilled in the applicants’ case. The ECtHR found that the lack
of a right to marry for same-sex couples under national law, which was
a prerequisite for obtaining a residence permit, constituted a violation of
Article 14 in combination with Article 8 of the ECHR.
The ECHR also protects from government interference relating to sexual
orientation under Article 8 taken alone. Thus, even if discriminatory treatment
based on this ground has occurred, it may be possible simply to claim a violation
of Article 8 without needing to argue the existence of discriminatory treatment.
Example: In Karner v. Austria,
496 the applicant had been cohabiting with
his partner, the main tenant, who died. The national courts interpreted the
relevant legislation so as to exclude homosexual couples from automatically
succeeding to a tenancy agreement where the main tenant died. The
government argued that differential treatment was justified to protect
those in traditional families from losing their accommodation. The ECtHR
stressed that, although protecting the traditional family could constitute
a legitimate aim, “the margin of appreciation […] is narrow […] where there
is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation”. The ECtHR
continued that “the principle of proportionality does not merely require
that the measure chosen is in principle suited for realising the aim sought.
It must also be shown that it was necessary in order to achieve that aim
to exclude certain categories of people – in this instance persons living in
a homosexual relationship – from the scope of application of section 14 of
the Rent Act”. The ECtHR thus made a finding of discrimination, since the
495 ECtHR, Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, 30 June 2016.
496 ECtHR, Karner v. Austria, No. 40016/98, 24 July 2003, paras. 34-43.
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state could have employed measures to protect the traditional family without
placing homosexual couples at such a disadvantage.
Example: In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,
497 the applicants, a same-sex couple,
requested from the competent authority permission to get married. Their
request was refused, because under domestic law a marriage could only
be concluded between persons of the opposite sex. The legislation was
subsequently changed, and the mechanism to recognise and give legal effect
to same-sex couples was established in the form of a registered partnership.
The ECtHR held, for the first time, that a cohabiting same-sex couple living in
a stable relationship constituted ‘family life’, but that their inability to marry
did not constitute a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of
the ECHR. The Court pointed out that the national authorities were better
placed to assess and respond to the needs of the society in the field and to
take account of social and cultural connotations. Article 12 of the ECHR did
not impose an obligation to establish a right to marry for same sex couples
and consequently there was no violation of that provision.
Article 5 of the ECHR protects the right to liberty of persons irrespective of their
sexual orientation. Interferences with this right are examined under Article 5.
Example: In O.M. v. Hungary,
498 the applicant, an Iranian national, claimed
asylum on the basis of his homosexuality. The authorities ordered his
detention, in particular because he was unable to prove his identity or right
to stay in the country. The ECtHR found that the authorities had failed to
carry out an assessment in a sufficiently individualised manner as required
by national law. When placing asylum seekers who claimed to be part of
a vulnerable group in the country that they had to leave, the authorities
should exercise particular care to avoid situations which could reproduce the
plight that forced them to flee. The authorities had failed to consider, when
ordering the applicant’s detention, the extent to which he was safe in custody
among other detained persons, many of whom had come from countries with
widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons. In conclusion,
the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 5 (1) of the ECHR.
497 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.
498 ECtHR, O.M. v. Hungary, No. 9912/15, 5 July 2016.
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The ESC also protects sexual orientation among ‘other’ grounds.
Example: The case of Interights v. Croatia499 concerns the use of homophobic
language in school materials. The ECSR stated that, although states enjoy
a wide margin of discretion in determining the content of national school
curricula, they have an obligation to ensure through the domestic legal
system that state-approved sexual and reproductive health education was
objective and non-discriminatory. The Committee found that the educational
material used in the ordinary curriculum described and presented people of
homosexual orientation in a manifestly biased, discriminatory and demeaning
way. It held that the discriminatory statements constituted a violation of
the right to health education (Article 11 (2) of the ESC) in light of the nondiscrimination clause.
5.4. Disability
Neither the ECHR nor the Employment Equality Directive provide a definition of
disability. Because of the nature of the CJEU’s role, national courts frequently
determine what constitutes a disability and present it as part of the factual
background to disputes they refer to the CJEU.
In Chacón Navas,
500 the CJEU interpreted the concept of disability under
Directive 2000/78/EC in a way close to a medical model of disability. However,
as discussed in Chapter 1, the EU became party to the CRPD,501 which is now
a reference point for interpreting EU law relating to discrimination on the grounds
of disability.502 The CJEU stated that “Directive 2000/78 must, as far as possible,
499 ECSR, International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interights) v. Croatia,
Complaint No. 45/2007, 30 March 2009.
500 CJEU, C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [GC], 11 July 2006.
501 For the EU the CRPD entered into force on 22 January 2011.
502 CJEU, C-312/11, European Commission v. Italian Republic, 4 July 2013; CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v.
A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community School [GC],
18 March 2014; CJEU, C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, 22 May 2014; CJEU,
C-395/15, Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, 1 December 2016; CJEU, C-406/15,
Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen
kontrol, 9 March 2017.
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be interpreted in a manner consistent with that Convention.”503 Consequently, the
CJEU refers to the definition of disability as provided in the CRPD, which reflects
the social model of disability. According to Article 1 of the CRPD:
“Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an
equal basis with others.”
According to Article 2 (3) of the CRPD, discrimination on the grounds of disability
means any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability, which
has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Article 2 (4) of the CRPD specifies that:
“‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden,
where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities
the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Furthermore, Article 2 (3) explicitly acknowledges that denial of reasonable
accommodation is covered by the definition of ‘discrimination’. An example of
denial of reasonable accommodation can be found in a case concerning refusal
of the application for permission to build a hydrotherapy pool that would meet
rehabilitation needs of a person with disability. 504 The Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities stressed that a law which is applied in a neutral
manner may have a discriminatory effect when the particular circumstances of
the individuals to whom it is applied are not taken into consideration. It found
that a departure from the development plan could accommodate the individual
needs of persons with disabilities and ensure them the enjoyment or exercise
of all human rights on an equal basis with others and without discrimination.
503 CJEU, Joined cases C-335/11 and C-33711, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk
almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, 11 April 2013.
504 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 3/2011,
CRPD/C/7/D/3/2011, 21 May 2012.
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As the authorities did not address the specific circumstances of applicant’s case
and her particular disability-related needs, the Committee found a violation of
several provisions of the CRPD.
Under both EU and CoE law, it is also recognised that states have obligations
to ensure reasonable accommodation to allow persons with disabilities the
opportunity to fully realise their rights. Therefore, failure to do so amounts to
discrimination.505
Example: In HK Danmark,
506 two employees were dismissed from their jobs
with a shortened notice period because of workplace absences resulting from
their health problems. The employers disputed that the claimants’ state of
health was covered by the notion of ‘disability’. They argued that the only
incapacity was that the claimants were not able to work full-time. The CJEU
stated that “Directive 2000/78 must, as far as possible, be interpreted in
a manner consistent with that convention.” As a consequence, the CJEU held
that “the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation
which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective
participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis
with other workers.” This means that disability does not necessarily imply
complete exclusion from work or professional life.
Furthermore, the CJEU interpreted Article 5 of the Employment Equality
Directive as meaning that employers were required to take appropriate
measures, in particular to enable a person with a disability to have access
to, participate in, or advance in employment. The CJEU referred to the broad
definition of reasonable accommodation as set out in Article 2 of the CRPD.
The CJEU noted that pursuant to recital 20 in the preamble to the Employment
Equality Directive and the second paragraph of Article 2 on reasonable
accommodation, measures are not limited to those that are material, but can
also include organisational measures. Consequently, it held that a reduction
in working hours may be regarded as a reasonable accommodation measure
in a case in which the reduction makes it possible for a worker to continue
505 ECtHR, Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 23 February 2016; ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary,
11146/11, 29 January 2013.
506 CJEU, C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk almennyttigt
Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, 11 April 2013.
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their employment. The CJEU left the matter for the national court to assess
whether a reduction in working hours represented in this particular case
a disproportionate burden on the employer.
Under EU law, the concept of disability within the meaning of Directive 2000/78
does not cover every medical condition (even a severe one) but only one that
prevents the person “from having access to, participating in or advancing in
employment”.507
Example: In C. D.508 and Z.,
509 the claimant was unable to become pregnant.
She used a surrogate mother to have a child. She applied for leave equivalent
to maternity or adoption leave. However, her request was refused on the
ground that she had neither been pregnant nor adopted a baby. The CJEU
noted that her inability to have a child by conventional means did not prevent
her from having access to, participating in, or advancing in employment.
Consequently, it held that her condition did not constitute a disability within
the meaning of the Directive. Thus, EU law does not require that a mother
should be granted maternity leave or its equivalent in such a situation.
To establish whether the health problems of a person concerned are included in
the scope of the notion of disability, the effects of the medical condition should
be taken into consideration. Specifically, it is vital to examine whether or not
this particular state of health may hinder the full and effective participation of
the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers.
Example: In FOA v. Kommunernes Landsforening, 510 the CJEU had to
determine whether or not disability applied to an obese worker who had
been dismissed. The CJEU held that obesity as such is not a disability within
the meaning of Directive 2000/78, but in some cases, it can amount to
a disability. The CJEU found that obesity can be considered as a disability,
507 CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v. A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community
School [GC], 18 March 2014, para. 81 (emphasis added).
508 CJEU, C-167/12, C. D. v. S. T. [GC], 18 March 2014.
509 CJEU, C-363/12, Z. v. A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community
School [GC], 18 March 2014.
510 CJEU, C-354/13, Fag og Arbejde (FOA) v. Kommunernes Landsforening (KL), 18 December 2014,
see in particular paras. 53-64.
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irrespective of its medical classification,511 when, for example, it results in
reduced mobility or medical conditions preventing the person concerned from
carrying out work or causing discomfort when carrying out a professional
activity.
In Mohamed Daouidi,
512 the CJEU considered whether the dismissal of a worker
due to temporary incapacity (but of unknown duration) could constitute direct
disability discrimination. The Court ruled that the dismissal could, in principle,
be considered directly discriminatory on the grounds of disability, provided the
incapacity was ‘long-term’.513 Whether it is ‘long-term’, is a question of fact for
national courts to decide based on all available objective evidence. Such evidence
may include medical and scientific data, and knowledge relating to that person’s
condition. It may also include the fact that, at the time of the discriminatory act,
the person’s prognosis regarding short-term progress is uncertain, or the fact
that the person’s incapacity is likely to last a significant amount of time before
they recover.
Under the ECHR, although not expressly featuring in the list of protected grounds,
disability has been included by the ECtHR in its interpretation of ‘other’ grounds
under Article 14.
Example: In Glor v. Switzerland,
514 the ECtHR found that the applicant, who
was a diabetic, could be considered as a person with a disability, irrespective
of the fact that national law classified this as a ‘minor’ disability. The applicant
was obliged to pay a tax to compensate for failing to complete his military
service, which was payable by all those who were eligible for military
service. To be exempted from this tax one either had to have a disability
reaching a level of ‘40 %’ (considered equivalent to the loss of use of one
limb), or be a conscientious objector. Conscientious objectors were obliged
to perform a ‘civil service’. The applicant’s disability was such that he was
found unfit to serve in the army, but the disability did not reach the severity
threshold required in national law to exempt him from the tax. He had offered
511 The CJEU did not follow the approach advanced by the Advocate General who referred to WHO
classification of obesity and stated that only Obese Class III can amount to a disability.
512 CJEU, C-395/15, Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, 1 December 2016.
513 Neither the CRPD nor Directive 2000/78 define ‘long-term’ as regards a physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairment.
514 ECtHR, Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04, 30 April 2009.
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to perform the ‘civil service’ but this was refused. The ECtHR found that the
state had treated the applicant comparably with those who had failed to
complete their military service without valid justification. This constituted
discriminatory treatment since the applicant found himself in a different
position (as being rejected for military service but willing and able to perform
civil service), and as such the state should have created an exception to the
current rules.
Example: In Guberina v. Croatia, 515 the applicant requested tax exemption
on the purchase of a new property adapted to the needs of his severely
disabled child. The authorities did not take into consideration his son’s
particular needs and found that he did not satisfy the conditions for tax
exemption on account of already being in possession of a suitable place
to live. The ECtHR stressed that, by ratifying the CPRD, Croatia was obliged
to respect such principles as reasonable accommodation, accessibility and
non-discrimination against persons with disabilities and that, by ignoring the
specific needs of the applicant’s family related to his child’s disability there
had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in conjunction with Article 14
of the Convention. In this case, for the first time, the ECtHR recognised that
discriminatory treatment of the applicant on account of the disability of his
child was “disability-based discrimination covered by Article 14”.516
As with other protected grounds under the ECHR, it is not uncommon for cases
to be dealt with under other substantive rights, rather than under Article 14.
Example: In Price v. the United Kingdom,
517 the applicant was sentenced to
prison for a period of seven days. She suffered from physical disabilities due
to ingestion of thalidomide by her mother during pregnancy, with the result
that she had absent or significantly shortened limbs as well as malfunctioning
kidneys. Consequently she relied on a wheelchair for mobility, required
assistance to go to the toilet and with cleaning, and needed special sleeping
arrangements. During her first night in detention she was placed in a cell
that was not adapted for persons with physical disabilities and consequently
was unable to sleep adequately, experienced substantial pain and suffered
hypothermia. On transferral to prison she was placed in the hospital wing
515 ECtHR, Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 22 March 2016.
516 Ibid., para. 79. It is an example of so called discrimination by association. See Section 2.1.4.
517 ECtHR, Price v. the United Kingdom, No. 33394/96, 10 July 2001.
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where some adaptation could be made, but she still experienced similar
problems. She was also not permitted to charge her electric wheel chair,
which lost power. The ECtHR found that the applicant had been subject to
degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3. Discrimination based on one of
the substantive rights of the ECHR under Article 14 was not raised in this case.
Example: In Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 518 the applicant, who suffered from
a degenerative disease, wished to obtain an assurance from the government that
her husband would not be prosecuted for assisting her to die where her condition
had progressed such that she was unable to carry out the act herself. Under
national law, assisting with the commission of a suicide constituted a criminal
offence of itself, as well as amounting to murder or manslaughter. Among other
things, the applicant argued that her right to make decisions about her own
body protected in the context of the right to private life (under Article 8) had
been violated in a discriminatory manner, since the state had applied a uniform
prohibition on assisted suicide, which had a disproportionately negative effect
on those who have become incapacitated and are therefore unable to end their
lives themselves. The ECtHR found that the refusal to distinguish between those
“who are and those who are not physically capable of committing suicide” was
justified because introducing exceptions to the law would in practice allow for
abuse and undermine the protection of the right to life.
Under the ESC, the wording of Article E of the Revised Social Charter is very
similar to that of Article 14 of the ECHR. Similarly, although disability is not
explicitly listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article E, it is
covered by the reference to ‘other status’.519 Another provision referring to rights
for people with disabilities is Article 15 of the ESC (revised), providing, among
others, for the right to education.
Example: In European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France,
520 the
claimant organisation complained that, with regard to education, there was
discrimination in the case of children with autism. It submitted that, owing
to insufficient places and facilities in France, children were obliged to attend
518 ECtHR, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002.
519 See for example ECSR, European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012,
11 September 2013, para. 132; ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe v. France,
Complaint No. 13/2002, 4 November 2003, para. 51.
520 ECSR, European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012,
11 September 2013.
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specialised facilities in Belgium. The ECSR acknowledged the importance of
education as a condition of “independence, social integration and participation
in the life of the community”.521 The ECSR held that the French authorities
failed to take into account the specific learning needs of children with autism
at schools within its own territory. As a result, families who wanted to educate
their children with autism in a specialised school had to go abroad. The ECSR
found that this constituted direct discrimination against them. Furthermore,
the ECSR considered that the limited funds in the state’s social budget for the
education of children and adolescents with autism indirectly disadvantages
these persons with disabilities. This constituted indirect discrimination.
The following example from national jurisdiction illustrates the link between the
refusal of certain services and the obligation of the providers toward persons
with disabilities.
Example: In a case before the French courts,522 three unaccompanied
applicants with disabilities filed a penal complaint against easyJet
because the airline had refused them boarding a plane at a Paris airport.
EasyJet explained that they had adopted such a policy towards disabled
unaccompanied travellers since their flight personnel were not trained to
“manage and assist disabled persons”. The Court of Cassation confirmed
that easyJet’s transportation policy did not allow disabled persons to board
a plane without verifying their individual capacity to travel. The Court
further stated that Article 4 of the Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2006523 allows
airlines to refuse a person with disabilities to board a plane only in case of
safety requirements that are established by national or international law,
or a competent authority. However, easyJet did not prove the existence of
such a safety requirement. The Court of Cassation pointed out that easyJet
had an obligation to train its personnel in line with the EU regulation and
French national law. In its ruling, the lower court sanctioned easyJet with
an administrative fine for its discriminatory policy against persons with
disabilities and the Cassation Court dismissed the company’s appeal.
521 Ibid., para. 75.
522 France, Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, Easyjet v. Gianmartini and Others, No. 13-81586,
15 December 2015.
523 Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006
concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air.
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5.5. Age
The protected ground of age relates to differential treatment or enjoyment based
on a victim’s age. Under the ECHR, although age discrimination per se does not
fall within the ambit of a particular right (unlike religion or sexual orientation),
issues of age discrimination may arise in the context of various rights. As such
the ECtHR has, as in other areas, adjudicated on cases whose facts suggested age
discrimination, without actually analysing the case in those terms – in particular
in relation to the treatment of children in the criminal justice system. The ECtHR
has found that ‘age’ is included among ‘other status’.524
Example: In Schwizgebel v. Switzerland,
525 a 47-year-old single mother
complained about a refused application to adopt a child. The national
authorities based their decision on the age difference between the applicant
and the child, and that the adoption would impose a significant financial
burden, since the applicant already had one child. The ECtHR found that she
was treated differently from younger women applying for adoption based
on her age. However, a lack of uniformity among states over acceptable
age limits for adoption allowed the state a large margin of appreciation. In
addition, the national authority’s consideration of the age difference had
not been applied arbitrarily, but it was based on consideration of the best
interests of the child and the financial burden that a second child might
pose for the applicant, which in turn could affect the child’s well-being.
Accordingly, the ECtHR found that the difference in treatment was justifiable.
Example: In T. v. the United Kingdom and V. v. the United Kingdom,
526 two
boys had been tried and found guilty of a murder committed when they
were 10 years old. The applicants complained that they had not been given
a fair trial because their age and lack of maturity prevented them from
participating effectively in their defence. The ECtHR found that in trying
a minor the state should take “full account of his age, level of maturity and
intellectual and emotional capacities” and take steps “to promote his ability
to understand and participate in the proceedings”. The ECtHR found that the
state had failed to do this and had accordingly violated Article 6 of the ECHR,
without examining the case from the perspective of Article 14.
524 ECtHR, Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, No. 25762/07, 10 June 2010.
525 Ibid.
526 ECtHR, T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24724/94, 16 December 1999 and V. v. the United
Kingdom [GC], No. 24888/94, 16 December 1999.
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Example: In D.G. v. Ireland and Bouamar v. Belgium,
527 pending placement
in a suitable institution the national authorities had placed the applicants
who were minors in detention. The ECtHR found that in the circumstances
this violated the right not to be detained arbitrarily (Article 5 of the ECHR).
In both cases, the applicants claimed that the treatment was discriminatory
compared with that of adults, since national law did not permit adults to be
deprived of their liberty in such circumstances. The ECtHR found that any
difference in treatment between minors requiring containment and education
and adults with the same requirements would not be discriminatory,
because it stems from the protective – not punitive – nature of the procedure
applicable to juveniles. Accordingly, there was an objective and reasonable
justification for any such difference in the treatment.
Under the ESC, there are also provisions relating to the issue of age discrimination.
In particular, Article 23 providing for the right of elderly persons to social
protection and Article 1 (2) and Article 24 relating to age discrimination in
employment are relevant.
Example: In Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway,
528 the ECSR
examined a national provision allowing the employers to terminate the
employment contract of seafarers upon reaching the age of 62 years. The
complainant argued that the contested provision was discriminatory on
grounds of age.
The ECSR examined the complaint under Article 24 of the ESC; which provides
for the right to protection in cases of termination of employment. It stressed
that employment termination solely on grounds of age may amount to
a restriction of that right to protection. The ECSR reaffirmed the principle
that employment termination on grounds of age is not a justified reason for
dismissal, unless such termination is objectively and reasonably based on
a legitimate aim and that the means of achieving that aim are appropriate
and necessary. The Committee further reiterated that Article 24 of the ESC
establishes in an exhaustive manner the valid grounds on which an employer
can terminate an employment relationship. Only two types of grounds can
be relied on, namely those connected with the capacity or conduct of the
527 ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland, No. 39474/98, 16 May 2002; ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium, No. 9106/80,
29 February 1988.
528 ECSR, Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway, Complaint No. 74/2011, 2 July 2013.
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employee and those based on the operational requirements of the company
(economic reasons). Therefore, the dismissal by an employer for reaching
a certain age would be contrary to the ESC, given that such a dismissal would
not be based on one of the two valid grounds.
The government defended the contested provisions stating that these were
based on considerations of employment policy and operational requirements,
as well as the goal of ensuring the health and security of those at sea. The
ECSR accepted those considerations as legitimate. However, in examining the
proportionality, necessity and appropriateness of the measures taken, the
ECSR found that the government failed to prove why it considered that health
would deteriorate to such an extent that seafarers were not able to continue
their work at the age of 62 years. In particular, it was evident that there
were other options to ensure the safety and the operational requirements
of shipping, for example through regular and sufficiently comprehensive
medical examinations of seafarers. In conclusion, the ECSR held that the
relevant provisions deprived the persons concerned of protection and
constituted a violation of Article 24 of the ESC.
The ECSR also established that the age-limit provision affected the
particular professional category of seafarers in a disproportionate way. Such
a difference in treatment, therefore, constituted discrimination, contrary to
the right to non-discrimination in employment guaranteed under Article 1 (2)
of the ESC (the effective right of a worker to earn one’s living in an occupation
freely entered upon).
Under EU law, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights sets a prohibition
of discrimination based on different grounds, including age. The CJEU’s holding in
Mangold529 established non-discrimination in respect of age as a general principle
of EU law. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is also included in the
Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). The CJEU stressed that the directive
does not itself lay down this principle but “it simply gives concrete expression”
to the general principle.530 The source of this principle is to be found “in various
international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the
529 CJEU, C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [GC], 22 November 2005. The case concerned
a dispute between Mr Mangold and his employer relating the application of a German legal
norm by the employer, which was allowing a specific form of age discrimination. It took place
before the implementation deadline of Directive 2000/78/EC for Germany.
530 CJEU, C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten Eigil
Rasmussen [GC], 19 April 2016, para. 23.
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member states”.531 In Kücükdeveci,
532 the CJEU viewed the provisions on age
discrimination in the Employment Equality Directive as giving expression to both
general principles of equal treatment (embodied in Article 20 of the EU Charter)
and of non-discrimination (embodied in Article 21 of the EU Charter).
Example: In Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of
Karsten Eigil Rasmussen,
533 the dispute related to a national provision that
deprived an employee of the right to receive a severance payment when
they could claim an old-age pension. As the case involved a dispute between
individuals, the directive was not directly applicable and could not be relied
upon as such against an individual. However, the CJEU relied on the general
principle prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age and found that
the contested national provision constituted discrimination on this ground.
Furthermore, it ruled that, if it is impossible to interpret the national provision
in a manner that is consistent with EU law, the national court must disapply
that provision.534
As a ground of discrimination, age has a different character to other nondiscrimination grounds. The Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)
provides for a wide range of exceptions in terms of age (Article 6). So, if it
can be shown that it is objectively justified as appropriate and necessary to
achieve a legitimate aim, age-based differential treatment may be permitted
under national law. Consequently, differences of treatment based on age may
be permitted under certain circumstances.
531 Ibid., para. 22.
532 CJEU, C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [GC], 19 January 2010.
533 CJEU, C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten Eigil
Rasmussen [GC], 19 April 2016. Compare with CJEU, C-499/08, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v.
Region Syddanmark [GC], 12 October 2010.
534 Ibid., para. 37. Following the CJEU judgment, the Supreme Court of Denmark delivered its
judgment on 6 December 2016 (Case No. 15/2014). It found that it was neither possible to
interpret the provision of the national law in conformity with EU law nor set aside national law
because this would mean acting outside the limits of their competences. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the employer. It noted that the only possible solution is an act
of parliament amending national rules and reassuring compliance with EU law. See Denmark,
Supreme Court (2016), ‘The relationship between EU law and Danish law in a case concerning
a salaried employee’ and also a comment on the national judgment by Klinge, S. (2016),
‘Dialogue or disobedience between the European Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional
Court? The Danish Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-principle, EU Law Analysis (website).
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Example: In J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën,
535 the dispute
concerns national provisions which allow persons under the age of
30 years to deduct in full from their taxable income the costs of vocational
training. By contrast, the right to that deduction is limited for persons who
had already reached that age. The CJEU confirmed that, in this case, the
Employment Equality Directive applies because the scheme is intended
to improve access to training for young people. The CJEU noted, however,
that the contested taxation scheme was not as such a precondition for
access to vocational training, but that through its financial consequences
it could affect accessibility to such training. The CJEU left it for the referring
court to determine whether the contested tax provision was appropriate
to improve the position of young people in the labour market. Assessing
whether the contested taxation scheme was necessary, the CJEU relied on
the government’s arguments:
i. persons over the age of 30 were not excessively disadvantaged by that
scheme because they still had the right to deduct up to € 15,000 from
their training expenses, which was the average yearly cost of training;
ii. persons over the age of 30 had generally had the opportunity to undertake
training before reaching that age and to pursue a professional activity,
with the result that, being in a better financial position than young people
who have recently left the school system, they are able to bear at least
in part the financial burden of new training.
In light of these arguments and given broad discretion accorded to
EU Member States in the social policy and employment field, the CJEU was
not convinced that a Member State adopting a taxation scheme such as that
at issue goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of promoting
the position of young people in the labour market. However, it is for the
national court to determine if that is the situation in the present case.
Example: In Specht and Others v. Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik
Deutschland,
536 the proceedings concern a national provision under which
a level of pay for civil servants is determined by reference to age at the
time of recruitment. The government argued that the contested provision
aims to reward previous professional experience. The CJEU stated that, as
535 CJEU, C-548/15, J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 10 November 2016.
536 CJEU, Joined cases C-501/12 to C-506/12, C-540/12 and C-541/12, Thomas Specht and Others v.
Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 19 June 2014. See also CJEU, C-20/13, Daniel
Unland v. Land Berlin, 9 September 2015.
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a general rule, an appropriate measure for achieving this aim might be to take
account of the length of an employee’s service and connect it to professional
experience. In the circumstances of this case, however, a particular step of
pay at the time of appointment was not based on previous professional
experience but solely on age. The CJEU concluded that this age discrimination
is contrary to the Employment Equality Directive.
One of the exceptions foreseen in the Employment Equality Directive relates to
age limits for recruitment. Whether in certain cases the age limit imposed by
national law fulfils the criteria specified in the directive has to be assessed on
a case-by-case basis. Such an assessment needs to take into account all relevant
facts and evidence, including the nature of the tasks of the persons concerned.
Example: In Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo,
537 the CJEU
was asked if an age limit of 30 years for the recruitment of a local police
officer constitutes prohibited discrimination. The CJEU reaffirmed that “the
possession of particular physical capacities is one characteristic relating to
age”.538 It also stated that the aim to ensure the operational capacity and
proper functioning of the police service constitutes a legitimate objective
within the meaning of the directive. However, the CJEU rejected the Member
State’s arguments that in this case the age limit was necessary to achieve
its aim. The eliminatory physical tests would be a sufficient measure with
which to assess whether the candidates possess the particular level of
physical fitness required for the performance of their professional duties. It
also argued that neither the training requirements of the post nor the need
to ensure a reasonable period of employment before retirement could justify
the age limit.
Example: In contrast, in Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de
Policía y Emergencias,
539 setting the age limit at 35 years for recruitment
as a police officer in the Basque Country was not considered to constitute
discriminatory treatment. The CJEU distinguished this case from the Mario
Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo case. It relied on the following facts:
537 CJEU, C-416/13, Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, 13 November 2014.
538 Ibid., para. 37.
539 CJEU, C-258/15, Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de Policía y Emergencias [GC],
15 November 2016.
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i. the duties imposed on officials were physically demanding;
ii. it was considered that a police officer who is over 55 years old was no
longer in full possession of the capabilities necessary for the proper
performance of his duties;
iii. recruitment of a candidate older than 35 years would not provide sufficient
time for that person to be assigned to his or her professional duties for
a sufficiently long period.
Furthermore, the CJEU relied on statistical data presented in the proceedings
which indicated how the age pyramid was going to develop in the following
years. The data revealed that it had been necessary to re-establish
a particular age structure to have a sufficient number of agents to whom the
most physically demanding tasks could be assigned. This would be possible
by gradually replacing older agents through the recruitment of younger staff,
better equipped to take on physically demanding tasks.
5.6. Race, ethnicity, colour and
membership of a national minority
Under EU law, although the Racial Equality Directive does exclude ‘nationality’
from the concept of race or ethnicity, the CJEU interpreted the concept of ethnicity
according to Article 14 of the ECHR as having “its origin in the idea of societal
groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, language,
cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds”.540
Example: In Feryn,
541 the CJEU held that statements made public by
an employer that he could not employ ‘immigrants’ constituted direct
discrimination in respect of recruitment within the meaning of the Racial
Equality Directive.
540 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015, para. 46.
541 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008.
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Apart from expressly excluding nationality, the Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC) does not itself contain a definition of ‘racial or ethnic origin’. There
are a number of other instruments, which offer guidance as to how racial and
ethnic origin should be understood. Neither ‘colour’ nor membership of a national
minority are listed expressly in the Racial Equality Directive, but are listed as
separate grounds under the ECHR. These terms appear to be indissociable from
the definition of race and/or ethnicity, and so will be considered here.
The EU Council’s Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia under
criminal law defines racism and xenophobia to include violence or hatred directed
against groups by reference to ‘race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic
origin’. The CoE European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has
also adopted a broad approach to defining ‘racial discrimination’, which includes
the grounds of ‘race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic
origin’.542 Similarly, Article 1 of the 1966 UN Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (to which all the Member States of the European Union
and the Council of Europe are party) defines racial discrimination to include the
grounds of ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’.543 The Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, responsible for interpreting and
monitoring compliance with the treaty, has further stated that unless justification
exists to the contrary, determination as to whether an individual is a member
of a particular racial or ethnic group “shall […] be based upon self-identification
by the individual concerned.”544 This prevents the state from excluding from
protection any ethnic groups whom it does not recognise.
Although EU law does not expressly list language, colour or descent as protected
grounds, it does not mean that these characteristics could not be protected as
part of race or ethnicity, in so far as language, colour and descent are inherently
attached to race and ethnicity. It would also seem that to the extent that factors
determining nationality are also relevant to race and ethnicity, the former ground
may, in appropriate circumstances, also fall under the latter grounds.
542 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination, CRI (2003)8, adopted 13 December 2002, paras. 1 (b) and (c).
543 UN, GA (1966), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), UNTS
vol. 660, p. 195.
544 UN, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1990), General
Recommendation VIII concerning the interpretation and application of Article 1, Paragraphs 1
and 4 of the Convention, Doc. A/45/18, 22 August 1990.
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Example: Discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin is the subject matter of
the proceedings in "CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria" AD v. Komisia za zashtita
ot diskriminatsia545 (discussed in Section 2.2.3). The complainant argued
that the placement of electricity meters at an inaccessible height put her in
a disadvantageous position compared with other customers whose metres
were in accessible locations. The only reason for installing electricity meters
at height was – according to her allegations – that most of the inhabitants
of the district were of Roma origin. Relying on this consideration, the CJEU
found that the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) applies to the policy of
the electricity supplier in this case. It was for the Bulgarian court to decide
whether the practice could be objectively justified.
Religion is expressly protected as a separate ground under the Employment Equality
Directive (2000/78/EC). However, an alleged victim of religious discrimination
may have an interest in associating religion with the ground of race because, as
EU law currently stands, protection from race discrimination is broader in scope
than protection from religious discrimination: the Racial Equality Directive relates
to the area of employment but also to access to goods and services, while the
Employment Equality Directive only relates to the area of employment.
Under the ECHR, nationality or ‘national origin’ are listed as a separate grounds.
The case law discussed below shows that nationality can be understood as
a constitutive element of ethnicity. In explaining the concepts of race and
ethnicity, the ECtHR has held that language, religion, nationality and culture
may be indissociable from race. In the Timishev case, an applicant of Chechen
origin was not permitted to pass through a checkpoint, because the guards
were instructed to deny entry to persons of Chechen origin. The ECtHR gave the
following explanation:
“Ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas the notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human beings
into subspecies according to morphological features such as skin colour or
facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups
marked by common nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared
language, or cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.”546
545 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015.
546 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 13 December 2005, para. 55.
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Protected grounds
Example: In Boacă and Others v. Romania,
547 the applicants are the heirs
of a Roma man, allegedly beaten by the police and discriminated against
because of his ethnic origins. The ECtHR found that the national authorities
have failed in their obligation to investigate the racist motivation of
crimes and found a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3
(procedural limb) of the ECHR.548
Example: In Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 549 the first case to
be decided under Protocol No. 12, the applicants complained that they are
unable to stand in elections. As part of a peace settlement to bring an end
to the conflict in the 1990s, a power sharing agreement between the three
main ethnic groups was reached. This included an arrangement that any
candidate standing for election has to declare their affiliation to the Bosniac,
Serb or Croat community. The applicants who are of Jewish and Roma origin
refused to do so and alleged discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.
The ECtHR repeated the abovementioned explanation of the relationship
between race and ethnicity and added that “[d]iscrimination on account of
a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination”. The ECtHR finding of
racial discrimination illustrates the interplay between ethnicity and religion.
Furthermore, the ECtHR found that despite the delicate terms of the peace
agreement this could not justify such discrimination.
The ECtHR has been extremely strict regarding discrimination based on race
or ethnicity stating: “no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or
to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively
justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism
and respect for different cultures”.550 Sometimes it may, however, be difficult
to identify the relevant discrimination ground because the same facts can be
seen from two different perspectives. Dependent on whether ethnic origin is the
reason or not for the differential treatment, the conclusion might be different.
547 ECtHR, Boacă and Others v. Romania, No. 40355/11, 12 January 2016.
548 Compare also ECtHR, Škorjanec v. Croatia, No. 25536/14, 28 March 2017 (discussed in
Section 2.6).
549 ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06,
22 December 2009.
550 Ibid., para. 44. Similarly, ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00,
13 December 2005, para. 58.
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Example: In Biao v. Denmark,
551 the applicants, a naturalised Danish citizen
of Togolese origin living in Denmark and his Ghanaian wife, complained
that their request for family reunification in Denmark was rejected for noncompliance with statutory requirements. According to Danish law, the permit
would be granted if they could demonstrate that their aggregate ties to
Denmark were stronger than their attachment to any other country, or if
they had held Danish citizenship for at least 28 years. The Grand Chamber
held that the relevant rule constituted a difference in treatment between
Danish citizens of Danish origin and those of non-Danish origin. Referring
to the European Convention on Nationality and a certain trend towards
a European standard, the ECtHR noted that there were no other states which
distinguished between nationals from birth and other nationals, including
naturalised persons when it came to the determination of the conditions
for granting family reunification. In the ECtHR’s view, such a rule “places at
a disadvantage, or has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on persons who
acquired Danish nationality later in life and who were of ethnic origins other
than Danish.”552 In conclusion, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14, read
in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.
Under the ESC, references to race, ethnicity, colour and membership of a national
minority as protected ground can be also found in the jurisprudence of the ECSR.
Example: In European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Ireland, 553 the ECSR
found that special consideration should be given to the needs and different
lifestyle of Irish Travellers554 who are vulnerable minority. In conclusion, it
held that Ireland violated Article 16 of the ESC by failing to provide sufficient
accommodation to Travellers (such as permanent halting sites, group
housing and transient halting sites). The ECSR stressed that failure to provide
sufficient accommodation for Travellers may also amount to discrimination
if the authorities fail to “take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and
collective advantages that are open to all are genuinely accessible by and
551 ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark [GC], 38590/10, 24 May 2016.
552 Ibid., para. 138.
553 ECSR, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Ireland, Complaint No. 100/2013,
1 December 2015.
554 For the purposes of the various anti-discrimination laws, Irish Travellers are considered an
ethnic group. See for example UN, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(2005), Concluding Observations on Ireland, CERD/C/IRL/CO/2, 14 April 2005, para. 20.
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Protected grounds
to all”.555 However, the ECSR found no violation of Article E. It held that
although there were still insufficient number of adequate accommodation
for Travellers, the authorities showed their efforts to respond to the specific
needs of the Travelling community.556
Example: In ERRC v. Portugal,
557 the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)
asked the ECSR to hold that the access to social housing, substandard quality
of housing, lack of access to basic utilities, residential segregation of Romani
communities and other systemic violations of the right to housing amounted
to a violation of several rights protected by the revised ESC. The ECSR
unanimously held that there was a violation of Article E (non-discrimination),
in conjunction with Article 31 (1) (failure to promote housing of an adequate
standard), Article 16 (the right of the family to social, legal and economic
protection) and Article 30 (the right to protection against poverty and social
exclusion).
Under international law, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination prohibits discrimination based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin. Other international instruments also prohibit
discrimination based on race, colour and national origin.558
In international law the term ‘racial discrimination’ means any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national
or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.559
555 Ibid., para. 69.
556 See also ECSR, European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v. Czech Republic, Complaint
No. 104/2014, 17 May 2016.
557 ECSR, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Portugal, Complaint No. 61/2010, 30 June 2011.
See also ECSR, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Italy, Complaint No. 58/2009,
decision on the merits of 26 June 2010.
558 ICCPR, Art. 2, 4 and 26; ICESCR, Art. 2; CRC, Art. 2, International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Art. 1 and 7.
559 ICERD, Art. 1, para. 1.
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5.7. Nationality or national origin
Key points
• Under the ECHR, discrimination on the basis of national origin features is a protected
ground.
• Under EU law, nationality discrimination is prohibited in the context of the free
movement of persons.
Discrimination based on nationality and national origin is prohibited by several
instruments of international law: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
Article 2 (a) of the CoE’s Convention on Nationality defines it as “the legal bond
between a person and a State”. While this treaty has not received widespread
ratification, its definition is based on accepted rules of public international law,560
and has also been endorsed by the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (ECRI).561 ‘National origin’ may be taken to denote a person’s former
nationality, which they may have lost or added to through naturalisation, or
to refer to the attachment to a ‘nation’ within a state (such as Scotland in the
United Kingdom).
Under EU law, discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited within the
scope of the application of the treaties (Article 18 of the TFEU). As discussed
in Section 1.2, EU law prohibits nationality discrimination, in particular in the
context of the free movement of persons (Article 45 of the TFEU, Citizenship
Directive562). According to Article 45 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
concerning freedom of movement and of residence, only EU citizens have the
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
560 ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (second phase), Judgment of 6 April 1955,
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4: “nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,
a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties.”
561 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination, CRI(2003)8, adopted on 13 December 2002, p. 6.
562 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States.
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Protected grounds
Example: Mr Cowan563 was a British citizen on holiday in France, who was
violently assaulted while leaving the subway station. French law provided for
compensation for the harm suffered in such circumstances when the victim
is French, holds a residence permit, or is a national of a country that has
entered into a reciprocal agreement on the matter with France (which was
the case of the United Kingdom). Mr Cowan claimed the French government
discriminated against him based on nationality. The CJEU confirmed that
persons in a situation governed by EU law should be placed on a completely
equal footing with nationals of the Member State. Thus, every EU citizen who
exercises the freedom of movement, in particular, recipients of services, is
covered by the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
The principle of non-discrimination is not exclusively addressed to EU Member
States. Entities not governed by public law also have to observe this principle when,
in the exercise of their legal autonomy, they issue rules collectively regulating
employment or the provision of services.564 Working conditions in the different
Member States are sometimes governed by provisions laid down by law and
sometimes by agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons.
This limits the application of the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality
to acts of a public authority and therefore risks creating inequality in its application.
Consequently, the CJEU held that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality must be regarded as applying to private persons as well.
According to Article 45 (2), freedom of movement and residence may also be
granted to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member
State.
Example: The Chen565 case concerns a question as to whether a child has
a right to reside in one Member State when they were born in a different
one, while their mother, on whom they depend, is a third-country national.
The CJEU considered that when a Member State imposes requirements to
be met, in order to be granted citizenship, and where those were met, it is
not open for a different Member State to then challenge that entitlement
when they apply for residence.
563 CJEU, Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public, 2 February 1989.
564 CJEU, C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 6 June 2000.
565 CJEU, C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, 19 October 2004.
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Example: Alfredo Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado566 relates to
EU citizens and their third-country national parents. The applicant was a man
who had the sole care of a minor. He was a national of a third country,
while the minor was an EU citizen. National legislation automatically denied
a residence permit to the applicant in this situation, on the sole ground
that he had a criminal record. The CJEU found that, where that denial has
the consequence of requiring a child or children to leave the territory of
the EU, there would be a compatibility conflict with EU law. Such a refusal
would be consistent with EU law, only if it is founded on the existence of
a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of
public policy or of public security. Accordingly, the national authorities
have to assess all the relevant circumstances of the case, in the light of the
principle of proportionality, bearing in mind the child’s best interests and
the fundamental rights.
Example: In European Commission v. Hungary,
567 the CJEU examined the
Hungarian provisions that excluded nationals from other Member States
from the profession of notary. The CJEU found that notaries as defined in
the Hungarian legal system do not exercise public authority. Therefore, the
nationality requirement constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality,
prohibited by Article 49 of the TFEU (freedom of establishment).
CJEU case law has progressively aligned the rules applied to EU nationals and
third-country nationals legally residing within the EU. In O. Tümer v. Raad van
bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen,
568 the CJEU stated
that the instruments protecting workers in general should be presumed as also
protecting third-country nationals, even in cases where they are not legally
authorised to work. In Servet Kamberaj v. IPES and Others,
569 the CJEU found that
a derogation from the right of equal treatment should be interpreted strictly to
safeguard the rights of third-country nationals to social and housing assistance,
566 CJEU, C-165/14, Alfredo Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado [GC], 13 September 2016.
567 CJEU, C-392/15, European Commission v. Hungary, 1 February 2017. See also CJEU, C-50/08,
European Commission v. French Republic [GC], 24 May 2011; CJEU, C-51/08, European
Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [GC], 24 May 2011; CJEU, C-53/08, European
Commission v. Republic of Austria [GC], 24 May 2011; CJEU, C-54/08, European Commission v.
Federal Republic of Germany [GC], 24 May 2011.
568 CJEU, C-311/13, O. Tümer v. Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut
werknemersverzekeringen, 5 November 2014.
569 CJEU, C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], 24 April 2012.
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so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources as
protected in Article 34 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.
The principle of equal treatment, enshrined in Article 11 of Directive 2003/109/
EC, applies to long-term residents in several fields, for example: education and
vocational training, including study grants in accordance with national law;
recognition of professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, in
accordance with the relevant national procedures; social security, social assistance
and social protection as defined by national law; tax benefits; access to goods
and services, and the supply of goods and services made available to the public
and to procedures for obtaining housing.
Example: In European Commission v. the Netherlands,
570 the CJEU examined
whether administrative charges to be paid by non-EU citizens for the issuing
of residence permits in the Netherlands were in accordance with Directive
2003/109/EC.571 It found that the charges applied to third-country nationals
were excessive and disproportionate compared to those applied to nationals
and therefore were liable to create an obstacle in the exercise of the rights
conferred by Directive 2003/109/EC.
Under the ECHR, all member states of the Council of Europe (which includes
all EU Member States) must ensure the rights guaranteed by the ECHR to all
individuals within their jurisdiction, including third-country nationals. The ECtHR
has maintained a balance between the state’s right to control what benefits it
may offer to those enjoying the legal bond of nationality and the need to prevent
states from discriminating against those who have formed substantial factual
bonds with the state. The ECtHR has applied great scrutiny in matters relating to
social security, if individuals can show a strong factual tie to a state.
While the ECHR provides greater protection than EU law on the ground of
nationality, it readily accepts that the absence of a legal bond of nationality often
runs together with the absence of factual connections to a particular state. This,
in turn, prevents the alleged victim from claiming to be in a comparable position
to nationals. The essence of the ECtHR’s approach is that the closer the factual
570 CJEU, C-508/10, European Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 26 April 2012.
571 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country
nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, pp. 44–53.
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bond of an individual to a particular state, particularly in terms of taxation, the
less likely it will find that differential treatment based on nationality is justified.
Example: In Zeïbek v. Greece, 572 the applicant was refused a pension
entitlement intended for those with ‘large families’. While she had the
requisite number of children, one of her children did not hold Greek
nationality at the time the applicant reached pensionable age. This situation
had resulted from the government’s earlier decisions to remove nationality
from the applicant’s entire family (which itself was tainted with irregularities)
and then reissue nationality only to three of her children (since the fourth was
already married). The ECtHR found that a policy of revocation of nationality
has been applied in particular to Greek Muslims. The Court also found that
the refusal of the pension could not be justified on the basis of preserving
the Greek nation since this reasoning itself amounted to discrimination on
the grounds of national origin.573
Example: In Dhahbi v. Italy,
574 the applicant, a Tunisian national, had entered
Italy on a lawful residence and work permit. His application for a family
allowance was rejected, because, according to relevant legislation, only
Italian nationals and third-country nationals in possession of a long-term
residence permit were eligible. The applicant alleged that he had been
discriminated against on the grounds of his nationality. The ECtHR found
that he had been treated less favourably than EU workers. The Court
concluded that this difference in treatment, based exclusively on the grounds
of nationality, required very weighty reasons to be justified and that the
budgetary arguments put forward by Italy did not constitute sufficient
justification. Therefore, there was a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 8 of the ECHR.
Example: In Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 575 a Congolese national was
unlawfully resident in Belgium, because, shortly after giving birth, her
residence permit expired and she began the process of applying for
a renewal. She had separated from her Congolese husband, and both she
and the natural father of her child, a Belgian national, wished to establish
572 ECtHR, Zeïbek v. Greece, No. 46368/06, 9 July 2009.
573 See also ECtHR, Fawsie v. Greece, No. 40080/07, 28 October 2010 and Saidoun v. Greece,
No. 40083/0728, October 2010.
574 ECtHR, Dhahbi v. Italy, No. 17120/09, 8 April 2014.
575 ECtHR, Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, No. 45413/07, 10 March 2009.
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the child’s paternity. To do so, the applicant had to bring a claim against her
spouse within a year of the birth. The applicant requested legal aid to cover
the cost of the procedure, as she had insufficient funds. However, this was
refused because such funding was only available to nationals of non-Council
of Europe states where the claim related to establishing a right of residence.
The applicant was advised to complete the renewal of her residence permit
and then apply again. The ECtHR found that in these circumstances the
applicant had been deprived of her right to a fair trial, and that this was based
on her nationality. The state was not justified in differentiating between
those who did or did not possess a residence permit in a situation where
serious issues of family life were at stake, where there was a short time
limit to establish paternity, and where the individual was in the process of
renewing her permit.
The entitlement of states to regulate entry and exit of their borders by nonnationals is well established under public international law and accepted by
the ECtHR. In this connection, the ECtHR has primarily intervened in complaints
relating to the deportation of individuals where they face inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment or torture in the destination state (under Article 3),576
or have formed strong family ties in the host state which will be broken if the
individual is forced to leave (under Article 8).577
Example: In C. v. Belgium and Moustaquim v. Belgium,
578 the applicants, who
were Moroccan nationals, had been convicted of criminal offences and were
to be deported. They complained that this amounted to discrimination on
the basis of nationality since neither Belgian nationals, nor non-nationals
from other EU Member States could be deported in similar circumstances.
The ECtHR found that that the applicants were not in a comparable situation
to Belgian nationals, since nationals enjoy a right to remain in their home
state, which is specifically enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR.
Furthermore, the difference in treatment between third-country nationals
and nationals of other EU Member States was justifiable because the EU had
created a special legal order as well as EU citizenship.
576 See, for example, ECtHR, Trabelsi v. Belgium, No. 140/10, 4 September 2014.
577 ECtHR, Nunez v. Norway, No. 55597/09, 28 June 2011.
578 ECtHR, C. v. Belgium, No. 21794/93, 7 August 1996; ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium,
No. 12313/86, 18 February 1991.
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These cases should be compared to situations where the applicant has developed
close factual links to the host state, through a long period of residence or
contribution to the state through taxation.
Example: In Andrejeva v. Latvia,
579 the applicant used to be a citizen of the
former Soviet Union, with the right to permanent residence in Latvia. National
legislation classified the applicant as having worked outside Latvia for the
period prior to independence (despite having been in the same post within
Latvian territory before and after independence) and consequently calculated
her pension based on the time spent in the same post after independence.
Latvian nationals in the same post, in contrast, were entitled to a pension
based on their entire period of service, including work prior to independence.
The ECtHR found the applicant to be in a comparable situation to Latvian
nationals since she was a ‘permanent resident non-citizen’ under national
law and had contributed taxes on the same basis. It was stated that ‘very
weighty reasons’ would be needed to justify differential treatment based
solely on nationality, which it said did not exist in the present case. Although
it accepted that the state usually enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in
matters of fiscal and social policy, the applicant’s situation was factually
too close to that of Latvian nationals to justify discrimination on that basis.
Example: In Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria,580 two Russian teenagers living in
Bulgaria were excluded from secondary education because they could
not pay the required school fees. The ECtHR noted that a state could have
legitimate reasons for restricting the use of resource-hungry public services
by short-term and illegal immigrants, who, as a rule, did not contribute to
their funding. Additionally, in certain circumstances, states could justifiably
differentiate between different categories of aliens residing in its territory.
However, unlike some other public services, education is a right that enjoys
direct protection under the Convention. Education is a very particular type
of public service, which not only directly benefits those using it, but also
serves broader social functions. The ECtHR distinguished between education
at university level, where higher fees for aliens could be considered fully
justified, and primary and secondary education where the states enjoy
a narrower margin of appreciation. In regard to the situation of the applicants,
the ECtHR stressed that they were not in the same position as individuals
579 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], No. 55707/00, 18 February 2009.
580 ECtHR, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 21 June 2011.
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arriving unlawfully. They had come to live in Bulgaria as small children, were
fully integrated and spoke fluent Bulgarian. In conclusion, the ECtHR found
that Bulgaria had discriminated against the applicants on the grounds of their
nationality and immigration status and had violated Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.
Example: In Koua Poirrez v. France,
581 a national of the Ivory Coast applied
for a benefit payable to those with disabilities. It was refused on the basis
that it was available only to French nationals or nationals from states with
which France had a reciprocal social security agreement. The ECtHR found
that the applicant was in fact in a similar situation to French nationals, since
he satisfied all the other statutory criteria for receipt of the benefit, and had
been in receipt of other social security benefits that were not dependent on
nationality. It stated that ‘particularly weighty reasons’ would be needed to
justify a difference in treatment between the applicant and other nationals. In
contrast to the cases examined above, where the state was accorded a wide
margin of appreciation, in relation to fiscal and social security matters, the
ECtHR was not convinced by France’s argument of the necessity to balance
state income and expenditure, or of the factual difference that no reciprocity
agreement existed between France and the Ivory Coast. Interestingly, the
benefit in question was payable, irrespective of whether the recipient had
made contributions to the national social security regime (which was the
principal reason for not tolerating nationality discrimination in the above
cases).
Example: In Rangelov v. Germany,
582 a Bulgarian national, held in preventive
detention, was refused access to a therapeutic programme that a German
national in his position would have been able to follow. The authorities based
their refusal on the fact that an expulsion order had already been issued
in the applicant’s case and they were unable to prepare him for a life in
Bulgaria as they did not know the living conditions there. The ECtHR found
that such discrimination based exclusively on the ground of nationality made
the continued detention arbitrary and thus in breach of Article 14 together
with Article 5.
581 ECtHR, Koua Poirrez v. France, No. 40892/98, 30 September 2003.
582 ECtHR, Rangelov v. Germany, No. 5123/07, 22 March 2012.
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5.8. Religion or belief
While EU law contains some limited protection against discrimination on the
basis of religion or belief, the ECHR’s scope is significantly wider than this, since
Article 9583 contains a self-contained right to freedom of conscience, religion
and belief.
Example: In Alujer Fernandez and Caballero García v. Spain,
584 the applicants –
members of the Baptist Evangelical Church – complained that, unlike
Catholics, they were unable to allocate a proportion of their income tax
directly to their church. The ECtHR found the case inadmissible, concluding
that the applicant’s church had not been in a comparable position to the
Catholic Church, in that they had not made any such request with the
government, and because the government had a reciprocal arrangement
in place with the Holy See.
Example: In Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France,585 the applicant, a Jewish
association, considered that the meat slaughtered by an existing Jewish
organisation no longer conformed to the strict precepts associated with
kosher meat, and sought authorisation from the state to conduct its own
ritual slaughters. This was refused on the basis that it was not sufficiently
representative within the French Jewish community, and that authorised ritual
slaughterers already existed. The ECtHR found that in the circumstances there
was no actual disadvantage suffered by the organisation since it was still
able to obtain meat slaughtered in the required method from other sources.
Example: In Vojnity v. Hungary,
586 the applicant, a member of the
Congregation of the Faith, had his access rights to his child withdrawn after
the national authorities found that he had abused his rights to influence
the child in pursuit of his own religious beliefs. The ECtHR held that the
restrictions of the right of the applicant to respect for family life and the
right to communicate and promote his religious convictions in his child’s
upbringing, pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the child’s interest. However, it
found that the authorities had disregarded the principle of proportionality by
introducing a complete withdrawal of his access rights. It concluded that the
583 An explanation as to the scope of Art. 9 ECHR can be found in: CoE (2015), Guide to Article 9.
584 ECtHR, Alujer Fernandez and Caballero García v. Spain (dec.), No. 53072/99, 14 June 2001.
585 ECtHR, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], No. 27417/95, 27 June 2000.
586 ECtHR, Vojnity v. Hungary, No. 29617/07, 12 February 2013.
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applicant was discriminated against on the basis of his religious convictions
in exercising his right to respect for family life.
Example: In İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey,
587 the applicants, followers
of the Alevi faith, requested recognition of the services connected with the
practice of their faith as a religious public service. The applicants’ request was
dismissed in accordance with national legislation. The applicants complained
that the refusal of their request breached their freedom of religion and
that their treatment was less favourable than that of citizens adhering
to a majority branch of Islam. The ECtHR found that freedom of religion
did not oblige a state to establish a particular legal framework bestowing
privileges on religious groups. However, if they did, each religious group
should have a fair opportunity, and the criteria for obtaining privileges should
be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Therefore, the ECtHR considered
this difference in treatment between members of a religious minority and
members of a religious majority to be discriminatory, and concluded that
there had been a violation of the prohibition of discrimination and of the
right to freedom of religion.
Example: In Milanović v. Serbia,
588 the applicant, a leading member of the Hare
Krishna religious community in Serbia, was stabbed on several occasions.
He reported these attacks to the police and his belief that they may have
been committed by members of a far-right extremist group. The police
questioned witnesses and several potential suspects but never identified
the attackers. The ECtHR found that the state authorities had the additional
duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any religious motives and to
establish whether or not religious hatred or prejudice could have played a role
in the events, even though the ill-treatment had been inflicted by private
individuals. Although it had been obvious in the light of the police reports
that the religion of the applicant may have been a reason behind the attacks,
the authorities had not conducted an investigation in accordance with the
requirements of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.
Example: In O’Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom,
589 the applicant,
a Nigerian national seeking asylum in the UK, and his partner, wished to
get married in a Roman Catholic Church. As a person subject to immigration
control, he was obliged to apply to the Secretary of State for permission
587 ECtHR, İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], No. 62649/10, 26 April 2016.
588 ECtHR, Milanović v. Serbia, No. 44614/07, 14 December 2010.
589 ECtHR, O’Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom, No. 34848/07, 14 December 2010.
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in the form of a certificate of approval, for which he had to pay a fee.
These formalities were not compulsory in case of persons wishing to get
married in the Church of England. The applicant applied for a certificate of
approval and requested exemption from the fee on the grounds of his poor
financial status, but his application was rejected. The ECtHR found the above
scheme discriminatory on the ground of religion for which no objective and
reasonable justification had been provided.
What actually constitutes a ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ qualifying for protection was
subject matter of the following judgment concerning manifestation of religion
at work.
Example: In Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom,
590 the applicants,
practising Christians, complained that they had suffered religious
discrimination at work. The first and second applicants complained that
their employers had placed restrictions on their visible wearing of Christian
crosses while at work and the third and fourth applicants that they had been
dismissed for refusing to carry out certain duties which they considered
would condone homosexuality, a practice they felt was incompatible with
their religious beliefs. The ECtHR found a violation in respect of the first
applicant, a British Airways employee, stressing that her cross was discreet
and could not have detracted from her professional appearance. In addition,
there was no evidence of any real encroachment on the interests of others.
As regards the second applicant, a nurse, the interference was proportionate
to the desired aim (protection of the health and safety of nurses and
patients). In respect of the third applicant, a registrar of births, marriages and
death, who had been disciplined for refusing to conduct a civil partnership,
the authorities acted within a wide margin of appreciation given to a state
when the right of others not to be discriminated against is at stake. In the
case of the fourth applicant, a relationship and psychosexual counsellor in
a private national organisation, the ECtHR found that there was reasonable
and objective reason to restrict the applicants’ freedom of religion in order
to uphold other peoples’ rights because the employer was pursuing a policy
of non-discrimination for service users. Therefore, the state had acted within
the limits of its wide margin of appreciation.
590 ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and
36516/10, 15 January 2013.
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In a series of cases relating to the substantive right to freedom of religion and
belief under the ECHR, the ECtHR has made clear that the state cannot attempt
to prescribe what constitutes a religion or belief, and that these notions protect
“atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned”, thus protecting those who
choose “to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise
a religion”.591 These cases also note that religion or belief is essentially personal
and subjective, and need not necessarily relate to a faith arranged around
institutions.592 Newer religions, such as Scientology, have also been found to
qualify for protection.593
The ECtHR has elaborated on the idea of ‘belief’ in the context of the right to
education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which provides that the
state must respect the right of parents to ensure that their child’s education
is “in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”. The
ECtHR stated:
“In its ordinary meaning the word “convictions”, taken on its own, is not
synonymous with the words “opinions” and “ideas”, such as are utilised in
Article 10 […] of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of expression;
it is more akin to the term “beliefs” (in the French text: “convictions”)
appearing in Article 9 [...] - and denotes views that attain a certain level of
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.”594
One manifest symbol of an individual’s religious belief is the wearing of religious
clothing. The ECtHR has been faced with cases related to religious freedom in the
context of states wishing to maintain secularism. Here it has placed particular
weight on the state’s stated aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights
and freedoms of others.
591 ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014, para. 124; ECtHR, İzzettin Doğan and
Others v. Turkey [GC], No. 62649/10, 26 April 2016, para. 103.
592 ECtHR, The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, No. 72881/01, 5 October 2006,
paras. 57-58; ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, No. 45701/99,
13 December 2001 para. 114; ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], No. 30985/96,
26 October 2000, paras. 62 and 78.
593 ECtHR, Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, No. 18147/02, 5 April 2007.
594 ECtHR, Campbell and Cosans v. The United Kingdom, Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76,
25 February 1982, para. 36.
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Example: In S.A.S. v. France,
595 following an amendment to national law, the
applicant, a French national and practising Muslim, had been banned from
covering her face in public. The ECtHR found that the ban on wearing the
integral veil was necessary for ‘living together’ harmoniously and within
the law. The ECtHR stressed that “respect for the minimum set of values of
an open democratic society” prevailed over the individual’s choice to wear
a full-face veil. The ECtHR noted also that, while the ban disproportionately
affected Muslim women wishing to wear a full-face veil, there was nothing
in the law, which expressly focused on religious clothing; the ban also
prevented any item of clothing which covers the face.
Example: In Ebrahimian v. France, 596 the applicant’s contract of employment
as a hospital social worker was not renewed after she had refused to
stop wearing the Islamic headscarf. Relying on its previous case law on
headscarf bans,597 the ECtHR found that the right of the applicant to manifest
her religion was incompatible with the requirement that a public hospital
service remained neutral. The inference to the applicant’s right to manifest
her religion was justified by the necessity to protect the right of others.
Examples: In a judgment of 27 January 2015, the German Constitutional
Court598 rejected an abstract ban and restricted the possibility of the
authorities introducing a headscarf ban in situations in which there is
a concrete risk to neutrality or the rights of others.599 In its Ordinance of
26 August 2016, the French Council of State declared that municipal bylaws
forbidding Islamic swimwear on the beach were null and void.600
Example: In a case601 from Austria, the complainant was employed as a notary
clerk. When she wore the Islamic headscarf and Abaya her contact with
clients was restricted. When she started wearing a full face veil she was
dismissed. The Supreme Court found that limiting of the scope of her tasks
was not justified. It emphasised that the non-wearing of a headscarf did
not constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement and
595 ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014.
596 ECtHR, Ebrahimian v. France, No. 64846/11, 26 November 2015.
597 ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005; ECtHR, Kurtulmuş v.
Turkey (dec.), No. 65500/01, 24 January 2006.
598 Germany, German Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, 27 January 2015.
599 See also: Belgium, Council of State, No. 228.752, judgement of 14 October 2014.
600 France, Council of State Ordinance, Nos. 402742 and 402777, 26 August 2016.
601 Austria, Supreme Court of Austria, 9 ObA 117/15, 25 May 2016.
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Protected grounds
confirmed direct discrimination in this regard. The court held however, that
the wearing of face veils in the workplace did constitute an obstacle in the
performance of work because unimpaired communication and interaction
with clients, colleagues and employer was necessary. Therefore, there was
a genuine and determining occupational requirement to not wear a face veil.
In 2017, almost 17 years after the adoption of the Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), the CJEU delivered its first judgment on discrimination on grounds
of religion.
Example: In Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV,
602 the complainant was dismissed
for non-compliance with the internal rule not to wear visible signs of their
political, philosophical or religious beliefs at work. The CJEU found that the
contested internal rule covered any manifestation of such beliefs without
distinction and treated all employees of the undertaking in the same way by
requiring them to dress neutrally. Accordingly, such an internal rule did not
introduce a difference of treatment that is directly based on religion or belief, for
the purposes of the directive. By contrast, it held that such a rule could constitute
indirect discrimination if it results in putting at a particular disadvantage persons
adhering to a particular religion. However, such treatment could be objectively
justified by a legitimate aim, such as the pursuit by the employer, in its relations
with its customers, of a policy of political, philosophical and religious neutrality,
provided that the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
CJEU also stressed that a rule restricting religious symbols or attire can only be
seen to be appropriate when it is part of a neutrality policy that “is genuinely
pursued in a consistent and systematic manner”.
Example: In Asma Bougnaoui and ADDH v. Micropole SA,
603 following
a request from a customer, the complainant was asked not to wear the veil
at work. As she did not agree to accept the request, she was dismissed.
The CJEU reiterated that a generally applicable ban on all visible symbols of
religious, philosophical or political belief would be indirectly discriminatory
unless it would be justified. In contrast, if the decision to dismiss was not
602 CJEU, C-157/15, Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV [GC], 14 March 2017.
603 CJEU, C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v.
Micropole SA [GC], 14 March 2017.
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based on a general ban but was specific to the headscarf, then it would be
necessary to answer whether compliance with such a request from a client
could be seen as a “genuine and determining occupational requirement”
that could justify a directly discriminatory policy. The CJEU explained that the
concept of a “genuine and determining occupational requirement” refers to
a requirement that is objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational
activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out. Therefore,
it cannot cover subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the
employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer.
5.9. Social origin, birth and property
It is possible to view these three grounds as interconnected as they relate to
a status imputed to an individual by virtue of an inherited social, economic or
biological feature.604 As such they may also be interrelated with race and ethnicity.
Under EU law, in the following case, the complainants referred to birth as
a protected ground.
Example: In Zoi Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon,
605 the CJEU examined whether
granting only one period of parental leave for twins was discriminatory on
the basis of birth, contrary to Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The CJEU held that the rights in the Framework Agreement on parental leave
were afforded to parents in their capacity as workers to help them reconcile
their parental and professional responsibilities. There was no right relating to
parental leave granted to the child, neither in the Framework Agreement nor in
the EU Charter. Consequently, there was no discrimination based on birth where
only one period of parental leave was given for twins. The CJEU further held that
the Framework Agreement could not be interpreted as automatically allowing
a separate period of parental leave for each child born. It was acknowledged
that the Framework Agreement set down only minimum requirements and that
adjustments to the rules could be made where EU Member States allowed more
604 The grounds of social origin, birth and property also feature under Art. 2 (2) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (to which all the EU Member States are
party). See UN, CESCR (2009), General comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social
and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, paras. 24-26 and 35.
605 CJEU, C-149/10, Zoi Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, 16 September 2010.
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than the minimum three months of required parental leave. However, when
adopting measures transposing the Framework Agreement, the EU Member
States’ legislatures must keep in mind the principle of equal treatment and ensure
that parents of twins receive treatment which takes their needs into account.
Under the ECHR, aside from the ground of ‘birth’, few, if any, cases have been
brought before the ECtHR relating to these grounds. In Mazurek v. France,
606 the
ECtHR found that the difference in treatment, based solely on the fact of being
born out of wedlock, could only be justified by particularly ‘weighty reasons’.
Example: In Wolter and Sarfert v. Germany,
607 the applicants were born out
of wedlock. Following the death of their respective fathers, the applicants
were recognised as heirs of their fathers’ estate. However, in accordance
with national legislation, the applicants could only have inherited it if they
were born out of wedlock after 1 July 1949 and if their fathers died after
28 May 2009. The national courts held that the legislation could not apply
retrospectively, because of the principle of legal certainty. The applicants
complained that they were discriminated against as children born outside
of marriage when compared to children born within marriage.
The ECtHR found that, although the legal certainty was a weighty factor, it was
not sufficient to prevent the applicants from inheriting their fathers’ estate and
made reasonable the relation between proportionality of the means employed
and the aim pursued. Consequently, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14
of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Example: In the case of Chassagnou v. France, 608 the applicants complained
that they were not permitted to use their land in accordance with their
wishes. A law obliged smaller landowners to transfer public hunting rights
over their land, while owners of large land were under no such obligation
and could use their land as they wished. The applicants wished to prohibit
hunting on their land and use it for the conservation of wildlife. The ECtHR
found that difference in treatment between large and small landowners
constituted discrimination on the basis of property.609
606 ECtHR, Mazurek v. France, No. 34406/97, 1 February 2000.
607 ECtHR, Wolter and Sarfert v. Germany, Nos. 59752/13 and 66277/13, 23 March 2017. See also
Fabris v. France [GC], No. 16574/08, 7 February 2013.
608 ECtHR, Chassagnou and Others. v. France [GC], No. 25088/94 and others, 29 April 1999.
609 See also ECtHR, Herrmann v. Germany [GC], No. 9300/07, 26 June 2012.
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Under international law, the grounds of social origin, birth and property also
feature under Article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, to which all the EU Member States are party. The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, responsible for monitoring and interpreting
the treaty has expanded on their meaning in its General Comment 20. 610 According
to the Committee, ‘social origin’, ‘birth’ and ‘property’ status are interconnected.
Social origin ‘refers to a person’s inherited social status’. It may relate to the
position that they have acquired through birth into a particular social class or
community (such as those based on ethnicity, religion, or ideology), or from one’s
social situation, such as poverty and homelessness. Additionally, the ground of
birth may refer to one’s status as born out of wedlock, or being adopted. The
ground of property may relate to one’s status in relation to land (such as being
a tenant, owner, or illegal occupant), or in relation to other property.
5.10. Language
Under EU law, the ground of language does not feature, of itself, as a separate
protected ground under the non-discrimination directives. Nevertheless, it may be
protected under the Racial Equality Directive in so far as it can be linked to race or
ethnicity. It has also been protected via the ground of nationality by the CJEU in the
context of the law relating to free movement of persons.611 The CJEU stressed on
many occasions that the provisions of the TFEU relating to the freedom of movement
for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by nationals of the Member States of
occupational activities of all kinds throughout the European Union; these provisions
preclude measures which might place nationals of Member States at a disadvantage
if they wish to pursue an economic activity in another Member State.612
Example: In European Commission v. Belgium,
613 the CJEU examined
linguistic requirements for candidates applying for posts in the local
services established in the French-speaking or German-speaking regions.
610 UN, CESCR (2009), General comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural
rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, paras. 24-26 and 35.
611 CJEU, Case 379/87, Anita Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational
Educational Committee, 28 November 1989.
612 CJEU, C-202/11, Anton Las v. PSA Antwerp NV [GC], 16 April 2013, para. 19; CJEU, C-461/11, Ulf
Kazimierz Radziejewski v. Kronofogdemyndigheten i Stockholm, 8 November 2012, para. 29.
613 CJEU, C-317/14, European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 5 February 2015.
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Protected grounds
According to the relevant law, persons, whose diplomas or certificates do
not show that they were educated in the language concerned, were obliged
to obtain a certificate issued only by one particular Belgian body following
an examination conducted by that body. The CJEU found it legitimate to
require candidates to have knowledge of the language of the region in which
that municipality is located to be able to communicate with the authorities
and public. However, making the certificate the only way in which those
persons could prove their linguistic knowledge was disproportionate to the
aim pursued. The CJEU concluded that Belgium failed to fulfil its obligations
under Article 45 of the TFEU and Regulation No. 492/2011.
Under CoE law, the ground of language is mentioned in the Article 14 of the
ECHR and Article 1 Protocol No.12. Furthermore, both the Council of Europe
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995614 (ratified
by 39 CoE member states), and the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages 1992615 (ratified by 24 CoE member states), impose specific duties on
states relating to the use of minority languages. However, neither instrument
defines the meaning of ‘language’. Article 6 (3) of the ECHR explicitly provides,
in the context of the criminal process, that everyone enjoys the right to have
accusations against them communicated in a language which they understand,
as well as the right to an interpreter where they cannot understand or speak
the language used in court.
The principle case before the ECtHR involving language relates to the context
of education.
Example: In the Belgium Linguistic case,
616 a collection of parents complained
that national law relating to the provision of education was discriminatory
on the basis of language. In view of the French speaking and Dutch speaking
communities in Belgium, national law stipulated that state provided or
subsidised education would be offered in either French or Dutch, depending
on whether the region was considered French or Dutch. Parents of Frenchspeaking children living in the Dutch-speaking region complained that this
614 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
CETS No. 157, 1995.
615 Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, CETS No. 148, 1995.
616 ECtHR, Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in
Belgium’ v. Belgium, No. 1474/62 and others, 23 July 1968.
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prevented, or made it considerably harder, for their children to be educated
in French. The ECtHR found that while there was a difference in treatment,
this was justified. The decision was based around the consideration that
regions were predominantly unilingual. The difference in treatment was
therefore justified, since it would not be viable to make teaching available
in both languages. Furthermore, families were not prohibited from making
use of private education in French in Dutch-speaking regions.
In Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia,
617 (discussed in
Section 2.4.2) the ECtHR reiterated that there was a right to receive education
in a national language.
In a series of cases related to the rules for spelling of names, the ECtHR referred
to the wide margin of appreciation that the member states enjoyed, and found
that the relevant policy did not violate Article 14. The reasons given were that
the policy did not deprive an individual of choice as to how their names should
appear618 nor was there any legal obstacle to choosing a Kurdish forename or
surname, provided that they were spelt in accordance with the rules of the
Turkish alphabet.619
Example: In Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland,
620 the applicant’s
request to change her surname on the grounds that the Swiss pronunciation
of the name had an offensive meaning in her mother tongue was refused.
The ECtHR held that she was not in a comparable situation to that of persons
whose names had a ridiculous or humiliating meaning in a more common
language such as a national language. Her situation was also not comparable
to that of Polish migrants who had been authorised to change their names
because they could not be pronounced by Swiss people. In conclusion, the
ECtHR found the complaint manifestly ill founded.621
617 ECtHR, Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], Nos. 43370/04, 18454/06
and 8252/05, 19 October 2012.
618 ECtHR, Bulgakov v. Ukraine, No. 59894/00, 11 September 2007, para. 58.
619 ECtHR, Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 30206/04 and others, 2 February 2010.
620 ECtHR, Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 12209/10, 15 September 2015.
621 Compare also CJEU, C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus
miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others, 12 May 2011, discussed in Section 4.6.
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Protected grounds
Example: A case from Austria622 concerned a job advertisement which
required applicants to have German as their ‘mother tongue’. The court held
that a certain degree of language knowledge was necessary for a position as
a graphic designer, but the requirement to speak German as a mother tongue
constituted indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.
Example: In a case623 from the United Kingdom, the instruction to a non-native
English speaker not to speak her native language at work was justified. The
national courts found that the treatment of the claimant was not connected
with her nationality. They accepted that the reason for the instruction given
to her was because of the reasonable suspicions (based on her behaviour)
that she might be an animal rights activist wanting to infiltrate the company,
which was involved in testing products on animals. Therefore, for security
reasons, it was important that English-speaking managers could understand
their staff in the workplace.
For further elucidation as to how the protected ground of language operates
in practice, it is possible to draw on a case decided by the UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC), responsible for interpreting and monitoring compliance with
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which all EU Member
States have joined).
Example: In Diergaardt v. Namibia,
624 the applicants belonged to a minority
group of European descent, which had formerly enjoyed political autonomy
and now fell within the state of Namibia. The language used by this
community was Afrikaans. The applicants complained that during court
proceedings they were obliged to use English rather than their mother
tongue. They also complained of a state policy to refuse to respond in
Afrikaans to any written or oral communications from the applicants, even
though they had the ability to do so. The HRC found that there had been
no violation of the right to a fair trial, since the applicants could not show
that they were negatively affected by the use of English during court
proceedings. This would suggest that the right to an interpreter during a trial
does not extend to situation where the language is simply not the mother
622 Austria, Regional administrative court in Tirol, LVwG-2013/23/3455-2, 14 January 2014.
623 United Kingdom, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Kelly v. Covance Laboratories Limited,
UKEAT/0186/15/LA, 20 October 2015.
624 HRC, Diergaardt and Others v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, 6 September 2000.
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tongue of the alleged victim. Rather it must be the case that the victim is
not sufficiently able to understand or communicate in that language. The
HRC also found that the state’s official policy of refusing to communicate in
a language other than the official language (English) constituted a violation
of the right to equality before the law on the basis of language. While the
state may choose its official language, it must allow officials to respond in
other languages where they are able to do so.
5.11. Political or other opinion
Under the ECHR, ‘political or other opinion’ is expressly listed as a protected
ground. However, under EU law they do not feature among the grounds protected
by the EU non-discrimination directives.
At a general level, in the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR established
that the right to freedom of expression will protect not only ‘“information” or
“ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of
the population’.625 Political opinion has been given privileged status. The ECtHR has
repeatedly emphasised that free elections and freedom of expression, particularly
freedom of political debate, constitute “the foundation of any democratic system”.626
Accordingly, the powers of states to put restrictions on political expression or debate
on questions of public interest are very limited.627
Example: In Virabyan v. Armenia,
628 the applicant, a member of one of the
main opposition parties, complained under Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 3 of the ECHR that he had been subjected to ill treatment in custody on
account of his political opinion. The ECtHR found that he had been subjected
to a particularly cruel form of ill treatment in violation of Article 3. Examining
the complaint under Article 14, the ECtHR noted that “political pluralism,
which implies a peaceful co-existence of a diversity of political opinions
and movements, is of particular importance for the survival of a democratic
society based on the rule of law, and acts of violence committed by agents
625 ECtHR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976.
626 ECtHR, Oran v. Turkey, Nos. 28881/07 and 37920/07, 15 April 2014, para. 51.
627 ECtHR, Kurski v. Poland, No. 26115/10, 5 July 2016, para. 47.
628 ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2 October 2012.
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Protected grounds
of the State which are intended to suppress, eliminate or discourage political
dissent or to punish those who hold or voice a dissenting political opinion
pose a special threat to the ideals and values of such a society.”629 The ECtHR
found, however, that the evidence in the case was insufficient to prove that
the ill treatment had been motivated by his political opinion. In particular,
it stated that the finding that the applicant’s arrest had been politically
motivated was not sufficient to conclude that the ill treatment had also
been inflicted for political motives. The ECtHR stressed that the state had an
“additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any political motive
and to establish whether or not intolerance towards a dissenting political
opinion may have played a role in the events”.630 It found that the authorities
had done almost nothing to verify a possible causal link between alleged
political motives and the abuse suffered by the applicant. In conclusion, it
ruled that the manner in which the authorities had investigated the case
constituted a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 3 in its procedural limb.
Example: In Redfearn v. the United Kingdom,
631 the applicant had been
dismissed on account of his political affiliation to a far right political party
which promoted, among others, the view that only white people should be
citizens of the United Kingdom and called for the removal of settled nonwhite populations from the country. The applicant worked as a bus driver
for a private company providing transport services for local authorities.
The majority of his passengers were of Asian origin. There had been no
complaints about his work or his conduct at work. However, once he had
been elected as a local councillor for the right-wing party, he was summarily
dismissed on account of his employer’s concerns that the applicant might
endanger its contract with a local council to transport vulnerable people of
various ethnicities. The applicant complained that his dismissal, motivated
solely on the grounds of his political involvement, violated his rights under
Article 10 and 11 of the Convention.
The ECtHR did not examine whether the dismissal itself was justified.
However, a violation of Article 11 was found on the basis that he had been
unable to challenge the dismissal. The ECtHR noted that “in the absence of
judicial safeguards, a legal system which allows dismissal from employment
629 Ibid., para. 200.
630 Ibid., para. 218.
631 ECtHR, Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, No. 47335/06, 6 November 2012.
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solely on account of the employee’s membership of a political party carries
with it the potential for abuse”.632 The ECtHR also emphasised that the
applicant’s right to challenge his dismissal was still valid, notwithstanding
the nature of his political beliefs stating: “Article 11 is applicable not only to
persons or associations whose views are favourably received or regarded
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those whose views
offend, shock or disturb”.633
5.12. ‘Other status’
Under the ECHR, the term ‘other status’ is broadly defined by the ECtHR as
“differences based on an identifiable, objective, or personal characteristic, or
“status”, by which individuals or groups are distinguishable from one another.”634
Moreover, the interpretation of this notion “has not been limited to characteristics
which are personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent”.635
As can be seen from the previously described protected grounds, the ECtHR has
developed several grounds under the ‘other status’ category, many of which
coincide with those developed under EU law, such as sexual orientation, age
and disability.
In addition to disability, age and sexual orientation, the ECtHR has also recognised
that the following characteristics are protected grounds under ‘other status’:
fatherhood;636 marital status;637 membership of an organisation;638 military rank;639
parenthood of a child born out of wedlock;640 place of residence;641 health or any
632 Ibid., para. 55.
633 Ibid., para. 56.
634 ECtHR, Novruk and Others v. Russia, Nos. 31039/11 and others, 15 March 2016, para. 90.
635 ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark [GC], No. 38590/10, 24 May 2016, para. 89.
636 ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary, No. 44399/05, 31 March 2009.
637 ECtHR, Petrov v. Bulgaria, No. 15197/02, 22 May 2008.
638 ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, No. 67336/01, 30 July 2009 (trade union); ECtHR,
Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (No. 2), No. 26740/02, 31 May 2007
(freemasons).
639 ECtHR, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, Nos. 5100/71 and others, 8 June 1976.
640 ECtHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], No. 31871/96, 8 July 2003; ECtHR, Sahin v. Germany [GC]
No. 30943/96, 8 July 2003.
641 ECtHR, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 42184/05, 16 March 2010; ECtHR,
Pichkur v. Ukraine, No. 10441/06, 7 November 2013.
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Protected grounds
medical condition;642 former KGB officer status;643 retirees employed in certain
categories of the public sector;644 detainees pending trial.645
Example: In Varnas v. Lithuania,
646 the applicant had been refused permission
to receive conjugal visits from his wife during his pre-trial detention because,
as the relevant authorities stated, “detainees who had not been convicted
had no right to conjugal visits”. Accordingly, the difference in treatment
was based on the fact that the applicant was a detainee pending trial and
not a convicted prisoner. The ECtHR found that the authorities had failed
to provide any reasonable and objective justification for the difference in
treatment and had thus acted in a discriminatory manner. In particular, the
security consideration could not serve as a justification. The applicant’s wife
was neither a witness nor a co-accused in the criminal cases against him,
so there was no risk of obstructing the process of collecting evidence. The
ECtHR stressed that the authorities had relied on the legal norms, without
explaining why those prohibitions had been necessary and justified in his
specific situation. The ECtHR also considered that the particularly long period
of the applicant’s pre-trial detention (two years at the moment when the
applicant had first asked for a conjugal visit) had reduced his family life to
a degree that could not be justified by the inherent limitations involved in
detention.
Under the ESC, the list of the grounds of prohibited discrimination specified in
Article E of the ESC (revised) is also not exhaustive.
Example: In Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy,
647 the ECSR
examined differences in legal status between different categories of judges
(tenured and lay judges). The claimant organisation alleged that persons
performing the duties of a Justice of the Peace were discriminated against in
matters of social security in comparison with tenured judges and other types
642 ECtHR, Novruk and Others v. Russia, No. 31039/11 and others, 15 March 2016.
643 ECtHR, Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, No. 50421/08 and 56213/08, 23 June 2015.
644 ECtHR, Fábián v. Hungary, No. 78117/13, 15 December 2015. The case has been referred to the
Grand Chamber.
645 ECtHR, Varnas v. Lithuania, No. 42615/06, 9 July 2013.
646 Ibid.
647 ECSR, Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy, Complaint No. 102/2013, 5 July 2016.
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of lay judges. Justices of the Peace, as members of the judiciary, exercised in
practice the same duties as tenured judges. Moreover, both categories were
treated equally for tax purposes and the same recruitment procedure was
applied in regard to both categories. The main difference was that Justices
of the Peace were denied the legal status of civil servants and workers, and
provisions on remuneration, social security, pension and leave applied only
to tenured judges. This resulted in a situation whereby some Justices of the
Peace suspended or reduced their professional activity, and thereby were
not entitled to social security protection, whereas the others enjoyed social
security coverage stemming from other sources (under a pension scheme,
an employment contract, or a self-employed professional activity). The ECSR
found that the duties assigned to both groups and the tasks performed
were similar, and confirmed that Justices of the Peace were in a comparable
situation to tenured judged.
The government put forward several arguments to justify the differential
treatment. They referred particularly to the selection procedure, the
fixed term in office, part-time work, honorary service or remuneration
by compensation. The ECSR found that these arguments concerned mere
modalities of a work organisation and did not constitute an objective and
reasonable justification of the differential treatment. In conclusion, it found
a violation of Article E read in conjunction with Article 12 (1) of the Charter
in respect of Justices of the Peace who were precluded from social security
coverage.
Under EU non-discrimination directives, only discrimination based on the specified
ground is prohibited. Consequently, differences in treatment between persons
in comparable situations which are not based on one of the protected grounds
will not constitute discrimination.648
648 CJEU, C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [GC], 11 July 2006.
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Protected grounds
Example: In Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia
i sledprivatizatsionen kontrol,
649 the complaint about discrimination concerned
national legislation conferring on employees with certain disabilities specific
advance protection in the event of dismissal, without conferring such
protection on civil servants with the same disabilities. The CJEU stressed
a difference of treatment on grounds of disability can only be established
if the national legislation uses a criterion that is not inseparably linked
to disability. In this case, the difference in treatment was based on the
employment relationship itself, and as such did not fall within the general
framework laid down by the Employment Equality Directive.
649 CJEU, C-406/15, Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia
i sledprivatizatsionen kontrol, 9 March 2017.

229
EU Issues covered CoE
Employment Equality Directive
(2000/78/EC), Art. 10
Racial Equality
Directive (2000/43/EC), Art. 8
Gender Goods and Services
Directive (2004/113/EC), Art. 9
Gender Equality Directive
(recast) (2006/54/EC), Art. 19
CJEU, C-81/12, Accept v. Consiliul
Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării, 2013
CJEU, C-415/10, Meister v.
Speech Design Carrier Systems
GmbH, 2012
CJEU, C-104/10, Kelly v. National
University of Ireland, 2011
CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor
gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. Firma
Feryn NV, 2008
CJEU, C-381/99, Brunnhofer
v. Bank der österreichischen
Postsparkasse AG, 2001
Sharing of the
burden of proof
ECHR, Art. 3 (prohibition of
torture), Art. 14 (prohibition of
discrimination)
ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia,
No. 40094/05, 2012
ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia,
Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00,
2005
CJEU, C-423/15, Kratzer v. R+V
Allgemeine Versicherung AG, 2016
CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor
gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. Firma
Feryn NV, 2008
Circumstances
irrelevant for
the finding of
discrimination
ECtHR, D.H. and Others v.
the Czech Republic [GC],
No. 57325/00, 2007
6
Procedural issues in
non-discrimination law
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EU Issues covered CoE
CJEU, C-527/13, Cachaldora
Fernández v. INSS and TGSS
[GC], 2015
CJEU, Joined cases C-4/02 and
C-5/02, Schönheit v. Stadt
Frankfurt am Main and Becker v.
Land Hessen, 2003
CJEU, C-167/97, Regina
v. Secretary of State for
Employment, 1999
Role of statistics
and other data
ECtHR, Di Trizio v. Switzerland,
No. 7186/09, 2016
ECtHR, Abdu v. Bulgaria,
No. 26827/08, 2014
ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey,
No. 33401/02, 2009)
ECtHR, D.H. and Others v.
the Czech Republic [GC],
No. 57325/00, 2007
Employment Equality Directive,
Art. 17
Racial Equality Directive, Art. 15
Framework Decision on racism
and xenophobia (2008/913/JHA)
CJEU, C-407/14, Arjona Camacho
v. Securitas Seguridad España,
SA, 2015
CJEU, C-81/12, Accept v. Consiliul
Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării, 2013
Enforcement
of nondiscrimination
law
ECHR, Art. 6 (right to fair trial),
Art. 8 (right to respect for
private and family life), Art. 14
(prohibition of discrimination)
ECtHR, Sidabras and Others v.
Lithuania, No. 50421/08 and
56213/08, 2015
ECtHR, García Mateos v. Spain,
No. 38285/09, 2013
ECtHR, Hulea v. Romania,
No. 33411/05, 2012
Key points
• The initial burden rests with the complainant to establish evidence that suggests that
discrimination has taken place.
• Statistical evidence may be used to help give rise to a presumption of discrimination.
• The burden then shifts to the alleged defendant who must provide evidence that
shows that the less favourable treatment was not based on one of the protected
grounds.
• The presumption of discrimination can be rebutted by proving: either that the
victim is not in a similar situation to their ‘comparator’; or that the difference in
treatment is based on some objective factor, unconnected to the protected ground.
If the defendant fails to rebut this presumption they may still attempt to justify the
differential treatment.
Discrimination does not tend to be manifested in an open and easily identifiable
manner. Proving direct discrimination is often difficult even though, by definition,
the differential treatment is ‘openly’ based on a characteristic of the victim. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the ground of differential treatment is often either not
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Procedural issues in non-discrimination law
expressed or superficially related to another factor (such benefits conditioned on
an individual being retired, which are connected to age as a protected ground).
In this sense, cases where individuals openly declare their basis for differential
treatment as one of the protected grounds are relatively rare. An exception to
this case may be found in the Feryn case,650 where the owner of a company in
Belgium declared, through advertisements and orally, that no ‘immigrants’ would
be recruited to work for him. The CJEU found that this was a clear case of direct
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. However, the defendants will not
always declare that they are treating someone less favourably than others, nor
indicate their reason for doing so. A woman may be turned down for a job and
told that she is simply ‘less qualified’ than the male candidate who is offered the
job. In this situation, the victim may find it difficult to prove that she was directly
discriminated against because of her sex.
To address the difficulty of proving that differential treatment has been based on
a protected ground, European non-discrimination law allows the burden of proof
to be shared. Accordingly, once the claimant can show facts from which it can
be presumed that discrimination may have occurred, the burden of proof falls on
the defendant to prove otherwise. This shift in the burden of proof is particularly
helpful in claims of indirect discrimination where it is necessary to prove that
particular rules or practices have a disproportionate impact on a particular group.
To raise a presumption of indirect discrimination, a claimant may need to rely
on statistical data that proves general patterns of differential treatment. Some
national jurisdictions also accept evidence generated through ‘situation testing’.
6.1. Shifting the burden of proof
The onus is normally on the person bringing the claim to convince the deciding
body of the occurrence of discrimination. However, it can be particularly difficult to
show that the differential treatment received was based on a particular protected
characteristic. This is because the motive behind differential treatment often exists
only in the mind of the defendant. Accordingly, claims of discrimination are most
often based on objective inferences related to the rule or practice in question. Put
otherwise, the plaintiff must show that the only reasonable explanation for the
difference in treatment is the protected characteristic of the victim, such as sex
or race. The principle applies equally in cases of direct or indirect discrimination.
650 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008.
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Because the alleged defendant is in possession of the information needed to
prove a claim, non-discrimination law allows the burden of proof to be shared
with the alleged defendant (the shift of the burden of proof). Once the person
alleging discrimination established a presumption of discrimination (prima facie
discrimination), the burden then shifts to the defendant, which has to show
that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory. This can be done either
by proving that there was no causal link between the prohibited ground and
the differential treatment, or by demonstrating that although the differential
treatment is related to the prohibited ground, it has a reasonable and objective
justification. If the alleged discriminator is unable to prove either of the two, they
will be liable for discrimination.
The principle of the sharing of the burden of proof is well entrenched in the
law of the EU651and ECHR. The ECSR has also acknowledged that in matters of
discrimination, the burden of proof should not rest entirely on the complainant,
but should be the subject of an appropriate adjustment.652
Under EU law, the preamble of the Directive 2006/54/EC653 emphasises that
“[t]he adoption of rules on the burden of proof plays a significant role in ensuring
that the principle of equal treatment can be effectively enforced. As the Court of
Justice has held, provision should therefore be made to ensure that the burden of
proof shifts to the respondent when there
is a prima facie case of discrimination,
except in relation to proceedings in which
it is for the court or other competent
national body to investigate the facts.”
The obligation to introduce the shifted
burden of proof into the domestic nondiscrimination regulations of EU Member
651 In addition to the cases referred to below, see: Racial Equality Directive, Art. 8; Employment
Equality Directive, Art. 10; Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 19; Gender Goods and
Services Directive, Art. 9.
652 ECSR, Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy, Complaint No. 102/2013, 5 July 2016,
para. 73; ECSR, SUD Travail Affaires Sociales, SUD ANPE and SUD Collectivité Territoriales v.
France, Complaint No. 24/2004, 8 November 2005; ECSR, Mental Disability Advocacy Centre
(MDAC) v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 41/2007, 3 June 2008.
653 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women
in matters of employment and occupation (recast).
Shared burden of proof: the claimant
needs to bring sufficient evidence to
suggest that discriminatory treatment
may have occurred. This will raise
a presumption of discrimination, which
the alleged defendant then has to rebut.
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States also appears in the Racial Equality Directive,654 the Employment Framework
Directive655 and the recast Gender Equality Directive.656
Under ECHR law, the sharing of the burden of proof has been explained through
ECtHR case law. Along with other regional and global human rights protection
mechanisms, ECtHR case law has adopted the sharing of the burden of proof more
generally to prove claims of human rights violations. The practice of the ECtHR
is to look at the available evidence as a whole, out of consideration of the fact
that it is the state that often has control over much of the information needed
to prove a claim. Accordingly, if the facts as presented by the claimant appear
credible and consistent with the available evidence, the ECtHR will accept them
as proved, unless the state is able to offer a convincing alternative explanation.
In the ECtHR’s words it accepts as facts those assertions that are
“supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions… [P]roof may
follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant
inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the
level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in
this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically
linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and
the ECHR right at stake.”657
Example: In Timishev v. Russia,
658 the claimant alleged that he was prevented
from passing a checkpoint into a particular region because of his Chechen
ethnic origin. The ECtHR found this to be corroborated by official documents,
which noted the existence of a policy to restrict the movement of ethnic
Chechens. The state’s explanation was found unconvincing because of
654 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
655 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation.
656 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women
in matters of employment and occupation (recast).
657 ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005, para.
147. This is repeated in the case of ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00,
13 December 2005, para. 39 and ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC],
No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 178.
658 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 13 December 2005, paras. 40-44.
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inconsistencies in its assertion that the victim left voluntarily after being
refused priority in the queue. Accordingly, the ECtHR accepted that the
claimant had been discriminated against based on his ethnicity.
Under EU law, the person who claims to have been discriminated against must
initially establish the facts from which it may be presumed that there has been
discrimination. The assessment of the facts from which it may be presumed
that there has been discrimination is a matter for national judicial bodies, in
accordance with national law or practice.
Example: In Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse
AG,
659 the claimant alleged sex discrimination because she was paid less than
a male colleague who was on the same pay grade. The CJEU stated that it
was for the claimant to prove firstly, that she was receiving less pay than
her male counterpart, and secondly that she was performing work of equal
value. This would be sufficient to raise a presumption that the differential
treatment could only be explained by reference to her sex. It would then fall
to the employer to disprove this.
Example: In Patrick Kelly v. National University of Ireland (University College,
Dublin),660 the claimant applied for a vocational programme at University
College Dublin (UCD) but his application was turned down. The claimant
believed that he was better qualified than a female candidate that had
been offered a place. He argued that he had not been granted the training
because of sex discrimination and sought disclosure of the other applications
to establish the facts. UCD disclosed only redacted versions.
The CJEU held that neither the directive on the burden of proof in sex
discrimination cases (97/80/EC) nor the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/
EEC) generally entitled a vocational training applicant to access information
about the qualifications of the other applicants based on a suspicion of
discrimination, and that any disclosure would be subject to EU rules on the
confidentiality of personal data. However, it was for the national court to
659 CJEU, C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG,
26 June 2001, paras. 51-62.
660 CJEU, C-104/10, Patrick Kelly v. National University of Ireland (University College, Dublin),
21 July 2011.
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decide whether the aim of Council Directive 97/80/EC661 required a disclosure
of such facts in individual cases.
Example: In Galina Meister v. Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH,
662 the
claimant’s applications for a job as a software developer were rejected. Being
of the view that she fulfilled the requirements of the post, she claimed that
she suffered less favourable treatment than another person in a comparable
situation on the grounds of her sex, age and ethnic origin. The CJEU held that,
in accordance with EU legislation (the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC),
the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) and the Gender Equality
Directive (recast) (2006/54/EC), workers who meet the requirements
stated in the vacancy notice but have their job applications rejected are
not entitled to be given any reasons whether the position was filled by
a different candidate at the end of the recruitment process. However, the
refusal to provide such information can be considered as one of the elements
presuming discrimination in that recruitment process.
Under the ECHR, the applicant similarly bears the burden of proof for facts from
which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination.
Example: In Virabyan v. Armenia,
663 the applicant had been arrested on
suspicion of carrying a firearm and subjected to ill treatment allegedly on
account of his political opinion. In arguing his case, the applicant relied on
various reports detailing the political situation in Armenia and the widespread
suppression of political opposition carried out by the government. He also
submitted that there was no credible evidence supporting the suspicion
on which he had been arrested. He had been questioned solely about
his participation in demonstrations and his role in encouraging others to
participate. The ECtHR found that the applicant’s arrest had been politically
motivated but concluded that this fact was not sufficient to conclude that the
ill treatment itself had also been inflicted for political reasons. In particular,
the ECtHR stressed that there was no objective way to verify the applicant’s
661 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of
discrimination based on sex, repealed by Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast).
662 CJEU, C-415/10, Galina Meister v. Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, 19 April 2012.
663 ECtHR, Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2 October 2012. For detailed description of the
case, see Section 5.11.
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allegations. There were other possible explanations of the violent behaviour
of the police officers: revenge for the injury that the applicant had inflicted
on one of them, the confrontation between the applicant and the police
officers, or generally for reasons of police brutality. The ECtHR concluded that
it could not be established beyond reasonable doubt that political motives
had played a role in the applicant’s ill treatment. In contrast, the evidence
in the case was sufficient for the ECtHR to establish that the authorities had
failed to investigate whether or not discrimination may have played a role
in the applicant’s ill treatment. The government should have proved that
it had collected and secured the evidence, explored all practical means of
discovering the truth and delivered fully reasoned, impartial and objective
decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that might have been indicative
of politically induced violence. As the authorities had not examined the
numerous inconsistencies and other elements pointing at the possible
politically motivated nature of that measure, and no conclusions had been
drawn from the available material, the ECtHR could confirm that there had
been a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3
in its procedural limb.
It is important to keep two issues in mind. Namely, it is national law that will
determine what kind of evidence is admissible before national bodies, and this
may be stricter than the rules used by the ECtHR or CJEU. Furthermore, the rule
on the shift of the burden of proof will not normally apply in cases of criminal
law where the state is prosecuting the defendant for a hate crime. This is partly
because a higher standard of proof is needed to establish criminal liability, and
partly because it would be difficult to require a defendant to prove that they did
not hold a racist motive, which is entirely subjective.664
Where an applicant alleging direct discrimination established a presumption of
discrimination, the alleged defendant can rebut the presumption in two ways.
They may either prove that the claimant is not actually in a similar or comparable
situation to their ‘comparator’, as discussed in Section 2.2.3, or that the differential
treatment is not based on the protected ground, but other objective differences,
as discussed in Section 3.2. If the defendant fails to rebut the presumption, they
will have to raise justification for differential treatment, showing that it is an
664 For the approach of the ECHR to the reversal of the burden of proof in the context of racist
violence see ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98,
6 July 2005, paras. 144-159. EU discrimination legislation does not require the reversal of the
burden of proof to be applied in the context of criminal law.
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objectively justified and proportionate measure. Under the ECHR, the objective
justification test is available, whereas under EU law difference in treatment can
be justified only in certain cases.665
Under the ECHR, where an applicant alleging indirect discrimination establishes
a rebuttable presumption that the effect of a measure or practice is discriminatory,
the burden then shifts to the respondent state, which must show that the
difference in treatment is not discriminatory.666 Under EU law, in the case of
indirect discrimination, the defendant has to prove that the adopted measure, law
or practice is appropriate and necessary to achieve those legitimate aims and the
disadvantages caused were not disproportionate to the objectives pursued.667
Example: In Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse
AG,
668 the CJEU offered guidance on how the employer might rebut the
presumption of discrimination. Namely, by showing that the male and
female employees were not actually in a comparable situation because they
performed work which was not of equal value. This might be the case if their
jobs involved duties of a substantially different nature. Moreover, by showing
that objective factors, unrelated to sex, explained the difference in pay. This
might be the case if the male employee’s income was being supplemented
by travel allowances owed by virtue of him having to commute over a long
distance and stay in a hotel during the working week.
Example: In Feryn,
669 the CJEU found that the advertisements and statements
made by the defendant gave rise to a presumption of direct discrimination.
However, the CJEU also said that the alleged defendant could rebut this
presumption if he could prove that recruitment practices did not actually
treat non-whites differently – for instance, by showing that non-white staff
were in fact routinely recruited.
665 See Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
666 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 189.
667 CJEU, C-83/14, “CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
16 July 2015, para. 128.
668 CJEU, C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG,
26 June 2001.
669 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008.
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Example: In Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării,
670 Accept, an NGO promoting and protecting LGBT rights in
Romania, complained that homophobic public statements had been made
by a patron of a professional football club. In particular, it referred to his
statement given in an interview that he would never hire a homosexual
player. The CJEU observed that, although the patron did not have a legally
binding capacity in recruitment matters, he publicly claimed to play an
important role in the management of the football club. In this situation,
the patron’s statements could have given rise to a liability for that club.
For this reason, the burden of proof that it did not have a discriminatory
recruitment policy could have been shifted onto the football club. However,
The CJEU stressed that in this context it was not necessary to prove that
persons with a specific sexual orientation had been recruited in the past,
because it could have interfered with the right to privacy of the persons
concerned. It would have been sufficient for the club to have distanced
itself from the discriminatory public statements and proved the existence
of express provisions in its recruitment policy aimed at ensuring compliance
with the principle of equal treatment.
Similarly, the principle of sharing of the burden of proof applies in international
law. An example can be found in jurisprudence of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.671 A Slovakian national of Roma origin filed
an application for the position of a teaching assistant. Her candidacy was refused
and a person less qualified and less experienced than the petitioner was hired.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination found a violation of
the State Party’s obligation to guarantee equality in respect of the right to work
without distinction as to race, colour, national or ethnic origin. This was because
the state had not satisfactorily replied to the petitioner’s allegations and did
not provide persuasive arguments to justify the differential treatment of the
petitioner when disregarding her job application. The Committee considered
that the courts’ insistence that the petitioner prove discriminatory intent was
inconsistent with the Convention’s prohibition of conduct having a discriminatory
effect, and also with the procedure of shifted burden of proof introduced by the
State Party. Since the State Party has adopted such a procedure, its failure to
apply it properly amounts to a violation of the petitioner’ s right to an effective
670 CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
25 April 2013.
671 UN, CERD (2015), Communication No. 56/2014, CERD/C/88/D/56/2014, 4 December 2015.
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remedy, including appropriate satisfaction and reparation for the damage
suffered.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pointed out that “where
the facts and events at issue lie wholly, or in part, within the exclusive knowledge
of the authorities or other respondent, the burden of proof should be regarded
as resting on the authorities, or the other respondent, respectively.”672
The CERD also recommends to State Parties to “[r]egulate the burden of proof
in civil proceedings involving discrimination based on race, colour, descent, and
national or ethnic origin so that once a non-citizen has established a prima facie
case that he or she has been a victim of such discrimination, it shall be for the
respondent to provide evidence of an objective and reasonable justification for
the differential treatment”.673
6.2. Circumstances irrelevant for the
finding of discrimination
Certain issues of fact that often accompany examples of discrimination, such
as the existence of prejudice, or an intention to discriminate, are not actually
of relevance to determining whether the legal test for discrimination has been
satisfied. What must be proved in a case of discrimination is simply the existence
of differential treatment based on a prohibited ground, which is not justified. This
means that several ancillary facts surrounding situations of discrimination do not
need establishing to prove a claim.
There is no need to prove that the defendant is motivated by prejudice. Thus,
there is no need to prove the defendant has ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’ views to prove race
or sex discrimination. General law cannot regulate individuals’ attitudes since
they are entirely internal. Rather, it can only regulate actions through which such
attitudes may manifest themselves.
672 UN, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2009), General comment No. 20:
Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009.
673 UN, CERD (2005), General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens,
para. 24.
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Example: In Feryn case,
674 the owner of the company said that he applied
this rule because his customers (rather than he himself) only wanted white
Belgians to perform the work. The CJEU did not treat this as relevant to
deciding if discrimination had occurred. Usually, it is not necessary to prove
a discriminatory motive unless there is an attempt to prove the commission
of a ‘hate crime’, since criminal law has higher thresholds of evidence.
Furthermore, it is not necessary to show that the rule or practice in question
is intended to result in differential treatment. That is to say, even if a public
authority or private individual can point to a well-intentioned or good faith
practice, if the effect of that practice is to disadvantage a particular group, this
will amount to discrimination.
Example: In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 675 the government argued
that the system of ‘special’ schools was established to assist in the education
of Roma children by overcoming language difficulties and redressing the lack
of pre-school education. However, the ECtHR found that it was irrelevant
whether the policy in question was aimed at Roma children. To prove
discrimination, it was necessary to show that they were disproportionately
and negatively affected by comparison to the majority population, not that
there existed any intention to discriminate.676
Moreover, in relation to a case on race discrimination and sexual orientation, the
CJEU found that there was no need to prove that there is actually an identifiable
victim,677 and presumably this has equal application for other grounds of
discrimination in similar circumstances. While under EU law there may be no
requirement for an identifiable victim, this is not the case for accessing the
ECtHR, where such a claim would not meet the criteria for admissibility under
Article 34 of the ECHR.
674 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008.
675 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 79.
676 Ibid, paras. 175 and 184.
677 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008; CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea
Discriminării, 25 April 2013.
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Procedural issues in non-discrimination law
Example: In Feryn,
678 it was not possible to show that someone had tried
to apply for a job and been turned down, and it was not possible to find
someone who said that they had decided not to apply for the job on the
basis of the advert. In other words, there was no ‘identifiable’ victim, and the
case was brought by Belgium’s equality body. The CJEU said that it was not
necessary to identify someone who had been discriminated against. This was
because it was clear from the wording of the advert that ‘non-whites’ would
be deterred from applying because they knew in advance that they could not
be successful. According to this, it would be possible to prove that legislation
or policies were discriminatory, without needing to show an actual victim.
Example: In cases of ‘situation testing’, individuals often take part in the
knowledge or expectation that they will be treated less favourably. Their
main aim is not to actually access the service in question, but to collect
evidence. This means that these individuals are not ‘victims’ in the traditional
sense. They are concerned with ensuring enforcement of the law rather
than seeking compensation for harm suffered. In a case brought in Sweden,
where a group of law students conducted situation testing at nightclubs and
restaurants, the Supreme Court found that those involved in testing were
still able to bring proceedings for discriminatory treatment. At the same time
the damages they were awarded could be reduced to reflect the fact that
they had not been denied something that they actually wanted (i.e. entry
to particular establishments).679 However, it seems that the CJEU adopted
a different approach to ‘situation testing’.
Example: The case of Nils-Johannes Kratzer v. R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG680
concerns a lawyer who had applied for a job solely to bring a discrimination
complaint rather than with a view to obtaining that position. The CJEU ruled
that such a person could not rely on the protection offered by the Employment
Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) and the Gender Equality Directive (recast)
(2006/54/EC) because such a situation does not fall within the definition of
‘access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation’. The CJEU also
found that such an application could be considered as an abuse of rights.
678 CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, 10 July 2008.
679 Sweden, Supreme Court, Escape Bar and Restaurant v. Ombudsman against Ethnic
Discrimination T-2224-07, 1 October 2008. For an English summary, see European Network of
Legal Experts on the Non-Discrimination Field (2009), ‘Sweden’, European Anti-Discrimination
Law Review, No. 8, July 2009, p. 68.
680 CJEU, C-423/15, Nils-Johannes Kratzer v. R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG, 28 July 2016.
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6.3. Role of statistics and other data
Statistical data can play an important role in helping a claimant give rise to
a presumption of discrimination. It is particularly useful in proving indirect
discrimination, because in these situations, the rules or practices in question are
neutral on the surface. Where this is case, it is necessary to focus on the effects
of the rules or practices to show that they are disproportionately unfavourable
to specific groups of persons by comparison to others in a similar situation.
The production of statistical data works together with the shift of the burden
of proof: where data shows, for example, that women or disabled persons are
particularly disadvantaged, it will be for the state to give a convincing alternative
explanation of the figures. The ECtHR spelt this out in the case of Hoogendijk v.
the Netherlands:
“[T]he Court considers that where an applicant is able to show, on the
basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in
fact affects a clearly higher percentage of women than men, it is for the
respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors
unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex.”681
When considering statistical evidence, the courts do not appear to have laid
down any strict threshold requirement that needs to be evidenced in establishing
that indirect discrimination has taken place. The CJEU does emphasise that
a substantial figure needs to be achieved. A summary of CJEU case law is
presented in the Opinion of Léger AG in the Nolte case, where he stated in
relation to sex discrimination:
“[I]n order to be presumed discriminatory, the measure must affect “a far
greater number of women than men” [Rinner-Kühn682] or “a considerably
lower percentage of men than women” [Nimz,
683 Kowalska684] or “far more
women than men” [De Weerd685].
681 ECtHR, Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 58641/00, 6 January 2005.
682 CJEU, C-171/88, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG,
13 July 1989.
683 CJEU, C-184/89, Helga Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 7 February 1991.
684 CJEU, C-33/89, Maria Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 27 June 1990.
685 CJEU, C-343/92, M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor
de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others, 24 February 1994.
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Procedural issues in non-discrimination law
Cases suggest that the proportion of women affected by the measure must
be particularly marked. In Rinner-Kühn, the Court inferred the existence of
a discriminatory situation where the percentage of women was 89 %. In
this instance, per se the figure of 60 % [...] would therefore probably be
quite insufficient to infer the existence of discrimination.”686
Accordingly, when assessing statistics, national courts have to determine if they
cover enough individuals to exclude fortuity and short-term developments.687
Example: A case688 from Denmark concerns dismissals made in a government
agency due to the need to reduce the workforce. All of the dismissed
employees were above 50 years of age. The two complainants claimed
that they had been discriminated against because of their age. The Supreme
Court stated that statistical information could establish an assumption for
discrimination because of age. However, the court found that a number of
employees in the government agency who were older than the claimants
had not been dismissed during the process of reducing the workforce. On
this basis, the court concluded that, in this case, the statistical data regarding
the age of the dismissed employees, as well as information about the age
composition in the government agency, did not establish any facts which
amounted to possible discrimination.
Example: In Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia Becker v.
Land Hessen,689 a part-time employee alleged that she was discriminated
against on the basis of her sex.The difference in payable pensions, which was
not based on differences in the time worked, meant that part-time employees
were, effectively, paid less than full-time employees. Statistical evidence was
brought to show that 87.9 % of part-time employees were women. As the
measure, although neutral, negatively affected women disproportionately
to men, the CJEU accepted that it gave rise to a presumption of indirect
discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, a disadvantage to part-time
686 Opinion of Advocate General Léger of 31 May 1995, paras. 57-58 in CJEU, C-317/93, Inge Nolte v.
Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, 14 December 1995.
687 CJEU, C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for
Health, 27 October 1993.
688 Denmark, Supreme Court, Case 28/2015, 14 December 2015, see the English summary in:
European Equality Law Review (2016), vol. 1, p. 84.
689 CJEU, Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02, Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia
Becker v. Land Hessen, 23 October 2003.
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workers, where 87 % of these were women was accepted as sufficient in
the Gerster case.690
Example: In Lourdes Cachaldora Fernández v. Instituto Nacional de la
Seguridad Social (INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS),
691
the claimant had paid contributions to the Spanish social security scheme for
almost forty years. During that period, she had mostly been engaged in fulltime employment, except between 1998 and 2005, when she had first been
employed part-time and had then been unemployed. In 2010, she had applied
for invalidity pension. According to the relevant law, invalidity pension was
calculated on the basis of a period of eight years prior to the occurrence of
the event giving rise to the invalidity. Workers who had engaged in parttime work during a period immediately preceding a period of unemployment
were granted a reduced invalidity pension. The reduction came about as
a result of applying the part-time work coefficient. Consequently, through
this method of calculation, the claimant’s invalidity pension had been
significantly reduced. The referring court had asked whether the relevant
national provision could have been considered as discriminatory towards
workers who had engaged in part-time work during a period immediately
prior to an interruption of their contributions to the Spanish social security
scheme. It had referred to the fact that, given that there are far more female
part-time workers in Spain than male part-time workers, women would be
particularly affected by this provision. The CJEU noted, however, that these
provisions were not applicable to all part-time workers. They applied only
to a limited group of workers, including the claimant, who, after a period of
part-time employment had a gap in their contributions during the reference
period of eight years. Consequently, global statistical data concerning parttime workers taken as a whole were not relevant when establishing whether
or not women are more affected by the provisions of Spanish law than men.
Example: The Seymour-Smith case692 concerns UK law relating to unfair
dismissal, which gave special protection to those who had been working
for longer than two years continuously with the particular employer. The
complainant alleged that this amounted to indirect discrimination based on
sex, since women were less likely than men to satisfy this criterion. This case
690 CJEU, C-1/95, Hellen Gerster v. Freistaat Bayern, 2 October 1997.
691 CJEU, C-527/13, Lourdes Cachaldora Fernández v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)
and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS) [GC], 14 April 2015.
692 CJEU, C-167/97, Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez,
9 February 1999.
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Procedural issues in non-discrimination law
is interesting because the CJEU suggested that a lower level of disproportion
could still prove indirect discrimination “if it revealed a persistent and
relatively constant disparity over a long period between men and women”.
However, on the particular facts of this case, the CJEU indicated that the
statistics that were presented, which indicated that 77.4 % of men and
68.9 % of women fulfilled the criterion, did not prove that a considerably
smaller percentage of women could comply with the rule.
A similar approach can be found in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
Example: In Di Trizio v. Switzerland,
693 the applicant, who had been working
full-time, was obliged to stop working due to back pain. She was granted
a disability allowance which was discontinued after she gave birth. The
competent authorities based the decision regarding her entitlement to
the allowance on the ‘combined’ method. They had assumed that, even
without her disability, she would not have been employed full-time after
the birth of her children. The ECtHR noted that the applicant would probably
have received partial disability allowance if she had worked full time or
had devoted her time entirely to her household. Furthermore, it relied on
statistics proving that 97 % of persons affected by the combined method
were women who wished to reduce their working hours after birth of
a child. Consequently, the statistics provided sufficient reliable information
to establish a presumption of indirect discrimination.
Example: The case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic694 involved
complaints by Roma applicants that their children were excluded from the
mainstream education system and placed in ‘special’ schools intended for
those with learning difficulties, on the basis of their Roma ethnicity. The
allocation of Roma children to ‘special’ schools was based on the use of
tests designed to test intellectual capacity. Despite this apparently ‘neutral’
practice, the nature of the tests made it inherently more difficult for Roma
children to achieve a satisfactory result and enter the mainstream education
system. The ECtHR found this to be proved by reference to statistical evidence
showing the particularly high proportion of pupils of Roma origin placed
in ‘special’ schools. The data submitted by the applicants relating to their
particular geographical region suggested that 50 to 56 % of special school
693 ECtHR, Di Trizio v. Switzerland, No. 7186/09, 2 February 2016.
694 ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007.
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pupils were Roma, while they only represented around 2 % of the total
population in education. Data taken from inter-governmental sources
suggested between 50 to 90 % of Roma attended special schools in the
country as a whole. The ECtHR found that while the data was not exact it
did reveal that the number of Roma children affected as ‘disproportionately
high’ relative to their composition of the population as a whole.695
Example: In Abdu v. Bulgaria,696 the applicant and his friend, both Sudanese
nationals, had been involved in a fight with two Bulgarian youths. According
to the applicant, they had been attacked by the two young men who
had verbally insulted them with racist remarks. The proceedings against
the attackers were discontinued on the basis that it was not possible to
ascertain who had initiated the fight and their motives. The authorities
had not questioned the witnesses and had not interrogated the alleged
attackers about the possible racist motive of their actions. The ECtHR found
that the authorities had been in possession of evidence of a possible racist
motive, and they had failed to conduct an effective investigation into it. In its
judgment, the ECtHR referred to national and international reports on racist
violence in Bulgaria, which revealed that the Bulgarian authorities generally
did not investigate the racist nature of those cases.
It seems that it may be possible to prove that a protected group is disproportionately affected even where no statistical data is available, but the available
sources are reliable and support this analysis.
Example: The case of Opuz v. Turkey involved an individual with a history of
domestic violence who had brutalised his wife and her mother on several
occasions, eventually murdering the mother.697 The ECtHR found that the
state had failed to protect the applicant and her mother from inhuman
and degrading treatment, as well as the latter’s life. It also found that the
state had discriminated against the applicants because the failure to offer
adequate protection was based on the fact that they were women. It came
to this conclusion in part based on evidence that victims of domestic violence
were predominantly women, and figures illustrating the relatively limited
use the national courts had made of powers to grant orders designed to
695 Ibid. paras. 18 and 196-201.
696 ECtHR, Abdu v. Bulgaria, No. 26827/08, 11 March 2014.
697 ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009.
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protect victims of violence in the home. Interestingly in this case, there
were no statistics presented to the ECtHR showing that victims of domestic
violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty
International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather,
the ECtHR was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International,
a reputable national NGO and the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant
problem in Turkey.
Note that statistical data may not always be necessary to prove cases of indirect
discrimination. Whether statistics are necessary to prove a claim will depend on
the facts of the case. In particular, proof as to the practices or beliefs of others
belonging to the same protected category may be enough.
Example: In Oršuš and Others v. Croatia,698 certain schools had established
classes which dealt with reduced curricula as compared to normal classes. It
was alleged that these classes contained a disproportionately high number of
Roma students and therefore amounted to indirect discrimination on the basis
of ethnicity. The government contended that these classes were constituted
on the basis of competence in Croatian, and that once a student reached
adequate language proficiency, they were transferred to the mainstream
classes. The ECtHR found that unlike the D.H. case, the statistics alone did
not give rise to a presumption of discrimination. In one school 44 % of pupils
were Roma and 73 % attended a Roma-only class. In another school 10 %
were Roma and 36 % of them attended a Roma only class. This confirmed
that there was no general policy to automatically place Roma in separate
classes. However, the ECtHR went on to state that it was possible to establish
a claim of indirect discrimination without relying on statistical data. Here, the
fact that the measure of placing children in separate classes on the basis of
their insufficient command of Croatian was only applied to Roma students.
Accordingly, this gave rise to a presumption of differential treatment.
It is also important to note that data and statistics can only be compared when
they are available. In this context, under EU law, the Commission published
698 ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], No. 15766/03, 16 March 2010, paras. 152-153.
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a recommendation699 in March 2014, focusing on pay transparency. The
recommendation aims to propose measures for the Member States to facilitate
wage transparency in companies, such as improving the conditions for employees
to obtain information on pay or the establishment of pay reporting and gender
neutral job classification systems from companies, among others.
Also according to the ECSR, States Parties must promote positive measures to
narrow the pay gap, including measures to improve the quality and coverage of
wage statistics.700
6.4. Enforcement of non-discrimination law
Key points
• Anti-discrimination law can be enforced by initiating civil, administrative or criminal
proceedings against the alleged discriminator.
• Applicable sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive; however,
Member States are free to choose between different adequate measures.
Anti-discrimination laws can be enforced through civil, administrative or
criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings the victim of discrimination can obtain
reparation whereas the aim of criminal proceedings is the criminal punishment
of discriminators.
Under EU law, the non-discrimination directives require the Member States to
establish judicial and/or administrative procedures allowing individuals to enforce
their rights under the directives.701 Moreover, it is provided that the sanctions,
which may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim, must be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.702 The CJEU stressed on several occasions
the need of effective sanctions, which is an important tool to deter and sanction
cases of discrimination. The severity of sanctions must be commensurate to the
699 European Commission Recommendation 2014/124/EU of 7 March 2014 on strengthening the
principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency, OJ L 69, 8.3.2014.
700 ECSR, Conclusions XVII-2 (2005), Czech Republic.
701 Employment Equality Directive, Art. 9 (1); Gender Equality Directive (recast), Art. 17 (1);
Gender Goods and Services Directive, Art. 8 (1); Racial Equality Directive, Art. 7 (1).
702 Employment Equality Directive, Art. 17; Racial Equality Directive, Art. 15.
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gravity of the breaches. However, the directive does not prescribe a specific
sanction; it leaves the Member States free to choose between the different
solutions suitable for achieving its objective.703 Nevertheless, if a Member
State chooses to penalise discrimination the award of compensation, it must be
adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must therefore amount to
more than purely nominal compensation to ensure that it is effective and that
it has a deterrent effect.
The applicable sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, even
in cases when there is no identifiable victim.704 This means that the EU approach
to remedies goes beyond traditional, individual-rights-based legal approach.
In some cases, it is considered that the adequate legal protection against
discrimination requires criminal measures.
Example: In Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării705 (discussed in Sections 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1), concerning discriminatory
comments made by a patron of a football club, the CJEU held that that a purely
symbolic sanction cannot be regarded as compatible with the requirement
of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. It was however for the
national court to establish whether in the circumstances of the case, the
written warning fulfilled the criteria. The CJEU also stressed that each remedy
available under national provisions in cases of discrimination should individually fulfil the criteria of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness.
Example: In María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v. Securitas Seguridad España,
SA,
706 the national proceedings concern the award of punitive damages to
Ms Arjona Camacho following her dismissal constituting discrimination on
grounds of sex. The CJEU held that the compensation has to cover in full
the loss and damage sustained. However, damages which go beyond full
703 CJEU, Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
9 April 1984.
704 CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
25 April 2013, para. 36; CJEU, C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, 10 July 2008, paras. 23-25.
705 CJEU, C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
25 April 2013.
706 CJEU, C-407/14, María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v. Securitas Seguridad España, SA,
17 December 2015.
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compensation for the loss and damage are allowed but not required under
the Equal Treatment Directive.
Under the ECHR, States are required to enable applicants to obtain adequate
and sufficient enforcement of domestic court decisions. Accordingly, failure to
enforce a judgment may amount to a violation of the ECHR.
Example: In García Mateos v. Spain,
707 the applicant’s request for a reduction
in her working time to look after her son was refused. The Spanish
Constitutional Court confirmed that the applicant was discriminated against
on grounds of sex and remitted the case to the Employment Tribunal, which
again dismissed the applicant’s case. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court
found that its previous judgment had not been properly enforced, and
declared null and void the second judgment delivered by the Employment
Tribunal. It decided, however, that there was no need to remit the case to the
lower court as in the meantime the applicant’s son had reached the age of six
and the new judgment would be pointless. Moreover, it noted that an award
of compensation was not provided for in relevant national legislation. The
ECtHR stressed that in spite of two judgments in the applicant’s favour, the
domestic court had not provided redress and found a violation of Article 6 (1)
in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
Example: In Hulea v. Romania,
708 the applicant was refused parental leave.
The Constitutional Court held that the legislative provision in question
infringed the principles of non-discrimination on grounds of sex but refused
to grant him compensation. The ECtHR found that there had been a violation
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR, as the courts had not
advanced sufficient reasons for its decision not to award compensation.
Similarly, failure to enforce a judgment delivered by the ECtHR finding a violation
of the ECHR may amount to a new violation of Convention.
707 ECtHR, García Mateos v. Spain, No. 38285/09, 19 February 2013.
708 ECtHR, Hulea v. Romania, No. 33411/05, 2 October 2012.
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Example: In Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania,
709 the three applicants
complained about Lithuania’s failure to repeal legislation banning former
KGB employees from working in certain spheres of the private sector,
despite previous ECtHR judgments in their favour.710 In respect of the third
applicant, the ECtHR noted that the domestic courts had acknowledged
that his dismissal had been contrary to the Convention and explicitly stated
that while the KGB Act remained in force, the question of reinstating him
might not be favourably resolved. In light of that statement and lack of
reasoning, the state had not convincingly demonstrated that the domestic
courts’ reference to the KGB Act had not been the decisive factor forming
the legal basis on which the third applicant’s claim for reinstatement had
been rejected. As such, there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 8. In contrast, the ECtHR found that the first and second
applicants had not plausibly demonstrated that they were discriminated
against after the ECtHR’s judgments in their previous case. The first applicant
was unemployed for justified reasons, specifically because he lacked the
necessary qualifications, whereas the second applicant never attempted to
obtain other private sector jobs.
Furthermore, in the context of the right to life and freedom from torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR also create
a duty of the state to effectively investigate allegations of ill treatment, which
includes also allegations that the ill treatment was itself discriminatory, being
motivated for example by racism.711 This is discussed in Section 2.6 on hate crime.
709 ECtHR, Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, Nos. 50421/08 and 56213/08, 23 June 2015.
710 ECtHR Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, Nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, 27 July 2004 and
ECtHR, Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania, Nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01, 7 April 2005.
711 ECtHR, Turan Cakir v. Belgium, No. 44256/06, 10 March 2009.

253
Selected case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice
of the European Union
Equality and non-discrimination
ECtHR
Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, 2017
(imposition of life imprisonment)
Pichkur v. Ukraine, No. 10441/06, 2013 (payment of pension dependent from
place of residence)
Savez crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia, No. 7798/08, 2010 (religious
community denied certain rights)
CJEU
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil
des ministres [GC], C-236/09, 2011 (circumstances differences in the insurance
premiums and benefits between men and women)
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], C-571/10, 2012 (refusal of housing benefits to
third-country nationals)
Case law
254
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Direct discrimination
ECtHR
Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05, 2008
(denial to grant inheritance tax exemption to cohabiting siblings)
Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 2016 (discriminatory treatment on account
of the disability of applicant’s child)
ECSR
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint
No. 91/2013, 2015 (discrimination of medical practitioners who did not raise
conscious objection to provide abortion services)
CJEU
Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing
Services, trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education
and Employment, C-256/01, 2004 (different working condition resulting from
employment in an external company)
Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des DeuxSèvres, C-267/12, 2013 (exclusion of same-sex partners in civil unions from
benefits restricted to married employees)
P v. S and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94, 1996 (dismissal following gender
reassignment)
S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], C-303/06, 2008 (unfavourable
treatment of an employee - mother of disabled child)
Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, C-423/04,
2006 (age of entitlement to retirement pension in a case of a trans woman)
Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [GC], C-267/06,
2008 (exclusion of partners civil partnership from survivors pension)
Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, C-356/12, 2014 (different conditions for
different categories of driving licence)
255
Case law
Indirect discrimination
ECtHR
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 2007
(placement of Roma children in special schools)
ECSR
European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012, 2013
(limited state funds for the education of children and adolescents with autism)
CJEU
“CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
C-83/14, 2015 (placement of electricity meters in Roma-populated district)
Isabel Elbal Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, Tesorería
General de la Seguridad Social, C-385/11, 2012 (restricted right of a part-time
worker to pension)
Johann Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH, C-152/11, 2012 (flexible redundancy
compensation paid to disabled workers under social plan)
Multiple and intersectional discrimination
ECtHR
B.S. v. Spain, No. 47159/08, 2012 (failure to comply with duty to carry out
a thorough investigation of allegations of police ill-treatment)
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal [GC], No. 17484/15, 2017
(discriminatory decision to reduce compensation awarded to a 50-year-old
woman for a medical error)
S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 2014 (ban on wearing face covering)
CJEU
David L. Parris v. Trinity College Dublin and Others, C-443/15, 2016
(payment of a survivor’s benefit to the same-sex civil partner)
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Harassment and instruction to discriminate
ECtHR
Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC],
Nos. 43370/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05, 2012 (harassment of pupils)
Đorđević v. Croatia, No. 41526/10, 2012 (harassment of a disabled
man and his mother)
CJEU
Carina Skareby v. European Commission, F-42/10, 2012 (psychological
harassment psychological harassment by a hierarchical superior)
CQ v. European Parliament, F-12/13, 2014 (psychological harassment)
Q v. Commission of the European Communities, F-52/05, 2008
(psychological harassment)
S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], C-303/06, 2008
(unfavourable treatment of an employee – mother of a child with disabilities)
Specific measures
ECtHR
Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 2016 (refusal of a music school to enrol a student
on the grounds of her visual disability)
Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, 29 January 2013
(placement of Roma children in special schools)
ECSR
The Central Association of Carers in Finland v. Finland,
Complaint No. 71/2011, 2012 (pricing system of long-term care
providing services for elderly persons in Finland)
257
Case law
CJEU
Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, C-450/93, 1995
(priority to female candidates for posts or promotions)
Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-409/95, 1997
(priority to female candidates for posts or promotions)
Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, C-407/98,
2000 (priority to female candidates for posts or promotions)
Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice
and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des collectivités locales, C-173/13,
2014 (early retirement for female civil servants)
Hate crime / Hate speech
ECtHR
Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, 2015 (liability of online news portal for
offensive comments made by anonymous third parties)
Halime Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 63034/11, 2016 (domestic violence)
Identoba and Others v. Georgia, No. 73235/12, 2015
(homophobic attacks on participants of an LGBT assembly)
M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.), No. 25239/13, 2015
(expression of hatred and anti-Semitism)
Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], No. 27510/08, 2015 (denial of genocide of the
Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire)
Škorjanec v. Croatia, No. 25536/14, 2017 (racially motivated violence)
Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2012 (ill treatment on account of
political opinion)
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Justification for less favourable treatment
CJEU
Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v. Antonino Bordonaro, C-143/16, 2017
(automatic dismissal at age 25)
Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v.
Micropole SA [GC], C-188/15, 2017 (wearing of an Islamic headscarf at work)
Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
Case 222/84, 1986 (refusal to a female police officer to renew her contract
and to grant her training in firearms)
Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, C-416/13, 2014
(age limit of 30 for recruitment of local police officers)
Silke-Karin Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, C-207/98, 2000
(restrictions on the working conditions of pregnant women)
Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-285/98, 2000
(limitation of access by women to military posts involving the use of arms)
Ute Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH, C-354/16, 2017
(calculation of early retirement pension for part-time worker)
Employment
ECtHR
Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, No. 67336/01, 2009
(harassment in the workplace due to trade union)
I.B. v. Greece, No. 552/10, 2013 (dismissal of a HIV-positive employee)
CJEU
Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării, C-81/12,
2013 (homophobic remarks made by financial patron of a football club)
C., C-122/15, 2016 (supplementary tax on income from a retirement pension)
Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres,
C-267/12, 2013 (exclusion of partners entering into a same-sex civil union from special
benefits which was restricted only to employees on occasion of their marriage)
259
Case law
J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, C-548/15, 2016
(tax treatment of vocational training costs)
Jennifer Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, C-116/94, 1995
(method of calculation of the eligibility of single parents for family credit)
Julia Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, C-79/99, 2000 (priority for a training post to
male candidates who had completed their military service)
Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, C-147/08, 2011
(supplementary retirement pensions available only for married couples)
Nadežda Riežniece v. Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta dienests,
C-7/12, 2013 (dismissal after taking parental leave)
Welfare and social security
ECtHR
Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08, 2011 (different retirement age for
men and women)
Bah v. the United Kingdom, No. 56328/07, 2011 (refusal of accommodation
assistance due to immigration status)
Gouri v. France (dec.), No. 41069/11, 2017 (disability benefit dependent on
place of residence)
Stummer v. Austria [GC], No. 37452/02, 2011 (work performed in prison)
CJEU
Anita Cristini v. Société nationale des chemins de fer français, Case 32/75, 1975
(refusal to grant travel passes for large families because of foreign nationality)
Elodie Giersch and Others v. État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, C-20/12, 2013
(financial aid for higher education studies granted dependent from place of residence)
Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v. Jovanna García-Nieto and
Others, C-299/14, 2016 (refusal to grant subsistence benefits during first three
months of residency in Germany)
X., C-318/13, 2014 (different level of disability allowance granted to men and
women)
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Education
ECtHR
Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 2016 (refusal of a music school to enrol a student
on the grounds of her visual disability)
Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 2011 (school fees for foreigners)
CJEU
Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, C-147/03,
2005 (university admission for holders of Austrian and foreign diplomas)
Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, Case 9/74, 1974
(educational grants)
Laurence Prinz v. Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v. Studentenwerk
Heidelberg, Joined cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, 2013 (educational grants)
Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-491/13, 2014
(refusal of entry of third-country national student)
Access to supply of goods and services, including
housing
ECtHR
Hunde v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 17931/16, 2016 (denial of shelter and
social assistance to failed asylum seeker)
Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 2005
(right to home)
Vrountou v. Cyprus, No. 33631/06, 2015 (discriminatory refusal to grant a refugee card)
ECSR
Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 90/2013,
2014 (obligation to provide accommodation to children and adult migrant)
European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless
(FEANTSA) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 86/2012, 2014 (access to
emergency assistance to adult migrants in an irregular situation)
261
Case law
CJEU
“CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [GC],
C-83/14, 2015 (placement of electricity meters in Roma-populated district)
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], C-571/10, 2012 (refusal of housing benefits to
third-country nationals)
Access to justice
ECtHR
Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, No. 45413/07, 2009 (restricted legal aid to irregular
migrants)
Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 2005
(applicants’ living conditions)
Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, No. 37193/07, 2010 (refusal to suspend
enforcement of penalty on ground of applicant’s Roma origin)
Right for respect of private and family life
ECtHR
A.H. and Others v. Russia, Nos. 6033/13 and 22 other applications, 2017
(adoption of Russian children by US nationals)
Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, No. 32407/13, 2017
(restricted contact with his son due to applicant’s disability)
Pajić v. Croatia, No. 68453/13, 2016 (refusal to grant residence permit to
homosexual partner)
Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 2013
(no civil unions for same-sex couples)
X and Others v. Austria [GC], No. 19010/07, 2013 (adoption of a partner’s child
by a homosexual person)
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Handbook on European non-discrimination law
CJEU
Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto
savivaldybės administracija and Others, C-391/09, 2011 (rules governing
spelling of surnames in official national language)
Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA, C-104/09, 2010
(refusal to grant a leave for a father because his child’s mother was
self-employed)
Political participation
ECtHR
Partei Die Friesen v. Germany, No. 65480/10, 2016 (electoral thresholds)
Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 41939/07, 2016 (inability to stand for
election for the presidency on account of place of residence)
Criminal law matters
ECtHR
D.G. v. Ireland, No. 39474/98, 2002; ECtHR, Bouamar v. Belgium, No. 9106/80,
1988 (detention of minors)
Martzaklis and Others v. Greece, No. 20378/13, 2015 (conditions of detention
of HIV-positive persons)
Stasi v. France, No. 25001/07, 2011 (ill-treated in prison due to applicant’s
homosexuality)
CJEU
Aleksei Petruhhin v. Latvijas Republikas Ģenerālprokuratūra [GC], C-182/15,
2016 (extradition to a third state of an EU citizen exercising freedom of
movement)
Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued
against João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge [GC], C-42/11, 2012 (non-execution of
arrest warrants)
263
Case law
Sex
ECtHR
Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08, 2011 (different pensionable age for
men and women)
Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, No. 61960/08, 2014 (dismissal of a women from the
post of security officer)
Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], No. 30078/06, 2012 (restriction of parental
leave for male military personnel)
Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, No. 29865/96, 2004 (transmission of parents’ surnames
to their children)
CJEU
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil des
ministres [GC], C-236/09, 2011 (sex-specific risk factors in insurance contracts)
C. D. v. S. T. [GC], C-167/12, 2014 (refusal of maternity leave to a mother
through surrogacy)
Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienneSabena,
C-43/75, 1976 (lower salaries for female workers)
Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and
Department of Finance, C-243/95, 1998 (job-sharing scheme indirectly
disadvantaging women)
Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon
Dikaiomaton, C-222/14, 2015 (right to take parental leave for a man whose
wife is unemployed)
M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging
voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and Others,
C-343/92, 1994 (incapacity benefit indirectly discriminating women)
Margaret Kenny and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
Minister for Finance and Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, C-427/11, 2013
(lower salaries for female workers)
Z. v. A Government department and The Board of Management of a Community School
[GC], C-363/12, 2014 (refusal of maternity leave to a mother through surrogacy)
264
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Gender identity
ECtHR
Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], No. 37359/09, 2014 (refusal to change the applicant’s
male identity number to a female one following her gender reassignment
surgery, unless her marriage was transformed into a civil partnership)
Van Kück v. Germany, No. 35968/97, 2003 (reimbursement of the costs of
gender reassignment surgery and hormone treatment)
Y.Y. v. Turkey, No. 14793/08, 2015 (refusal to grant permission to gender
reassignment surgery)
CJEU
K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency et Secretary of State for
Health, C-117/01, 2004 (law excluding transsexuals from widower’s pension)
Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, C-423/04,
2006 (lack of legal recognition of new gender after gender reassignment surgery)
Sexual orientation
ECtHR
E.B. and Others v. Austria, Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07 and
48779/07, 2013 (maintaining of criminal record entries after finding that the
criminal provision violated the Constitution and the Convention)
E.B. v. France [GC], No. 43546/02, 2008 (discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the context of adoption)
Karner v. Austria, No. 40016/98, 2003 (discrimination of homosexual couples
in the context of tenancy rights)
O.M. v. Hungary, No. 9912/15, 2016 (detention of a gay asylum seeker)
S.L. v. Austria, No. 45330/99, 2003 (criminalisation of consensual sexual
relations between men)
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 2010 (right to marry for same sex couples)
Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, 2016 (refusal to grant residence
permit to a same-sex couple)
265
Case law
ECSR
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v.
Croatia, Collective Complaint No. 45/2007, 2009 (use of homophobic language
in school materials)
CJEU
A and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie [GC], Joined cases
C-148/13 to C-150/13, 2014 (sexual orientation of asylum seekers)
Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării, C-81/12,
2013 (discriminatory comments made by a patron of a football club)
Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des
femmes and Etablissement français du sang, C-528/13, 2015 (permanent ban
from giving blood for homosexual men)
Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X and Y and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie
en Asiel, Joined cases C-199/12, C-200/12, C-201/12, 2013 (sexual orientation of
asylum seekers)
Disability
ECtHR
Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04, 2009 (the applicant was turned down for
military service due to disability, but was nevertheless obliged to pay taxes
for not performing military service)
Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 2016 (refusal to grant tax exemption on the
purchase of a new property adapted to the needs of the applicant’s child with
severe disabilities)
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, 2002 (right to die)
Price v. the United Kingdom, No. 33394/96, 2001 (detention of a person with
physical disabilities in a cell that was not adapted for her needs)
ECSR
European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France, Complaint No. 81/2012, 2013
(education of children with autism)
266
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
CJEU
Fag og Arbejde (FOA) v. Kommunernes Landsforening (KL), C-354/13, 2014
(obesity as a disability)
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab
and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, Joined cases
C-335/11 and C-337/11, 2013 (dismissal from work, notion of ‘disability’)
Z. v. A Government department and the Board of Management of
a Community School [GC], C-363/12, 2014 (refusal of maternity leave
to mother through surrogacy, notion of ‘disability’)
Age
ECtHR
Bouamar v. Belgium, No. 9106/80, 1988 (detention of minors)
D.G. v. Ireland, No. 39474/98, 2002 (detention of minors)
Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, No. 25762/07, 2010 (refusal of the application to
adopt a child on the ground of age)
T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24724/94, 1999 (criminal proceedings
against minors)
V.v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24888/94, 1999 (criminal proceedings
against minors)
ECSR
Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway, Complaint No. 74/2011, 2013
(dismissal by an employer based on the reaching of a certain age)
CJEU
Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten Eigil
Rasmussen [GC], C-441/14, 2016 (severance allowance to workers entitled to
an old age pension)
Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de Policía y Emergencias [GC],
C-258/15, 2016 (age limit for recruitment as a police officer)
267
Case law
J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, C-548/15, 2016 (right to deduct
in full from their taxable income the costs of vocational training only for
persons under the age of 30)
Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, C-416/13, 2014
(age limit for recruitment as a police officer)
Thomas Specht and Others v. Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Joined cases C-501/12 to C-506/12, C-540/12 and C-541/12, 2014 (level of pay
for civil servants determined by reference to age at the time of recruitment)
Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [GC], C-144/04, 2005 (national legislation
authorising fixed-term contracts with older workers)
Race, ethnicity, colour and membership of
a national minority
ECtHR
Biao v. Denmark [GC], No. 38590/10, 2016 (refusal to grant the Ghanaian wife
of a Danish national family reunion in Denmark)
Boacă and Others v. Romania, No. 40355/11, 2016 (lack of an investigation into
a complaint of discrimination)
Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06,
2009 (right of minorities to stand in elections)
ECSR
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Ireland, Complaint No. 100/2013, 2015
(failure to provide sufficient accommodation for Travellers)
CJEU
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, C-54/07, 2008 (discriminatory public statement made by an employer)
“CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia
[GC], C-83/14, 2015 (placing of electricity meters at inaccessible height in
a predominantly Roma-populated district)
268
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Nationality or national origin
ECtHR
Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, No. 45413/07, 2009 (restriction of legal aid to
irregular migrants)
Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], No. 55707/00, 2009 (refusal to grant the applicant
a retirement pension in respect of her years of employment in the former
Soviet Union prior to 1991, on the ground that she did not have Latvian
citizenship)
C. v. Belgium, No. 21794/93, 1996 (deportation of foreigners convicted of
criminal offences)
Dhahbi v. Italy, No. 17120/09, 2014 (third-country nationals treated less
favourably than EU workers under Italian family allowance scheme)
Koua Poirrez v. France, No. 40892/98, 2003 (application for a disability
allowance refused on the grounds that the applicant did not have French
nationality or the nationality of a state having signed a reciprocity agreement
with France)
Moustaquim v. Belgium, No. 12313/86, 1991 (deportation of foreigners
convicted of criminal offences)
Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 2011 (right to secondary education for
foreigners)
Rangelov v. Germany, No. 5123/07, 2012 (refused access to a therapeutic
programme for a foreigner)
Zeïbek v. Greece, No. 46368/06, 2009 (refusal to grant the applicant a pension
payable for life as the mother of a large family because of the nationality of
the one of her children)
CJEU
Alfredo Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado [GC], C-165/14, 2016
(applicant, who was a national of a third country, while his child was an EU
citizen, was denied a residence permit)
European Commission v. Hungary, C-392/15, 2017 (exclusion of nationals from
other Member States from profession of notary)
269
Case law
European Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, C-508/10, 2012
(charges to be paid by non-EU citizens for the issuing of residence permits)
Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public, Case 186/87, 1989 (state compensation for
victims of assault)
Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, C-200/02, 2004 (right of a minor-EU citizen to reside in the
EU with his or her third-country national parents)
Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, C-281/98, 2000
(employer requiring those applying to take part in a recruitment competition
to obtain a certificate of bilingualism issued by a local authority)
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC], C-571/10, 2012 (refusal of housing benefits to
third-country nationals)
Religion or belief
ECtHR
Alujer Fernandez and Caballero García v. Spain (dec.), No. 53072/99, 2001
(Impossibility for members of the Baptist Church to allocate part of their
income tax directly to the financial support of their own church)
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], No. 27417/95, 2000
(refusal of a permit to conduct ritual slaughter of animals)
Ebrahimian v. France, No. 64846/11, 2015 (not renewing a contract for wearing
an Islamic headscarf)
Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10,
51671/10 and 36516/10, 2013 (religious discrimination at work)
İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], No. 62649/10, 2016
(refusal to provide a public service to followers of the Alevi faith)
Milanović v. Serbia, No. 44614/07, 2010 (lack of investigation by
the authorities into motives of the crime)
O’Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom, No. 34848/07, 2010
(provisions requiring foreigners, except those wishing to marry in the Church
of England, to pay large fees to obtain the permission to marry)
270
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 2014 (provisions forbidding covering face in public)
Vojnity v. Hungary, No. 29617/07, 2013 (removal of applicant’s access rights on
account of his attempts to transmit his religious beliefs to his child)
CJEU
Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v.
Micropole SA [GC], C-188/15, 2017 (dismissal for wearing an Islamic headscarf)
Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV [GC], C-157/15, 2017 (dismissal
for wearing an Islamic headscarf)
Language
ECtHR
Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages
in education in Belgium’ v. Belgium, No. 1474/62 and others, 1968
(the applicants’ children were denied access to an education in French)
Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.), application No. 12209/10, 2015
(refusal of an application for a change of the applicant’s surname on the grounds
that the Swiss pronunciation of the name had an offensive meaning in her mother
tongue)
CJEU
European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, C-317/14, 2015 (linguistic
requirements for candidates applying for posts in the local services
established in the French-speaking or German-speaking regions in Belgium)
Social origin, birth and property
ECtHR
Chassagnou and Others. v. France [GC], No. 25088/94, 28331/95 and
28443/95, 1999 (obligation to transfer public hunting rights over the land
applied only to smaller landowners)
Wolter and Safret v. Germany, Nos. 59752/13 66277/13, 23/03/2017, 2017
(discrimination of children born outside of marriage)
271
Case law
CJEU
Zoi Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, C-149/10, 2010 (one period of parental
leave for twins)
Political or other opinion
ECtHR
Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, No. 47335/06, 2012 (dismissal on the grounds
of the political involvement of the applicant)
Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2012 (ill treatment on account of political
opinion)
Other status
ECtHR
Varnas v. Lithuania, No. 42615/06, 2013 (refused to grant a permission to
receive conjugal visits during his pre-trial detention)
ECSR
Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy, Complaint No. 102/2013, 2016
(differences in access to social security scheme for tenured and lay judges)
CJEU
Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia
i sledprivatizatsionen kontrol, C-406/15, 2017 (differences in protection in the
event of dismissal conferred on employees and civil servants)
Sharing of the burden of proof
ECtHR
Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 2005
(applicant of Chechen origin not permitted to pass through a checkpoint)
Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2012
(ill treatment on account of political opinion)
272
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
CJEU
Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării, C-81/12,
2013 (discriminatory comments made by a patron of a football club)
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, C-54/07, 2008 (discriminatory public statement by an employer)
Galina Meister v. Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, C-415/10, 2012
(access to information on conclusion of recruitment process)
Patrick Kelly v. National University of Ireland (University College, Dublin),
C-104/10, 2011 (access to information about the qualifications of the other
applicants because of suspicion of discrimination)
Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, C-381/99,
2001 (lower salaries for female workers)
Circumstances irrelevant for the finding of
discrimination
ECtHR
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 2007 (placement of
Roma children in special schools)
CJEU
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn
NV, C-54/07, 2008 (discriminatory public statement made by an employer)
Nils-Johannes Kratzer v. R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG, C-423/15, 2016 (job
applicant does not seek the job, but the status of applicant in order to claim for
compensation)
273
Case law
Role of statistics and other data
ECtHR
Abdu v. Bulgaria, No. 26827/08, 2014 (lack of effective investigation into racist
violence)
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00, 2007 (placement of
Roma children in special schools)
Di Trizio v. Switzerland, No. 7186/09, 2016 (disability benefits of disadvantaged
women)
Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 2009 (domestic violence)
CJEU
Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia Becker v. Land Hessen,
Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02, 2003 (difference in payable pensions between
part-time and full-time workers)
Lourdes Cachaldora Fernández v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social
(INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS) [GC], C-527/13, 2015
(invalidity pension calculated on the basis of a period of eight years prior to
the occurrence of the event giving rise to the invalidity)
Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith
and Laura Perez, C-167/97, 1999 (protection against dismissal to workers
being employed for longer than two years continuously with the particular
employer)
274
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Enforcement of non-discrimination law
ECtHR
García Mateos v. Spain, No. 38285/09, 2013 (enforcement of judgment finding
sex-based discrimination)
Hulea v. Romania, No. 33411/05, 2012 (no compensation for discrimination)
Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, No. 50421/08, 2015 (failure to enforce a ECHR
judgment finding discrimination)
CJEU
Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
C-81/12, 2013 (discriminatory comments made by a patron of a football club)
María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v. Securitas Seguridad España SA,
C-407/14, 2015 (the award of punitive damages to claimant following
her discriminatory dismissal)
275
Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
A and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie [GC],
Joined cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, 2 December 2014.............................156, 178
Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v. Antonino Bordonaro, C-143/16, 19 July 2017......104
Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh & Co. v.
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen; Diamalt AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe,
Joined cases 117-76 and 16-77, 19 October 1977 .................................................35
Aleksei Petruhhin v. Latvijas Republikas Ģenerālprokuratūra [GC],
C-182/15, 6 September 2016 .......................................................................112, 153
Alfredo Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado [GC], C-165/14,
13 September 2016.............................................................................. 146, 158, 204
Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence,
C-273/97, 26 October 1999................................................................................... 101
Anita Cristini v. Société nationale des chemins de fer français, 32/75,
30 September 1975 ....................................................................................... 110, 123
Anita Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational
Educational Committee, 379/87, 28 November 1989 .......................................218
Annunziata Matteucci v. Communauté française of Belgium and
Commissariat général aux relations internationales of the Communauté
française of Belgium, C-235/87, 27 September 1988 .......................................125
Anton Las v. PSA Antwerp NV [GC], C-202/11, 16 April 2013...................................218
Arthur Burton v. British Railways Board, C-19/81, 16 February 1982...................... 115
Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme
(ADDH) v. Micropole SA [GC], C-188/15, 14 March 2017........... 91, 100, 159, 215
Index
276
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Asociaţia Accept v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării,
C-81/12, 25 April 2013................. 44, 109, 114, 156, 177, 229, 230, 238, 240, 249
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others
v. Conseil des ministres [GC], C-236/09, 1 March 2011 ........................ 15, 36, 163
B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms
v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, C-157/99, 12 July 2001 ...................134
Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber Von Hartz, 170/84, 13 May 1986............... 95
Birgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge
GmbH [GC], C-427/06, 23 September 2008.........................................................37
Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform [GC], C-127/08, 25 July 2008...................................146
C. D. v. S. T. [GC], C-167/12, 18 March 2014 ............................................... 155, 165, 185
C., C-122/15, 2 June 2016...................................................................................... 109, 117
Carina Skareby v. European Commission, F-42/10, Civil Service
Tribunal, 16 May 2012............................................................................................ 65
Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., C-32/93, 14 July 1994............47, 165
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma
Feryn NV, C-54/07, 10 July 2008..... 44, 114, 158, 196, 229, 231, 237, 240, 241, 249
“CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria” AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia
[GC], C-83/14, 16 July 2015...................... 40, 58, 94, 111, 133, 158, 196, 198, 237
Colin Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main [GC], C-229/08, 12 January 2010 ................ 98
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 248/83, 21 May 1985 ...................................................................... 98
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic,
318/86, 30 June 1988............................................................................................. 99
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic,
C-35/97, 24 September 1998................................................................................124
Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria,
C-147/03, 7 July 2005.....................................................................................110, 130
CQ v. European Parliament, F-12/13, Civil service Tribunal, 17 September 2014 ...... 65
Criminal proceedings against Gilbert Even and Office national des pensions
pour travailleurs salariés (ONPTS), 207/78, 31 May 1979................................124
Criminal proceedings against Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 137/84, 11 May 1985 ..... 125
Daniel Unland v. Land Berlin, C-20/13, 9 September 2015.......................................194
Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten
Eigil Rasmussen [GC], C-441/14, 19 April 2016..................................157, 192, 193
David Hütter v. Technische Universität Graz, C-88/08, 18 June 2009 ....................105
277
Index
David L. Parris v. Trinity College Dublin and Others, C-443/15,
24 November 2016 ............................................................................................... 40, 63
Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing
Services, trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for
Education and Employment, C-256/01, 13 January 2004 ............................ 39, 46
Domnica Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe [GC], C-341/08, 12 January 2010............................................. 97
Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, 9/74, 3 July 1974...........110, 130
Douglas Harvey Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group,
C-262/88, 17 May 1990 ........................................................................................ 116
Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of
State for Health, C-127/92, 27 October 1993 .................................................... 243
Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, C-450/93, 17 October 1995..... 41, 74, 75
Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Limited, 12/81, 9 February 1982 .......... 116
Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, C-177/88, 8 November 1990 ..............47, 165
Elodie Giersch and Others v. État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg,
C-20/12, 20 June 2013...................................................................................110, 124
Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, 29/69, 12 November 1969.............................................21
European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany [GC],
C-54/08, 24 May 2011..........................................................................................204
European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany,
C-206/10, 5 May 2011 ...........................................................................................125
European Commission v. French Republic [GC], C-50/08, 24 May 2011................204
European Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [GC],
C-51/08, 24 May 2011 ..........................................................................................204
European Commission v. Hungary, C-286/12, 6 November 2012 .......................... 108
European Commission v. Hungary, C-392/15, 1 February 2017 ......................158, 204
European Commission v. Italian Republic, C-312/11, 4 July 2013 ................ 26, 77, 182
European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, C-317/14,
5 February 2015..................................................................................... 113, 159, 218
European Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands,
C-508/10, 26 April 2012...............................................................................158, 205
European Commission v. Republic of Austria [GC], C-53/08, 24 May 2011...........204
European Commission v. Republic of Austria, C-75/11, 4 October 2012 .................123
Fag og Arbejde (FOA) v. Kommunernes Landsforening (KL),
C-354/13, 18 December 2014....................................................................... 157, 185
278
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA [GC], C-411/05,
16 October 2007 .................................................................................................... 115
Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 283/83, 13 November 1984 .......................35
Francesco Reina and Letizia Reina v. Landeskreditbank BadenWürttemberg, 65/81, 14 January 1982................................................................125
Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège, 293/83, 13 February 1985.................................. 118
Franz Lesar v. Beim Vorstand der Telekom Austria AG eingerichtetes
Personalamt, C-159/15, 16 June 2016..................................................................105
Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime et des
Deux-Sèvres, C-267/12, 12 December 2013 .................... 39, 46, 58, 109, 117, 178
Gabriele Habermann-Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband
Ndb./Opf. e.V., C-421/92, 5 May 1994 ................................................................165
Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne
Sabena, 149/77, 5 June 1978 ..................................................................................21
Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne
Sabena, 43/75, 8 April 1976.........................................................................155, 162
Galina Meister v. Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, C-415/10,
19 April 2012 ......................................................................................... 113, 229, 235
Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des
Droits des femmes and Etablissement français du sang,
C-528/13, 29 April 2015 ................................................................................156, 177
Georg Felber v. Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur,
C-529/13, 21 January 2015............................................................................106, 161
Gerhard Fuchs and Peter Köhler v. Land Hessen, Joined cases
C-159/10 and C-160/10, 21 July 2011 ...................................................................104
Gisela Rosenbladt v. Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges.mbH [GC],
C-45/09, 12 October 2010.....................................................................................107
Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de Policía
y Emergencias [GC], C-258/15, 15 November 2016............................98, 157, 195
H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij,
C-476/99, 19 March 2002..................................................................................... 115
Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, C-179/88, 8 November 1990.........................................165
Helga Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, C-184/89, 7 February 1991 ...... 57, 242
Hellen Gerster v. Freistaat Bayern, C-1/95, 2 October 1997 ................................... 244
Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-409/95,
11 November 1997.......................................................................................41, 74, 75
279
Index
Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Silvia Becker v. Land
Hessen, Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02, 23 October 2003........... 95, 230, 243
HK Danmark acting on behalf of Glennie Kristensen v. Experian A/S,
C-476/11, 26 September 2013..............................................................................105
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk almennyttigt
Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone
Skouboe Werge v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting
on behalf of Pro Display A/S, Joined cases C-335/11 and
C-337/11, 11 April 2013.................................................................... 26, 157, 183, 184
Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public, 186/87, 2 February 1989 ................153, 158, 203
Inge Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, C-317/93,
14 December 1995...........................................................................................57, 243
Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v. Region Syddanmark [GC],
C-499/08, 12 October 2010..................................................................................193
Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v. FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung
GmbH & Co. KG, C-171/88, 13 July 1989................................................57, 116, 242
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
für Getreide und Futtermittel, 11/70, 17 December 1970...................................21
Isabel Elbal Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)
and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS),
C-385/11, 22 November 2012 .........................................................................40, 54
Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v. Tiziana Bruno and
Massimo Pettini and Daniela Lotti and Clara Matteucci,
Joined cases C-395/08 and C-396/08, 10 June 2010........................................... 17
J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission of the
European Communities, 4/73, 14 May 1974 ........................................................21
J.J. de Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, C-548/15,
10 November 2016........................................................................ 109, 118, 157, 194
Jämställdhetsombudsmannen mod Örebro läns landsting,
C-236/98, 30 March 2000 .................................................................................... 115
Jennifer Meyers v. Adjudication Officer, C-116/94, 13 July 1995.............. 109, 113, 114
Johann Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH, C-152/11, 6 December 2012..........40, 56
Julia Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, C-79/99, 7 December 2000........................... 109, 114
Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [GC], C-147/08,
10 May 2011 ...................................................................................................109, 116
K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency et Secretary of
State for Health, C-117/01, 7 January 2004.................................................156, 172
280
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist,
C-407/98, 6 July 2000................................................................................ 41, 74, 75
Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and
Department of Finance, C-243/95, 17 June 1998.......................................155, 167
Kingdom of Spain v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
[GC], C-145/04, 12 September 2006...................................................................149
Kjell Karlsson and Others, C-292/97, 13 April 2000.....................................................35
Kone Oyj and Others v. European Commission, C-510/11 P, 24 October 2013 ......... 17
Konstantinos Maïstrellis v. Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai
Anthropinon Dikaiomaton, C-222/14, 16 July 2015 ................... 115, 147, 155, 162
Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, C-200/02, 19 October 2004 .........................158, 203
Laurence Prinz v. Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v. Studentenwerk
Heidelberg, Joined cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, 18 July 2013...............110, 130
Leopold Schmitzer v. Bundesministerin für Inneres [GC], C-530/13,
11 November 2014................................................................................................ 106
Lourdes Cachaldora Fernández v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social
(INSS) and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS) [GC],
C-527/13, 14 April 2015 ............................................................................... 230, 244
Luisa Sabbatini, née Bertoni, v. European Parliament, 20/71, 7 June 1972............ 116
M. A. De Weerd, née Roks, and Others v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging
voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen
and Others, C-343/92, 24 February 1994............................................57, 166, 242
Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto
savivaldybės administracija and Others, C-391/09, 12 May 2011 ........111, 147, 220
Margaret Kenny and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform, Minister for Finance and Commissioner of An Garda
Síochána, C-427/11, 28 February 2013........................................................155, 163
Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
222/84, 15 May 1986................................................................................. 91, 97, 99
María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v. Securitas Seguridad España, SA,
C-407/14, 17 December 2015 ..................................................................... 230, 249
Maria do Céu Bragança Linares Verruga and Others v. Ministre de
l’Enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, C-238/15, 14 December 2016.......95
Maria Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, C-33/89,
27 June 1990 ................................................................................................... 57, 242
Maria Luisa Jiménez Melgar v. Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios,
C-438/99, 4 October 2001 ....................................................................................165
281
Index
Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo, C-416/13,
13 November 2014 ....................................................................91, 98, 113, 157, 195
Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, ministre de
la Justice and Caisse nationale de retraite des agents des
collectivités locales, C-173/13, 7 July 2014......................................41, 76, 95, 164
Michael Efler and Others v. European Commission, Civil Service Tribunal,
T-754/14, 10 May 2017 .........................................................................................148
Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X and Y and Z v. Minister voor
Immigratie en Asiel, Joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12,
7 November 2013 ..........................................................................................156, 178
Ministerul Justiţiei și Libertăţilor Cetăţenești v. Ştefan Agafiţei
and Others, C-310/10, 7 July 2011 ......................................................................... 62
Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-491/13,
10 September 2014 .......................................................................................110, 130
Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, C-395/15,
1 December 2016................................................................................... 26, 182, 186
Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v. Standesamt der Stadt
Karlsruhe and Zentraler Juristischer Dienst der Stadt Karlsruhe,
C-438/14, 2 June 2016...........................................................................................147
Nadežda Riežniece v. Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta
dienests, C-7/12, 20 June 2013..................................................................... 109, 115
Nils-Johannes Kratzer v. R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG, C-423/15,
28 July 2016................................................................................................... 229, 241
North Western Health Board v. Margaret McKenna, C-191/03,
8 September 2005...................................................................................................47
O. Tümer v. Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut
werknemersverzekeringen, C-311/13, 5 November 2014...............................204
ÖBB Personenverkehr AG v. Gotthard Starjakob, C-417/13, 28 January 2015....... 106
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten
v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich [GC], C-220/02, 8 June 2004...................... 116
P v. S and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94, 30 April 1996........................ 39, 45, 172
Patrick Kelly v. National University of Ireland (University College,
Dublin), C-104/10, 21 July 2011....................................................................229, 234
Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA,
C-104/09, 30 September 2010.................................................................... 111, 147
Petya Milkova v. Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia
i sledprivatizatsionen kontrol, C-406/15, 9 March 2017 ........26, 62, 160, 182, 227
282
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Philip Morris Brands SARL and Others v. Secretary of State for Health,
C-547/14, 4 May 2016...........................................................................................149
Proceedings brought by Mircea Florian Freitag, C-541/15, 8 June 2017.................147
Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant
issued against João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge [GC], C-42/11,
5 September 2012 .........................................................................................112, 153
Q v. Commission of the European Communities, Civil Service Tribunal,
F-52/05, 9 December 2008................................................................................... 65
Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, C-158/96, 28 April 1998 ...........134
Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole SeymourSmith and Laura Perez, C-167/97, 9 February 1999 ................................ 230, 244
Reinhard Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG [GC],
C-447/09, 13 September 2011 ........................................................................97, 107
Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, C-281/98,
6 June 2000...................................................................................................158, 203
S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [GC], C-303/06,
17 July 2008...........................................................................................39, 51, 62, 65
Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [GC],
C-506/06, 26 February 2008 .................................................................................47
Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
C-14/83, 9 April 1984 ...........................................................................................249
Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV [GC], C-157/15,
14 March 2017................................................................................................159, 215
Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, C-423/04, 27 April 2006 ................................................ 39, 50, 156, 173
Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [GC], C-555/07,
19 January 2010 ...............................................................................................16, 193
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della
Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others [GC],
C-571/10, 24 April 2012.................................................... 15, 37, 111, 135, 158, 204
Silke-Karin Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
C-207/98, 3 February 2000 .............................................................................91, 99
Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [GC], C-13/05,
11 July 2006 ............................................................................................62, 182, 226
Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen
Postsparkasse AG, C-381/99, 26 June 2001 ..................................... 229, 234, 237
283
Index
Susanne Lewen v. Lothar Denda, C-333/97, 21 October 1999 ................................. 116
Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen
Bühnen [GC], C-267/06, 1 April 2008 ........................................ 39, 50, 54, 58, 178
Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-285/98,
11 January 2000 ...............................................................................................91, 101
The Queen, on the application of The Incorporated Trustees of the
National Council for Ageing (Age Concern England) v. Secretary
of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform,
C-388/07, 5 March 2009 .............................................................................. 104, 108
Thierry Delvigne v. Commune de Lesparre Médoc and Préfet
de la Gironde [GC], C-650/13, 6 October 2015 ..................................................149
Thomas Specht and Others v. Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Joined cases C-501/12 to C-506/12, C-540/12
and C-541/12, 19 June 2014..................................................................104, 157, 194
Torsten Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande AB, C-141/11, 5 July 2012 ...................... 106
Ulf Kazimierz Radziejewski v. Kronofogdemyndigheten i Stockholm,
C-461/11, 8 November 2012.................................................................................218
Ute Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH, C-354/16, 13 July 2017 ................................... 91, 104
V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ
Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, C-385/99,
13 May 2003 .............................................................................................................. 134
Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v. Tehnicheski universitet – Sofia, filial Plovdiv,
Joined cases C-250/09 and C-268/09, 18 November 2010 ..............................104
Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v. Jovanna
García-Nieto and Others, C-299/14, 25 February 2016 ............................ 110, 123
Vincent Blaizot v. University of Liège and Others, 24/86,
2 February 1988..................................................................................................... 118
Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [GC], C-144/04, 22 November 2005......... 157, 192
Wiebke Busch v. Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG,
C-320/01, 27 February 2003.................................................................................165
Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, C-356/12,
22 May 2014 ..........................................................................26, 35, 39, 45, 95, 182
X., C-318/13, 3 September 2014...........................................................................110, 122
Z. v. A Government department and The Board of Management of
a Community School [GC], C-363/12, 18 March 2014.....26, 155, 157, 165, 182, 185
Zoi Chatzi v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, C-149/10, 16 September 2010............. 160, 216
284
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Case law of the European Court of Human Rights
97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses
and 4 Others v. Georgia, No. 71156/01, 3 May 2007 ......................................... 86
A.H. and Others v. Russia, No. 6033/13 and 15 other applications,
17 January 2017.................................................................................. 30, 31, 111, 143
Abdu v. Bulgaria, No. 26827/08, 11 March 2014........................................83, 230, 246
Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011......... 27
Alujer Fernandez and Caballero García v. Spain (dec.),
No. 53072/99, 14 June 2001.........................................................................159, 210
Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, No. 45413/07, 10 March 2009 ............ 111, 140, 158, 206
Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], No. 55707/00, 18 February 2009.............32, 125, 158, 208
Andrle v. the Czech Republic, No. 6268/08,
17 February 2011................................................................... 108, 110, 125, 155, 169
B.S. v. Spain, No. 47159/08, 24 July 2012 .............................................................. 40, 61
Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 1543/06, 3 May 2007 ..........................68, 150
Bah v. the United Kingdom, No. 56328/07, 27 September 2011 .....................110, 128
Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], No. 53080/13, 13 December 2016 ..........................125
Biao v. Denmark, No. 38590/10 [GC], 24 May 2016............. 17, 43, 53, 158, 200, 224
Bigaeva v. Greece, No. 26713/05, 28 May 2009.......................................................120
Boacă and Others v. Romania, No. 40355/11, 12 January 2016..............158, 152, 199
Bouamar v. Belgium, No. 9106/80, 29 February 1988 ..................... 112, 152, 157, 191
Buckley v. the United Kingdom, No. 20348/92, 25 September 1996.....................136
Bulgakov v. Ukraine, No. 59894/00, 11 September 2007........................................220
Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008....... 39, 43, 48, 93
C. v. Belgium, No. 21794/93, 7 August 1996.....................................................158, 207
Çam v. Turkey, No. 51500/08, 23 February 2016 ..........................41, 78, 110, 131, 184
Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 7511/76
and 7743/76, 25 February 1982 ..........................................................................213
Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 42184/05,
16 March 2010.......................................................................................... 43, 48, 224
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, No. 17484/15, 25 July 2017 ......... 40, 61
Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages
in education in Belgium’ v. Belgium, Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62,
1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64, 23 July 1968............................159, 219
285
Index
Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], Nos.
43370/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05, 19 October 2012.........................40, 68, 220
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], No. 27417/95, 27 June 2000........159, 210
Chassagnou and Others. v. France [GC], Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95
and 28443/95, 29 April 1999...................................................................... 160, 217
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 28957/95, 11 July 2002 ........173
Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, No. 18147/02, 5 April 2007 ...................213
Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, No. 77/07, 7 January 2014.......................................... 141, 170
D.G. v. Ireland, No. 39474/98, 16 May 2002....................................... 112, 152, 157, 191
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], No. 57325/00,
13 November 2007......40, 43, 53, 55, 57, 131, 229, 230, 233, 237, 240, 245, 247
Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, No. 67336/01, 30 July 2009...............109, 120, 224
Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, 16 June 2015 .......................................... 41, 88
Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], No. 34503/97, 12 November 2008 .................120
Dhahbi v. Italy, No. 17120/09, 8 April 2014 .......................................................158, 206
Di Trizio v. Switzerland, No. 7186/09, 2 February 2016 .....................57, 169, 230, 245
Đorđević v. Croatia, No. 41526/10, 24 July 2012............................................ 40, 68, 85
Durisotto v. Italy, No. 62804/13, 6 May 2014............................................................127
E.B. and Others v. Austria, Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07,
48777/07 and 48779/07, 7 November 2013 ..................................... 153, 156, 179
E.B. v. France [GC], No. 43546/02, 22 January 2008 ................................141, 156, 179
Ebrahimian v. France, No. 64846/11, 26 November 2015................................159, 214
Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, No. 61960/08, 2 December 2014............................... 155, 168
Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71,
5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72, 8 June 1976................................................... 224
Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, No. 3564/11, 28 May 2013............................... 84
Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10,
51671/10 and 36516/10, 15 January 2013...................................................159, 212
Fábián v. Hungary [GC], No. 78117/13, 5 September 2017 .......................................126
Fábián v. Hungary, No. 78117/13, 15 December 2015............................................... 225
Fabris v. France [GC], No. 16574/08, 7 February 2013..............................................217
Fawsie v. Greece, No. 40080/07, 28 October 2010..................................................206
Fretté v. France, No. 36515/97, 26 February 2002 ....................................................178
García Mateos v. Spain, No. 38285/09, 19 February 2013.............................. 230, 250
286
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Gas and Dubois v. France, No. 25951/07, 15 March 2012 .........................................142
Gaygusuz v. Austria, No. 17371/90, 16 September 1996................................... 32, 125
Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04, 30 April 2009 .............................................157, 186
Gouri v. France (dec.), No. 41069/11, 28 February 2017...................................110, 128
Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (No. 2),
No. 26740/02, 31 May 2007................................................................................ 224
Guberina v. Croatia, No. 23682/13, 22 March 2016 ........................39, 51, 93, 157, 187
Halime Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 63034/11, 28 June 2016 ..................................... 41, 85, 167
Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], No. 37359/09, 16 July 2014..................................156, 174
Handyside v. the United Kingdom, No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976......................222
Harroudj v. France, No. 43631/09, 04 October 2012 .................................................. 25
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], No. 30985/96, 26 October 2000...................213
Herrmann v. Germany [GC], No. 9300/07, 26 June 2012..........................................217
Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 58641/00, 6 January 2005.................. 242
Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, 29 January 2013..............41, 78, 131, 184
Hulea v. Romania, No. 33411/05, 2 October 2012 ........................................... 230, 250
Hunde v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 17931/16, 5 July 2016.............................111, 137
I.B. v. Greece, No. 552/10, 3 October 2013........................................................ 109, 120
Identoba and Others v. Georgia, No. 73235/12, 12 May 2015 ............ 41, 83, 150, 173
İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], No. 62649/10,
26 April 2016.......................................................................................... 159, 211, 213
K.H. and Others v. Slovakia, No. 32881/04, 28 April 2009.......................................127
Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, No. 32407/13, 10 January 2017.......................111, 145
Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, No. 30587/13, 24 February 2015 ......................................... 87
Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], Nos. 42461/13 and
44357/13, 17 May 2016......................................................................................... 151
Karner v. Austria, No. 40016/98, 24 July 2003 ................................................. 156, 180
Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 30206/04, 37038/04, 43681/04,
45376/04, 12881/05, 28697/05, 32797/05 and 45609/05,
2 February 2010....................................................................................................220
Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], Nos. 60367/08 and
961/11, 24 January 2017 ............................................................ 15, 25, 31, 152, 169
Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], No. 30078/06, 22 March 2012 ..........155, 167, 168
Koua Poirrez v. France, No. 40892/98, 30 September 2003 ...........32, 125, 158, 209
Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012.............................. 78
287
Index
Kurski v. Poland, No. 26115/10, 05 July 2016.............................................................222
Kurtulmuş v. Turkey (dec.), No. 65500/01, 24 January 2006 ...................................214
Lavida and Others v. Greece, No. 7973/10, 30 May 2013 ........................................ 131
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005 ..............................214
Loizidou v. Turkey [GC], No. 15318/89, 18 December 1996....................................... 27
M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, No. 12060/12, 12 April 2016..............................82, 83, 152
M.G. v. Turkey, No. 646/10, 22 March 2016........................................................ 85, 167
M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.), No. 25239/13, 20 October 2015 ....................... 41, 87
Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 12209/10,
15 September 2015....................................................................................... 159, 220
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary,
No. 22947/13, 2 February 2016 ............................................................................ 88
Martzaklis and Others v. Greece, No. 20378/13, 9 July 2015...........................112, 152
Mazurek v. France, No. 34406/97, 1 February 2000 ........................................ 142, 217
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova,
No. 45701/99, 13 December 2001 .......................................................................213
Milanović v. Serbia, No. 44614/07, 14 December 2010..................................... 159, 211
Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Nos. 41138/98 and
64320/01, 12 July 2005......................................................................... 111, 136, 140
Moustaquim v. Belgium, No. 12313/86, 18 February 1991 ..............................158, 207
Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], No. 11138/10,
23 February 2016.................................................................................................... 27
Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, No. 49151/07, 8 December 2009 ............................................144
Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], No. 10511/10, 26 April 2016.................................127
N. B. v. Slovakia, No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012............................................................. 60
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and
43579/98, 6 July 2005 ....................................................................25, 84, 233, 236
Novruk and Others v. Russia, Nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12,
14618/13 and 13817/14, 15 March 2016.................................................... 224, 225
Nunez v. Norway, No. 55597/09, 28 June 2011......................................................... 207
O.M. v. Hungary, No. 9912/15, 5 July 2016.........................................................156, 181
O’Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom, No. 34848/07,
14 December 2010......................................................................................... 159, 211
Oliari and Others v. Italy, Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015.....................145
Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009...............................84, 152, 167, 230, 246
288
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Oran v. Turkey, Nos. 28881/07 and 37920/07, 15 April 2014..................................222
Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], No. 15766/03, 16 March 2010 ............. 78, 131, 247
Pajić v. Croatia, No. 68453/13, 23 February 2016...............................................111, 143
Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, No. 37193/07, 25 March 2010...................... 111, 140
Partei Die Friesen v. Germany, No. 65480/10, 28 January 2016.....................112, 150
Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v. Turkey,
Nos. 3840/10, 3870/10, 3878/10, 15616/10, 21919/10,
39118/10 and 37272/10, 12 January 2016.......................................................... 151
Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], No. 27510/08, 15 October 2015 ........................... 41, 89
Petrov v. Bulgaria, No. 15197/02, 22 May 2008 ................................................. 47, 224
Pichkur v. Ukraine, No. 10441/06, 7 November 2013 ..................................15, 32, 224
Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 41939/07, 9 June 2016 ................... 33, 112, 150
Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, No. 5335/05, 21 June 2011....................... 110, 131, 158, 208
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002...................... 44, 157, 188
Price v. the United Kingdom, No. 33394/96, 10 July 2001................................ 157, 187
R.B. v. Hungary, No. 64602/12, 12 April 2016 ............................................................ 83
Rangelov v. Germany, No. 5123/07, 22 March 2012 ........................................158, 209
Rasmussen v. Denmark, No. 8777/79, 28 November 1984............................. 142, 146
Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, No. 47335/06, 06 November 2012...........160, 223
S.A.S. v. France [GC], No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014 ........................... 40, 61, 159, 213, 214
S.L. v. Austria, No. 45330/99, 9 January 2003........................................... 153, 156, 179
Sahin v. Germany [GC], No. 30943/96, 8 July 2003................................................. 224
Saidoun v. Greece, No. 40083/07, 28 October 2010 ................................................206
Savez crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia,
No. 7798/08, 9 December 2010......................................................................15, 33
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010..................................156, 181
Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, No. 25762/07, 10 June 2010 ................................157, 190
Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC],
Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009..........................32, 158, 199
Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, Nos. 55480/00 and
59330/00, 27 July 2004 ................................................................................120, 251
Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, Nos. 50421/08 and 56213/08,
23 June 2015......................................................................................... 225, 230, 251
Škorjanec v. Croatia, No. 25536/14, 28 March 2017 ....................................41, 84, 199
Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, No. 28300/06, 20 January 2009..................................127
289
Index
Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 33985/96 and
33986/96, 27 September 1999 ...........................................................................136
Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], No. 31871/96, 8 July 2003 ....................... 30, 142, 224
Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, No. 70434/12, 22 March 2016.................................89, 173
Stasi v. France, No. 25001/07, 20 October 2011.................................................112, 153
Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 65731/01 and
65900/01, 12 April 2006.........................................................................................32
Stummer v. Austria [GC], No. 37452/02, 7 July 2011.................................110, 126, 128
T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24724/94, 16 December 1999.................157, 190
Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, 30 June 2016 .................... 144, 156, 180
The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia,
No. 72881/01, 5 October 2006 ............................................................................213
Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], No. 34369/97, 6 April 2000.......................................... 44
Timishev v. Russia, Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00,
13 December 2005 ...................................................................... 198, 199, 229, 233
Trabelsi v. Belgium, No. 140/10, 4 September 2014 ................................................ 207
Turan Cakir v. Belgium, No. 44256/06, 10 March 2009............................................251
Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, No. 29865/96, 16 November 2004 ...............................155, 170
V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24888/94, 16 December 1999 ............... 157, 190
V.C. v. Slovakia, No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011 ...................................................... 60
Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], Nos. 29381/09 and
32684/09, 7 November 2013....................................................................... 111, 144
Van Kück v. Germany, No. 35968/97, 12 June 2003..........................................156, 175
Varnas v. Lithuania, No. 42615/06, 09 July 2013 ........................................47, 160, 225
Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, No. 1813/07, 9 February 2012............................. 87
Virabyan v. Armenia, No. 40094/05, 2 October 2012........ 41, 83, 160, 222, 229, 235
Vojnity v. Hungary, No. 29617/07, 12 February 2013 ........................................159, 210
Vrountou v. Cyprus, No. 33631/06, 13 October 2015......................................... 111, 136
Weller v. Hungary, No. 44399/05, 31 March 2009...................................... 32, 52, 224
Wolter and Sarfert v. Germany, Nos. 59752/13 and
66277/13, 23 March 2017............................................................................ 160, 217
X and Others v. Austria [GC], No. 19010/07, 19 February 2013........................ 111, 142
Y.Y. v. Turkey, No. 14793/08, 10 March 2015......................................................156, 175
Zarb Adami v. Malta, No. 17209/02, 20 June 2006.................................................... 30
Zeïbek v. Greece, No. 46368/06, 9 July 2009...................................................158, 206
290
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Case law of the European Committee of Social Rights
Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v. Italy,
Complaint No. 102/2013, 5 July 2016..........................................49, 160, 225, 232
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Italy,
Complaint No. 58/2009, 25 June 2010................................................................201
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) v. France,
Complaint No. 50/2008, 9 September 2009 ...................................................... 54
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy,
Complaint No. 91/2013, 12 October 2015..........................39, 48, 54, 79, 121, 129
Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands,
Complaint No. 90/2013, 1 July 2014 ............................................................ 111, 138
European Action of the Disabled (AEH) v. France,
Complaint No. 81/2012, 11 September 2013................................. 40, 55, 157, 188
European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless
(FEANTSA) v. France, Complaint No. 39/2006, 5 December 2007 ......................137
European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless
(FEANTSA) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 86/2012, 2 July 2014.......... 111, 138
European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v. Czech Republic,
Complaint No. 104/2014, 17 May 2016...............................................................201
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. France, Complaint
No. 51/2008, 10 October 2010.............................................................................137
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Ireland, Complaint
No. 100/2013, 1 December 2015.................................................................158, 200
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Portugal,
Complaint No. 61/2010, 30 June 2011 .................................................................201
Fellesforbundet for Sjøfolk (FFFS) v. Norway,
Complaint No. 74/2011, 2 July 2013................................................49, 121, 157, 191
International Association Autism-Europe v. France,
Complaint No. 13/2002, 4 November 2003 .................................... 19, 54, 79, 188
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
(INTERIGHTS) v. Croatia, Complaint No. 45/2007,
30 March 2009...................................................................................... 132, 156, 182
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
(INTERIGHTS) v. Greece, Complaint No. 49/2008, 11 December 2009...........137
International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France,
Complaint No. 33/2006, 5 December 2007 .......................................................137
291
Index
International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network
(IPPF EN) v. Italy, Complaint No. 87/2012, 10 September 2013 ......................129
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) v. Bulgaria,
Complaint No. 41/2007, 3 June 2008.......................................................... 132, 232
SUD Travail Affaires Sociales, SUD ANPE and SUD Collectivité
Territoriales v. France, Complaint No. 24/2004, 8 November 2005.............. 232
The Central Association of Carers in Finland v. Finland,
Complaint No. 71/2011, 4 December 2012 .................................................... 41, 80
Case law of national courts
Austria, Austrian Constitutional Court, V 54/2014-20, 9 December 2014............. 100
Austria, Bezirksgericht Döbling, GZ 17 C 1597/05f-17, 23 January 2006.................134
Austria, Regional Administrative Court in Tirol,
LVwG-2013/23/3455-2, 14 January 2014 ...........................................................221
Austria, Supreme Court of Austria, 9 ObA 117/15, 25 May 2016.............................214
Belgium, Council of State, No. 228.752, 14 October 2014 ........................................214
Denmark, Supreme Court of Denmark, Case No. 15/2014,
6 December 2016 ..................................................................................................193
Denmark, Supreme Court, Case 28/2015, 14 December 2015................................ 243
France, Council of State Ordinance, Nos. 402742 and 402777,
26 August 2016......................................................................................................214
France, Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, Easyjet v.
Gianmartini and Others, No. 13 - 81586, 15 December 2015...........................189
France, Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, No. M 08-88.017 and
No. 2074, 7 April 2009 ..........................................................................................134
France, Court of Cassation, Social Chamber, M. Jean-François X... v.
M. Serge Y...; and Others, No. 14-19.702, 1 June 2016 ....................................... 66
France, Nîmes Court of Appeal, Lenormand v. Balenci,
No. 08/00907, 6 November 2008.......................................................................134
Germany, Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10,
27 January 2015 .....................................................................................................214
Germany, Federal Labour Court, 2 AZR 579/12, 25 April 2013 ................................103
Germany, Federal Labour Court, 8 AZR 638/14, 18 February 2016...........................57
Germany, Labour Court in Cologne, Az. 9 Ca 4843/15, 10 February 2016 ...............71
Greece, Athens Justice of Peace, Decision No. 418/2016, 23 September 2016........ 175
Hungary, Equal Treatment Authority, Case No. 72, April 2008................................134
292
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Hungary, Equal Treatment Authority, Decision No. 654/2009,
20 December 2009................................................................................................. 66
Poland, District Court in Warsaw (court of the second instance),
V Ca 3611/14, 18 November 2015..........................................................................52
Poland, Polish Supreme Court, III PK 11/16, 7 November 2016................................ 119
Romania, National Council for Combating Discrimination,
Decision 349, 4 May 2016.....................................................................................138
Sweden, Court of Appeal, Ombudsman Against Discrimination on
Grounds of Sexual Orientation v. A.S., T-3562-06, 11 February 2008 ............134
Sweden, Supreme Court, Escape Bar and Restaurant v. Ombudsman
against Ethnic Discrimination, T-2224-07, 1 October 2008 ......................134, 241
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Primary Court II Skopje,
I RO No. 618/15, 3 March 2016 ............................................................................ 119
United Kingdom, Bristol Employment Tribunal, McFarlane and another v.
easyJet Airline Company, ET/1401496/15 and ET/3401933/15,
29 September 2016................................................................................................ 70
United Kingdom, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Kelly v. Covance
Laboratories Limited, UKEAT/0186/15/LA, 20 October 2015...........................221
United Kingdom, Employment Appeal Tribunal, XC Trains Ltd v. CD & Ors,
UKEAT/0331/15/LA, 28 July 2016.......................................................................... 56
United Kingdom, the United Kingdom High Court, Amicus MSF Section, R.
(on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
EWHC 860 (Admin), 26 April 2004......................................................................103
293
CoE instruments
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950)
EU instruments
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC on the protection of
the dignity of women and men at work
Council declaration on the implementation of the Commission
Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of women and
men at work (19 December 1991)
Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security
(19 December 1978)
Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC (27 November 2000)
Equal Treatment Directive (recast) 2006/54/EC (5 July 2006)
Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC (9 February 1976)
Gender Goods and Services Directive 2004/113/EC (13 December 2004)
Gender Equality Directive (recast), 2006/54/EC (5 July 2006)
Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC (29 June 2000)
List of legal texts
294
Handbook on European non-discrimination law
Treaty Establishing the Economic Community (25 March 1957)
Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009)
International instruments
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966)
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(16 December 1966)
United Nations Convention Against Torture (9 December 1975)
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (4 January 1969)
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (18 December 1979)
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(13 December 2006)
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989)
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (10 December 1948)
295
The above case law provides the reader with comprehensive information that
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Note on citation

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